

1989

Canada and India an analysis of the political and economic relationship, 1947-88.

Christopher John. Kukucha
University of Windsor

Follow this and additional works at: <http://scholar.uwindsor.ca/etd>

Recommended Citation

Kukucha, Christopher John., "Canada and India an analysis of the political and economic relationship, 1947-88." (1989). *Electronic Theses and Dissertations*. Paper 1352.

This online database contains the full-text of PhD dissertations and Masters' theses of University of Windsor students from 1954 forward. These documents are made available for personal study and research purposes only, in accordance with the Canadian Copyright Act and the Creative Commons license—CC BY-NC-ND (Attribution, Non-Commercial, No Derivative Works). Under this license, works must always be attributed to the copyright holder (original author), cannot be used for any commercial purposes, and may not be altered. Any other use would require the permission of the copyright holder. Students may inquire about withdrawing their dissertation and/or thesis from this database. For additional inquiries, please contact the repository administrator via email (scholarship@uwindsor.ca) or by telephone at 519-253-3000ext. 3208.



National Library
of Canada

Bibliothèque nationale
du Canada

Canadian Theses Service

Service des thèses canadiennes

Ottawa, Canada
K1A 0N4

NOTICE

The quality of this microform is heavily dependent upon the quality of the original thesis submitted for microfilming. Every effort has been made to ensure the highest quality of reproduction possible.

If pages are missing, contact the university which granted the degree.

Some pages may have indistinct print especially if the original pages were typed with a poor typewriter ribbon or if the university sent us an inferior photocopy.

Reproduction in full or in part of this microform is governed by the Canadian Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-30, and subsequent amendments.

AVIS

La qualité de cette microforme dépend grandement de la qualité de la thèse soumise au microfilmage. Nous avons tout fait pour assurer une qualité supérieure de reproduction.

S'il manque des pages, veuillez communiquer avec l'université qui a conféré le grade.

La qualité d'impression de certaines pages peut laisser à désirer, surtout si les pages originales ont été dactylographiées à l'aide d'un ruban usé ou si l'université nous a fait parvenir une photocopie de qualité inférieure.

La reproduction, même partielle, de cette microforme est soumise à la Loi canadienne sur le droit d'auteur, SRC 1970, c. C-30, et ses amendements subséquents.

**CANADA AND INDIA:
AN ANALYSIS OF THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC
RELATIONSHIP, 1947-88**

by



Christopher John Kukucha

A Thesis
submitted to the
Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
through the Department of
Political Science in Partial Fulfillment
of the requirements for the Degree
of Master of Arts at
the University of Windsor

Windsor, Ontario, Canada
1989



National Library
of Canada

Bibliothèque nationale
du Canada

Canadian Theses Service Service des thèses canadiennes

Ottawa, Canada
K1A 0N4

The author has granted an irrevocable non-exclusive licence allowing the National Library of Canada to reproduce, loan, distribute or sell copies of his/her thesis by any means and in any form or format, making this thesis available to interested persons.

The author retains ownership of the copyright in his/her thesis. Neither the thesis nor substantial extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without his/her permission.

L'auteur a accordé une licence irrévocable et non exclusive permettant à la Bibliothèque nationale du Canada de reproduire, prêter, distribuer ou vendre des copies de sa thèse de quelque manière et sous quelque forme que ce soit pour mettre des exemplaires de cette thèse à la disposition des personnes intéressées.

L'auteur conserve la propriété du droit d'auteur qui protège sa thèse. Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés ou autrement reproduits sans son autorisation.

ISBN 0-315-54537-2

Canada

ACM6127

© Christopher John Kukucha 1989
All Rights Reserved

DEDICATION

This paper is dedicated to my family. Without the support and encouragement of my parents, Ed and Judy Kukucha, my brother Stephen, and other relatives, this effort could never have been accomplished. For those who did not live to see the completion of this work, their influence and memory continue to inspire me.

ABSTRACT

CANADA AND INDIA: AN ANALYSIS OF THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP, 1947-88

by

CHRISTOPHER JOHN KUKUCHA

This paper provides a descriptive and empirical analysis of the Indo-Canadian political and economic relationship. Politically, it demonstrates that relations between these two countries have been the result of pragmatic interaction based on each country's foreign policy considerations and at no time has there existed a "special relationship" as some authors have suggested. Economically, it demonstrates that Canadian aid to India has not been as significant or beneficial as Ottawa has implied and that the commercial relationship has not thus far met the expectations of either country.

Chapter I discusses the importance of understanding India in terms of Canada's foreign affairs and briefly covers some of the more significant literature that has been published dealing with this subject. Chapter II examines the evolution of both Canadian and Indian foreign policy and provides the necessary framework for evaluating the changing nature of the relationship in the ensuing chapters. Chapter III offers an in-depth look at the political bilateral relationship from 1949-57, the period often characterized as reflecting a special Canada-India relationship. Chapter IV covers the period from 1957-80 and suggests that as the foreign policy objectives of both countries began to change, so, too, did the warmth of their relations. Finally, in terms of the political analysis, Chapter V

covers Canada-India relations from 1980-89 and argues that during this latest period once again the two countries have begun to have similar foreign policy objectives and, as a result, an improvement in the bilateral relationship has occurred.

Chapters VI and VII empirically and descriptively examine Canada's economic relationship with India. Chapter VI looks at the commercial aspects and reaches the conclusion that, due to a decline in Canada's trade surplus with India and a shift from finished to unfinished exports Canada has not achieved its goals set out in the 1970 foreign policy review of developing the Indian market as an outlet for its fully processed goods and as a surplus area to offset deficits in trade with other countries. Chapter VII focuses on Canada's aid efforts in India and makes it clear that Ottawa's perception of the size and effectiveness of its development assistance program has been overestimated. Finally, Chapter VIII offers a brief summary of the findings of this study and concludes with several observations on the past, present and future of the Indo-Canadian bilateral relationship.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I should like to thank sincerely Dr. Terence A. Keenleyside for his assistance, supervision and patience throughout the completion of this paper. I also want to express my appreciation to Dr. E. Donald Briggs and Dr. Amrit Lall for their comments and suggestions on the final draft. Special thanks is extended to the Department of Political Science and the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research for their financial support during the 1988-89 school year. I am especially grateful to my colleagues in the 1988 and 1989 graduate classes whose advice and friendship will be warmly remembered for many years to come. Special mention goes to Cindy Kraft, Austin Barber, Rob Burge, Peter Gatti and Nola Serkasevich, all of whom made my social life entertaining and tolerated the brunt of my "scholastic moodiness". I would also like to thank Paul Guzyk for compensating for my computer illiteracy and Les Brown, Stu D'eath, Cam Gillies, Cam Nelson and Ken McPherson for their input and effort in proof-reading the final draft. Finally, I would like to express my gratitude to my friends and family in Toronto, Vancouver, New Westminster and Maple Ridge who always stayed in touch and made it clear that I had not been forgotten.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DEDICATION	ii
ABSTRACT	iii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	v
CHAPTER I	1
Introduction	
CHAPTER II	12
Canadian and Indian Foreign Policy: An Overview	
CHAPTER III	35
The Indo-Canadian Political Relationship 1947-57	
CHAPTER IV	81
The Indo-Canadian Political Relationship 1957-80	
CHAPTER V	141
The Indo-Canadian Political Relationship 1980-89	
CHAPTER VI	166
Canada-India Commercial Relations	
CHAPTER VII	190
Canada-India Aid Relations	
CHAPTER VII	214
Conclusion	
APPENDIX I	219
APPENDIX II	225
BIBLIOGRAPHY	230
VITA AUCTORIS	244

Chapter I

Introduction

With the twenty-first century quickly approaching, the strategic, political, and economic importance of India and the South Asian region to the West in general and Canada in particular continues to evolve. The importance of this region is derived in part from the fact that it borders on China, the Soviet Union, and a number of energy rich Persian Gulf states with expanding economies. As a consequence, it has been and continues to be a prominent political battlefield in the East-West competition for influence. The region has also been the focus of attention in recent years because of the increasing incidence of Muslim fundamentalism and religious terrorism originating in this area. Furthermore, economically, Asia is also the fastest growing market in the world and the continent's rapidly developing consumer sector has incredible potential for further expansion in the future. While South Asia has not been the most dynamic segment of the Asian economy, nevertheless, the states of this region and India in particular have considerable potential as trading partners for Canada and other Western countries. The Asian region in general (South Asia in particular) has also had a direct impact on Canada's domestic cultural, and in some cases, security concerns, due to the large number of Asian immigrants that arrive in this country every year. Clearly, therefore, it is imperative that Canada, like other Western countries, gain an increased knowledge of the continent overall, including the states of South Asia.

Of the South Asian countries, India arguably has the greatest potential to have an impact politically and economically on Canada as it enters the twenty-first century. Despite

this, however, the subject of India is greeted by most Canadians with an interest that borders on indifference. As Harold Issacs has pointed out, "by contrast to the scratches on our minds about China, the marks left by India are fewer and much fainter."¹ This situation is made even worse by the fact that the information that does exist regarding India is usually clouded by the typical stereotypes associated with this country. To most people, India is a backward society whose people dress in bed sheets and worship farm animals. Even the positive images of this country have been formulated almost exclusively through such sources as the 1983 Academy Award winning movie, *Gandhi*. As anthropologist Martin Singer has noted, India has been described as a "fabulous land of benighted heathen and lesser breeds, of Gandhi the saintly statesman and Nehru the intellectual leader."²

As the ensuing analysis will prove, however, these stereotypes hardly do justice to the importance of India globally and in Canadian international affairs. Politically, India is one of the worlds largest democracies and as indicated, it is situated in a region that has always been viewed as essential to western security interests. Economically, India is now the world's tenth leading industrial power and it has a growing consumer market that has mass potential for future Canadian exports. Put simply, India is a prime example of a rising Asian state about which Canada must have a better understanding. This paper is, therefore, interested in answering the following general questions: How has the Indo-Canadian political and economic relationship evolved over time? At what stage is this relationship today? And, finally, what direction is it heading for in the future? In sum, by the completion of this analysis it is hoped that a better understanding will be available of the past reality and future prospects of Canada-India relations.

¹ Harold Issacs, *Scratches on Minds*, (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1980), 239.

² Milton Singer, *When a Great Tradition Modernizes*, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972), 11.

Despite a certain indifference to and lack of understanding about the Canada-India connection on the part of Canadians, the fact is that Canada and India have had an active bilateral relationship for over forty years. Early indications of a strong political linkage between these two countries were evident as early as Indian independence in 1947. In the post-war period, India and Canada were two of the most important emerging middle powers, and this era provided an environment in which both countries could utilize their new found status. The bipolar global reality gave both India and Canada the perfect opportunity to act as mediators between the two superpowers and to provide a certain amount of leadership to other emerging post-colonial countries.³

This post-war "middlepowermanship" was most evident in multilateral institutions such as the United Nations. As a number of authors have made clear, the United Nations offered Canada and India a forum that they both viewed as being essential in implementing

³ There are several good sources available for more in depth discussions of Canadian and Indian foreign policy and both countries' roles as middle powers. In terms of Canada, some of the best of these include: Gerard Bergeron, "Foreign policy: 1950-1975 (or should that be 1945-70?)", International Perspectives, November/December, 1975, pp. 57-61; Peter C. Dobell, Canada's Search for New Roles, Foreign Policy in the Trudeau Era, (London: Oxford University Press 1972); David B. Dewitt and John J. Kirton, Canada as a Principal Power, a Study in Foreign Policy and International Relations, (Toronto: John Wiley and Sons, 1983); Norman Hillmer and Garth Stevenson, A Foremost Nation, Canadian Foreign Policy and a Changing World, (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1977); Kim Richard Nossal, The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy, (Scarborough Ontario: Prentice Hall, 1985); Douglas A. Ross, "Middlepowers as extra-regional balancer powers: Canada, India, and Indochina 1954-1962", Pacific Affairs 55, 1982; Ramesh C. Thakur "Change and continuity in Canadian foreign policy", India Quarterly 33, October-December 1977; D.C. Thomson and R.F. Swanson, Canadian Foreign Policy: Options and Perspectives, (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Limited, 1971); and Michael Tucker, Canadian Foreign Policy: Contemporary Issues and Themes, (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Limited, 1980). In terms of India, some of the best of these include: A. Appadorai, "The foreign policy of India", in Foreign Policies in a World of Change, Joseph E. Black and Kenneth W. Thompson (eds) (New York, Harper and Row, 1963) and Essays in Indian Politics and Foreign Policy, (New Delhi, Vikas Publications, 1971); A. Appadorai, M.S. Rajan, India's Foreign policy and Relations, (New Delhi: South Asian Publishers, 1985); Michael Brecher, The New States of Asia, a Political Analysis, (New York: Oxford University Press 1966); Michael Edwards, "Illusion and reality in India's foreign policy", International Affairs, January 1965; S.C. Gangal, Indian Foreign Policy, (New Delhi: Young Asia Publications, 1980); Shivaji Ganguly, "Continuity and change in India's foreign policy", India Quarterly, January- March 1978; Shivaji Ganguly, M.S. Rajan, Sisir Gupta, India and the International System, (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing, 1981); Ashok Kapur, "Indian foreign policy: perspectives and present predicaments", Round Table, July 1985; and Arthur Lall, "Change and continuity in India's foreign policy", Orbis 10, Spring 1966.

the middlepower global roles that they perceived for themselves. In situations like the Korean armistice negotiations and the Suez Crisis, India and Canada worked closely together in this organization to resolve these disputes. Although this close working relationship in the U.N. began in time to break down as the membership of this organization expanded and India associated itself increasingly with the third world majority, there can be no denying the positive effect that the U.N. had in contributing to an important and vital link between these two countries.⁴

Strong early relations were also apparent in India's and Canada's membership in the organization of Commonwealth states. Starting in 1949, when Canada actively supported India's membership in the association, the Canadian government consistently worked with Indian representatives in diffusing many issues that threatened to split this association along racial lines. In 1956, during the Suez crisis, and in 1961, with the Rhodesia issue, Canada and India worked closely together to ensure that the existence of the racially mixed Commonwealth was maintained. By not always siding with the other white members on a number of these controversial issues, Canada managed to offer assurances to the newer, non-white members that their concerns and positions on these matters would not be ignored. Although close Indo-Canadian Commonwealth cooperation began to break down in the late 1960s, due to such factors as the African focus of many of

⁴ A number of the above-mentioned books and articles offer information on Canada's and India's roles in the United Nations. Other sources include: Thomas F. Keating and T.A. Keenleyside, "Voting Patterns as a measure of foreign policy independence", International Perspectives, May/June 1980; Paul Martin, A Very Public Life: Volume 2, So Many Worlds, (Toronto: Deneau Publishers, 1985); John A. Munro and Alex Inglis, eds., Mike: The Memoirs of the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson, Volume 2, 1948-1957, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973); M.S. Rajan, "The Indo-Canadian Entente," International Journal, Autumn 1962; Escott Reid, Envoy to Nehru, (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1981); Denis Stairs, The Diplomacy of Constraint: Canada, the Korean War, and the United States, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press); Garth Stevenson, "Canada in the United Nations" in Norman Hillmer and Garth Stevenson, eds., A Foremost Nation, Canadian Foreign Policy and a Changing World, (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1977); Ramesh C. Thakur, "Peacekeeping and foreign policy: Canada, India, and the International Commission in Vietnam, 1954-65", British Journal of International Studies, July 1980; and Dale C. Thomson's, Louis St. Laurent: Canadian, (Toronto: MacMillan of Canada, 1967).

these issues and the decreasing emphasis placed on this association by Indira Gandhi, there have been recent indications that this multilateral link will once again play an important role in Canada-India relations in the future. As the 1987 Commonwealth conference in Vancouver made clear, India and Canada strongly support each other's efforts in pressuring other members of the association to implement sanctions against South Africa. Much like the relationship that existed between these two countries in the 1950s and early 1960s, it is now apparent that the Commonwealth is once again providing an important multilateral forum for both countries to deal with issues that are of mutual concern.⁵

As important as the political relationship has been, however, the economic aspect of Indo-Canadian relations also cannot be ignored. These economic relations have taken the form of both commercial and developmental linkages and they have contributed to the importance of the relationship to both countries over the years since Indian independence. Nowhere is this more evident than in the commitment to development assistance that the Canadian government has traditionally made to India. Over time, India has received more Canadian aid than any other Third World country. This fact is even more significant when it is realized that, even though Canada's assistance program underwent a diversification process throughout the 1960s and 1970s, India remained the number one yearly recipient of aid until 1977-78.

⁵ There is an abundance of literature available on Indian and Canadian roles in the Commonwealth. Many of the afore-mentioned publications deal with this relationship on some level. The best sources that discuss India-Canada relations in this association in more detail, however, include: S.C. Gangal, India and the Commonwealth, (New Delhi: Shiva Lal Agarwala and Company, 1970); Peter Harnetty, "Canada, South Africa, and the Commonwealth 1960-61", Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies, November 1963; Frank R. Hayes, "Canada, the Commonwealth, and the Rhodesia issue" in An Acceptance of Paradox, Essays on Canadian Diplomacy in Honour of John W. Holmes, Kim Richard Nossal, ed., (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1982); John Kirton, "Shaping the global order: Canada and the Francophone and Commonwealth summits of 1987", Behind the Headlines, June 1987; M.S. Rajan, "India and the Commonwealth", Australian Journal of Politics and History, August 1966; Clarence G. Redekop, "Trudeau at Singapore: The Commonwealth and arms sales to South Africa" in An Acceptance of Paradox, Nossal; Ramphal S. Shridath, "Canada and the Commonwealth", Round Table, October 1987; and Dale C. Thomson, "India and Canada, a decade of cooperation 1947-57", International Studies, April 1968.

India and Canada have, however, also maintained a relatively strong commercial relationship. In fact, there is a great deal of evidence to suggest that this factor has become the prime motive for recent Canadian efforts to revitalize this bilateral relationship. Canada has begun to recognize that India's growing industrial status, and its large emerging consumer class, offer an excellent opportunity for the export of Canadian goods and services. While official Canadian development assistance (ODA) has attempted to deal with the reality of the poverty that is facing India, Canada's official trade program has attempted to tap the important market potential that exists in this country. Therefore, when looking at the economic aspect of relations between India and Canada, it is essential that both developmental and commercial factors are taken into consideration. Given the dual character of this Canadian interest in India, there is no doubt about the economic importance of the bilateral link from Ottawa's standpoint.

Despite the importance of Canada-India relations as indicated, surprisingly, there is only a modest academic literature devoted specifically to examining Indo-Canadian bilateral political and economic relations. For the most part, discussion of relations between these two countries has been dealt with as a small part of larger, more diverse bodies of work. There has also been a much more substantial amount of material published on the political aspect of this relationship than the economic. These shortcomings are further compounded by the fact that most of the published material centres on the earliest stages of the Indo-Canadian relationship, Canada's development assistance program in India, or on the Indian explosion of a nuclear device in 1974. In sum, to date, nothing has been published dealing with the political and economic relationship between India and Canada in its entirety.

When examining the political literature that does exist, there is no question that the most definitive publication thus far dealing solely with relations between India and Canada

is Escott Reid's Envoy to Nehru.⁶ Reid, the former High Commissioner to India during the St. Laurent government, offers a detailed examination of the earliest period of relations between these two countries. Works by Dale Thomson, Lester B. Pearson, James Eayrs, Paul Martin, Peyton Lyon and Tareq Ismael, and Denis Stairs also offer interesting insights into this early period of interaction in the context of broader discussions of Canadian international affairs in the post-war period.⁷

Beyond Reid's analysis the majority of material dealing solely with the political aspects of Indo-Canadian relations has been in the form of journal articles, and has, for the most part, also focussed on this early stage of the bilateral relationship, i.e. up to 1957. Of these journal articles, those by M.S. Rajan, Dale Thomson, and Ramesh Thakur, published in 1962, 1968 and 1977 respectively, offer the most thorough discussions of the political relationship in this early period.⁸ Interestingly, these articles, along with Escott Reid's contribution, all share a common theme in terms of the nature of Indo-Canadian relations. All of these authors describe the interaction that existed between these two countries as a "special relationship", and/or an Indo-Canadian "entente" or "love affair". This thesis, however, challenges the notion that such a "special relationship" ever existed.

Despite the academic interest in this early period, very little attention has been given to Canada-India relations over the years of 1957-74. The principal exception is Douglas Ross's analysis of Indian and Canadian roles in the Indochina Commissions in Vietnam over this seventeen-year period.⁹ The Indian explosion of a nuclear device using Canadian

⁶ Reid, Envoy to Nehru.

⁷ Thomson, Louis St. Laurent; Munro and Inglis, Mike; Volume 2; James Eayrs, In Defence of Canada, Indochina: Roots of Complicity, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1983); Martin, A Very Public Life; Peyton V. Lyon and Tareq Y. Ismael, Canada and the Third World, (Toronto: The MacMillan Company of Canada, 1976); Stairs, The Diplomacy of Constraint.

⁸ M.S. Rajan, "The Indo-Canadian Entente", International Journal, Autumn 1962, pp. 358-84.; Thomson, "India and Canada, a decade of cooperation 1947-57"; Thakur, "Change and continuity".

⁹ Ross, "Middle powers"; and "The dynamics of Indochina diplomacy: Pearson, Holmes and the bureaucratic right- 1955", in An Acceptance of Paradox, Nossal.

material in 1974, however, once again focussed academic attention on India's role in Canadian international affairs. Barrie Morrison and Donald Page, Ashok Kapur and Richard Cronin all offer excellent background and analysis of the 1974 explosion and its effects on the Indo-Canadian relationship.¹⁰ While Reid, Ross and Thomson contend that the "special relationship" between India and Canada began to break down with both countries' involvement in the ICC, there is also agreement amongst them, together with Kapur and Thakur, that the events of 1974 effectively ended any alleged "love affair" that may have once existed.

Following the explosion, there was once again a void in published academic literature dealing with the political aspect of Indo-Canadian relations and this pattern has largely continued to this day. There has, however, been some renewed interest in this relationship in the last few years. Some examples of this are Bill Warden's article "Sikhs in Canada-India relations" published in 1987; the recent research findings resulting from the team headed by Arthur G. Rubinoff at the Centre for South Asian Studies at the University of Toronto, and the papers presented in Calgary at the Canada-India Opportunities Conference in May of 1988.¹¹ Other than this material, the main sources for information dealing with the political relationship during this period are government statements and documents and newspaper articles.

Much like the political, the economic literature dealing with the Indo-Canadian relationship has also largely been in the form of journal articles or sections in more

¹⁰ Barrie Morrison and Donald Page, "India's option: the nuclear route to achieve goal as world power", International Perspectives, July/August 1974; Ashok Kapur, "The Canada-India nuclear negotiations: some hypotheses and lessons", World Today, August 1978; and Richard P. Cronin, "Prospects for nuclear proliferation in South Asia", Middle East Journal, Autumn 1983.

¹¹ Bill Warden, "Sikh's in Canada-India relations", International Perspectives, July/ August 1987; Rubinoff, ed., Canada and South Asia: Issues and Opportunities, (University of Toronto: Centre for South Asian Studies, 1988); and Ashis Gupta, ed., Canada-India Opportunities. Selected 1988 Conference Proceedings, (The International Centre of the University of Calgary, 1988).

extensive publications. There is no doubt that it is the development aspect of Canada's economic relations with third world countries that has received the most attention. There are a number of publications which have examined generally Canada's developmental role abroad. Among the best are those by Keith Spicer, Clyde Sanger, Lyon and Ismael and Robert Carty and Virginia Smith.¹² There have also been a number of valuable reports issued by bodies like the North-South Institute and various committees of Parliament.¹³ The problem is, however, that despite the importance of these works in evaluating Canada's development efforts overall, none has dealt solely with Canada's bilateral assistance relationship with India.

This lack of information is also clear when looking at the published material on the commercial side of the economic relationship. Most research has dealt with Canadian trade and/or protectionist measures against the third world countries generally and does not present a detailed examination of any of the states of the south Asian region. The works of Ronald Wonnacott, Margaret Biggs and Martin Rudner are all examples of detailed, general discussions of Canadian trade practices and protectionist measures and the 1987 report on development assistance of the Standing Committee of External Affairs and International Trade (the Winegard report) also offers useful material on this subject.¹⁴

¹² Keith Spicer, A Samaritan State? External aid in Canada's Foreign Policy, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1966); Clyde Sanger, Half a Loaf: Canada's Semi-Role Among Developing Countries, (Toronto: The Ryerson Press, 1969); Lyon and Ismael, Canada and the Third World; and Robert Carty and Virginia Smith, Perpetuating Poverty. The Political Economy of Canadian Foreign Aid, (Toronto: Between the Lines, 1981).

¹³ Two of the most useful are: the In the Canadian Interest? Third World Development in the 1980's, (Ottawa: The North-South Institute, 1980); and For Whose Benefit? Report of the Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade on Canada's Official Development Assistance Policies and Programs, May, 1987, (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1987).

¹⁴ Ronald J. Wonnacott, Canada's Trade Options, (Ottawa: Economic Council of Canada, 1975); Margaret A. Biggs, Canada and Third World Trade- The Challenge: Adjust or Protect?, (Ottawa: The North-South Institute, 1980); Martin Rudner, "Trade cum aid in Canada's official development assistance strategy", in Canada Among Nations. Talking Trade, Brian W. Tomlin and Maureen Appel Molot, eds., (Toronto: James Lorimer and Company, 1987); and For Whose Benefit?

However, it is apparent that, as Canada has begun to recognize the economic potential of this region, more academic attention has been placed on South Asia. Recent publications by Syed Rahman and David Balcome, Janette Mark and Chantal Tremblay are all indications of the new focus and emphasis that the Canadian government and academic community has placed on the trading potential of these Asian countries.¹⁵ This new emphasis is also very clear when looking at the research presented at the 1988 Canada-India Opportunities Conference.¹⁶ The problem remains, however, that the contemporary literature has not focussed in a balanced way on all aspects of the bilateral economic relationship.

In sum, while a modest literature exists on Canada-India relations, there has not been published to date a comprehensive work that explores all aspects of the relationship from Indian independence to the present. This thesis attempts to fill that gap by examining both the political and economic aspects of the relationship over the entire period from 1947 to 1988. Before commencing that analysis, however, Chapter 2 provides a brief overview of both Canadian and Indian foreign policy in order to establish the context in which Canada-India relations have evolved. Chapters 3, 4 and 5 then examine the bilateral political relationship in what are perceived to be three relatively distinct periods: 1947-57, an era of relatively warm and cordial relations; 1957-1980, one that entailed a mixture of disagreement and indifference; and 1980 to the present, a period that has seen a renewal of interest on the part of each country in the other. The discussion in these chapters presents the thesis that the character of relations during these periods was directly related to the changing foreign policy objectives of both countries. Although a strong level of

¹⁵ Syed Sajjadur Rahman and David Balcome, Canadian Business Linkages with Developing Countries, Vol. I. The Asian Experience, (Ottawa: International Business Research Centre, 1987); Janette Mark, "Canada's economic relations with South Asia: some issues" and Chantal Tremblay, "Real and perceived opportunities for economic cooperation between Canada and South Asia", in Canada and South Asia, Rubinoff.

¹⁶ Gupta, Canada-India Opportunities.

cooperation was apparent in period one, there is no evidence of a "special relationship" at this or any other point in Indo-Canadian bilateral relations. When the interests and objectives of both countries coincided, so too did the cordiality of their relations. When these interests diverged an inverse pattern developed. Overall then, this study contends that the Indo-Canadian relationship has been an example of two nation-states acting on the basis of their own self interests. As a result, the relationship has entailed a series of ad-hoc, pragmatic, responses by both India and Canada, and has not represented a planned, "special relationship" at any stage over the years of its existence. In reaching these conclusions, the analysis of the political relationship relies principally on secondary source materials, newspaper articles, and correspondence with the Department of External Affairs and former Canadian high commissioners who served in India.

Chapters 6 and 7 deal with Canada-India economic relations. Chapter 6, dealing with aid, argues that Canadian assistance efforts to India have not been as significant as the raw data in aid disbursements might suggest. Chapter 7 discusses Canada-India commercial ties. Its central thrust is that while Canada appears to be the principal beneficiary in the trade relationship at the present time, this pattern will likely change in the future to India's advantage. It is further argued that Ottawa has failed to fulfil the goals first set out in the 1970 foreign policy review for trade development in South Asia in general and India in particular. Finally, Chapter 8 provides a brief conclusion.

Chapter II

Canadian and Indian Foreign Policy: An Overview

Canadian Foreign Policy

Most examinations of the evolution of post-war Canadian foreign policy are divided into several distinct periods. In this discussion the first period, running from 1945-57, is defined as an era of "functional internationalism". The concept of functional internationalism hinged on the perception of Canada as a global middle power in the post war period. "It was Canada's role in the Second World War which served to catalyze thinking about the country's position in the international hierarchy. The country's war effort was sizeable for a state with a small population and limited resources. Sizeable enough, many Canadians felt, to demand the revision of the country's status in the international hierarchy."¹⁷

As a result of this new perception of itself, Canada began to demand a role in the post-war Western alliance which reflected its new-found status. British and American responses, however, were less than enthusiastic about Canadian suggestions because of the fear that other Western allies would demand similar roles, making a difficult post-war situation even more complicated. "In response the Canadians formulated the so called

¹⁷ Nossal, The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy, 10.

'functional' principle of representation. Functionalism asserted that in those areas where a smaller state had both an interest and expertise it should be regarded as a major power."¹⁸

The major motive for this functional approach to Canadian foreign policy was Canada's concern over the development of the United Nations. Canada viewed this organization as having a key role in the years following the Second World War and felt that in order to avoid the potential of global conflict in the future it would be necessary for all states to make a commitment to an institution of this type. Canada was also concerned, however, with the dominance of this organization by the five post-war major powers, which were determined to exclude all other states from representation on the Security Council. Canada "feared [that] the elitism of the great powers [was] epitomized in the Security Council provisions of the U.N. Charter. These provisions laid the groundwork for a new concert system, a hierarchical structure in international politics with the great powers at the top and the rest, Canada included, below them. The principle of functional representation in international organizations was an antidote for this elitism."¹⁹

It should be pointed out that had MacKenzie King remained in power past 1948, or if St. Laurent and Pearson had not been major factors in shaping Canada's external policies at this time, it is possible that Canada would never have adopted this functional approach or become as involved in the U.N. as it eventually did. King was not a strong supporter of the U.N. and ultimately believed that the organization was more trouble than it was worth. As Pearson pointed out in his memoirs, King "became more and more worried about the U.N., its activities, and interventions. Indeed, before he had left office he had reverted to the fears of the thirties about international commitments, though he continued to preach the proper sermons about peace and international co-operation."²⁰ King confided in his diary

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Tucker, 6.

²⁰ Munro and Inglis, 132.

in 1948 that "the United Nations would get Canada into no end of trouble before very long, that we would be drawn into situations... that our own people would not want to be drawn into and we would find out only when it was too late where we had landed our country."²¹ Considering these attitudes, it is more than likely that had King remained in office, Canada's role in the U.N. would have been significantly more modest than proved to be the case.

One of the roles that Canada saw itself pursuing in the U.N. was peacekeeping. "As secretary of State for External Affairs, [Lester Pearson] sought to achieve progress [towards international peace and security] by helping to set up U.N. ad hoc peacekeeping forces, as the need arose. By involving Canadians in this type of operation, he started a pattern that resulted in Canada contributing to almost every U.N. peacekeeping force that has been created."²² By pursuing this policy Canada managed to find a role for itself in the U.N. that matched its goals and objectives as a functional middlepower in the post war period.

Michael Tucker has pointed out that the "exercise of middlepowermanship was ad hoc, not planned; [and that] its practitioners downplayed the pursuit of long-range goals."²³ It should also be recognized that Canada was not guided solely by idealism in the pursuit of functional internationalism. Although Canadian diplomats were possibly idealistic in their assumption that working solutions could be found for most situations, they were also realists in the sense that they realized final solutions were often not possible. "In their quest for working solutions Canadian internationalists, as idealists pursuing the common good, were after an international variant of the domestic experience with 'peace

²¹ Ibid, 133

²² Thomson and Swanson, 88.

²³ Tucker, 8.

order and good government.' As realists defending Canadian interests they were after allies to bolster Canadian positions."²⁴

Although it is clear that the U.N. was a major focus of Canadian foreign policy during this period, it should also be pointed out that the inability of the organization to operate as an effective tool for international security made a number of Canada's objectives difficult to attain in this multilateral institution. "As a consequence of Cold War antagonisms and the exercise of the veto by the Soviet Union in the Security Council [Canada's perceived role] was [often] still born. Quick to perceive the impotence of the U.N. in this area, Canada's internationalists helped... establish the North Atlantic Treaty Organization."²⁵ Canada had originally wanted to bring its idealist/realist functional approach into the new NATO organization by using it as a forum for influencing, and moderating, global developments. It was soon apparent, however, that the Canadian government's perceived role for itself in this alliance would also not materialize. Regardless of this, however, up until 1968 the NATO alliance remained the key pillar of Canadian foreign policy.

These two areas of Canadian foreign policy were the focus of the functional internationalist approach of this period. Canada, guided by a mix of idealism and pragmatism in its perception of its middle power role, saw the United Nations, in terms of peacekeeping, and NATO, in terms of collective security, as being the best means by which to attempt to implement its foreign policy objectives. The first of these in particular provided a basis on which Canada and India could foster closer bilateral relations. As will be made clear shortly, Canada and India shared similar attitudes toward foreign policy objectives throughout this early period.

²⁴ Ibid, 8-9.

²⁵ Ibid, 7.

The second phase in the evolution of Canadian foreign policy, 1957-63, has been labeled as the "era of independence". As some observers point out, this period was marked by a general domestic dissatisfaction with the direction of Canadian diplomacy and calls for Canada to back Britain and the Commonwealth more strongly and to advance further Canada's U.N. role. The approach of the Diefenbaker government to foreign policy during this period was influenced by his recognition of two different factors that were emerging at this time. He was acutely concerned by Canada's increased vulnerability in the era of the intercontinental missile and he was increasingly preoccupied with Canada's dependence on inflows of American capital. Diefenbaker wanted to continue the policy of Canadian internationalism, but was determined that this would not occur at the expense of bowing to American pressure. "Within North America, Diefenbaker accepted Lester Pearson's earlier judgement that the days of 'easy and automatic' relations with the United States were over. This, in addition to the disquiet caused by a record trade concentration and imbalance, led the Prime Minister to declare that he would approach the relationship by placing Canadian interests first."²⁶

As a result of these attitudes, this period was marked by a general effort at increasing the commitment to both Britain and the Commonwealth. Although Diefenbaker was well aware of the effect that the Suez Crisis in 1956 had on Britain's declining international role, and the strain that it had placed on the Commonwealth, he still believed that this approach would best fulfill Canada's foreign policy objectives. NATO and the United States were not to be forgotten or ignored in Canadian policy but there was a general feeling of uneasiness regarding the direction in which these relationships were headed.

²⁶ Ibid.

The third period of the Pearson government from 1963-68, saw intensified efforts on Canada's part to distance itself from the United States on the economic front, combined with closer cooperation in the political-security field, as reflected in the governments decision to bow to U.S. pressure and arm BOMARC missiles based in Canada with nuclear warheads.

Canadian foreign policy during this period was also heavily influenced by two other factors. The first of these was the concern and interest that Pearson and Martin had regarding Canada's domestic situation. Both men wanted to foster "consensus between Canada's English- and French- speaking communities" and confront constructively and effectively "the allied challenge of Quebec and France to anglophone dominance and orientations at home and abroad. Particularly after 1965, the challenge slowly forced a more direct fusion of international and domestic objectives and a search for a new conceptual foundation of foreign policy."²⁷ This did not necessarily mean that British and Commonwealth ties were ignored, but the dominance that these areas enjoyed during the "era of independence" was slightly diminished.

Second, accompanying this new domestic concern was a renewed commitment to Canada's role in the U.N. as a middle power. There was never any doubt of Pearson's view of the utility of this organization in terms of securing peace and advancing Canada's international objectives. Pearson had always believed that middle powers had a key role to play because they were strong enough to contribute to the decision-making process, but at the same time they were not burdened by the world-wide interests that the larger powers had. As Pearson noted in his memoirs, Canada "stood between the increasing number of small states which had little power and the great states which had too much."²⁸ As with his earlier efforts in the United Nations, during his stewardship as Prime Minister

²⁷ Ibid, 63.

²⁸ Munro and Inglis, 121.

"Canada's foreign policy was marked by... general attempts to mitigate tensions between the two blocs of the tight bipolar post-war world, and specific mediatory missions to defuse intra-bloc disputes."²⁹

Despite Pearson's faith in the U.N., however, his enthusiasm was also checked by a growing realization of the changing nature of the organization. As the U.N. grew older its membership and focus on issues began to change dramatically. Starting in the 1960's, the majority of U.N. issues began to focus on racism, colonialism, and underdevelopment. Although these issues could hardly be viewed as irrelevant, the wording of the resolutions was often such that many of the major western powers could not support them. This emerging trend in the organization had, in fact, become apparent to Pearson even before he became Prime Minister. In his memoirs he pointed out that during his earlier tenure in the U.N. Canada was "increasingly worried about the tendency of the Assembly to be stampeded into impracticable resolutions passed by a majority which did not include those powers essential to their implementation. This tendency increased as the membership expanded far beyond the original signatories of the Charter, giving small and economically weak states a dominant voting position in the Assembly."³⁰ Put more bluntly, this situation meant that many western states simply began to play down the importance of the U.N. and no longer attempted to use it as a forum to seek solutions to international problems. As a result, "Canada's role as a seeker of compromise between the western camp and the non-aligned, or between Western Europe and the United States, became largely irrelevant."³¹ In sum, the Pearson era marked a return to a stronger U.N. focus and desire to mediate the super power relationship, but at the same time it was tempered by the changing nature of the organization and the growing domestic concerns within Canada.

²⁹ Nossal, The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy, 12.

³⁰ Munro and Inglis, 133.

³¹ Garth Stevenson, "Canada in the United Nations" in A Foremost Nation, 151.

The next period of Canadian foreign policy, 1968-80, has been labeled by some observers as the era of "national interest". This period saw a significant shift in the focus and objectives of Canadian foreign policy. Following Trudeau's election in 1968, a wholesale review of Canadian foreign policy took place which culminated in the publication of the white paper, *Foreign Policy for Canadians*, in 1970. Essentially, this review argued that foreign policy was the extension abroad of national policies. The changes in policy addressed in the paper were "based on general dissatisfaction with the promises and public posture of foreign policy under Paul Martin and propelled by a specific interest in countering Quebec's claim to international status. According to the new doctrine, the requirements of national unity were to be directly reflected in the full range and overall structure of Canadian behaviour abroad."³²

To try to achieve these goals, Canada made a commitment to break away from traditional foreign policy areas of focus such as NATO, the U.N., and the Commonwealth and to shift its efforts to forge as many new autonomous bilateral relationships as possible. This was not meant to imply that Canada was going to play a passive international role, but simply that Canada's past policy of Pearsonian internationalism had to be re-evaluated. Basically, the review saw Pearsonian internationalism as being far too reactive and ad hoc to be truly effective for dealing with long-term domestic and international concerns.

Canadian foreign policy in this period reflected a changing attitude toward what was important in terms of overall objectives not only in Canada but globally as well. Put simply, other factors were now viewed as being the keys to Canadian foreign policy. As the challenges of international politics moved away from the strategic plateau of 'high politics' toward the 'low politics' of economic and environmental concerns, Canada had to

³² Dewitt and Kirton, 68.

realistically review what its international role should be. As Trudeau stated in May of 1968:

All of us need to ponder well what our national capacity is - what our potential may be - for participating in international affairs. We shall do more good by doing well what we know to be within our resources to do, than to pretend either to ourselves or to others that we can do things clearly beyond our capacity. ... There is no idle talk of the next century belonging to Canada, no reach that exceeds the grasp. Practicality, that's the watchword. Pragmatism.³³

Mitchell Sharp, Trudeau's Secretary of State for External Affairs retrospectively evaluated Canada's perceived role for itself in this era in the following manner:

Canada was no longer interested in being a helpful fixer. We did not seek a role in the world as a mediator or honest broker. Our foreign policy, like the foreign policies of other countries, was to be directed to promoting Canadian objectives and interests which, of course, included the preservation of peace and the avoidance of war. This did not mean that Canadian policy was to become more selfish... [but] Canadian policy did become more consciously nationalist in expression.³⁴

In sum, it is clear that Canada's traditional internationalist approach was no longer a major focus of Canadian foreign policy during this period. Naturally, this new approach to policy meant that Canada's role in institutions such as the U.N. underwent some modification. The 1970 review made it clear that the new government perceived a much smaller role for mediation and peacekeeping and believed that new issues, such as arms control and development assistance, would become the dominant focus of global affairs. Part of the reason for this change came as a result of a shift in the international system as a whole. "The loosening of the military alliances and the emergence of European states to

³³ Walter Stewart, Shrug: Trudeau in Power, (Toronto: New Press, 1971), 105.

³⁴ Mitchell Sharp, "Reflections on foreign policy during the Trudeau years," International Perspectives, November/December 1986, 3.

their former status as great powers, in an economic and diplomatic sense at least, signified a reduced stature for Canada in intra-alliance discussions and international economic forums."³⁵

There was also some concern over the continued growth in membership and subsequent dominance of the U.N. by Third World states. The increasing consciousness of this phenomenon, which had been under way for some time, ultimately, affected Trudeau's perception of the overall utility of the organization. Questions were thus raised regarding the value of keeping the U.N. as the main focus of Canadian foreign policy. These doubts were based largely on "fear of the consequences of the tendency of Third World states, focussing as they have on problems of colonialism, under-development and racism, to 'politicize' issues which came before the [Assembly]."³⁶ This factor, along with the changing nature of the international system, meant that Canada's traditional focus on the U.N. was no longer so evident in the Trudeau era.

One of the key areas in which this change was most apparent was in the field of peacekeeping. Canada had always been a strong advocate of the peacekeeping process of the U.N. as a way to promote peace and ensure stability. The foreign policy review, however, stated that development assistance and other non-military activity was now viewed as being the best way of securing these objectives. One of the reasons for this shift was that, due to the domestic rather than international nature of most new disputes and the rising costs of peacekeeping, Canada no longer saw this function as the best, most cost efficient, way to promote its global objectives. "The fact that such an operation, if undertaken," was likely to occur in the third world, "where white-skinned Canadian troops would appear to at least some of the contestants as Caucasian interventionists,"³⁷ was

³⁵ Tucker, 108.

³⁶ Ibid, 111.

³⁷ Thomson and Swanson, 89.

another disincentive to a policy focus on peacekeeping. Furthermore, peacekeeping no longer seemed a likely "key role for middlepowers like Canada in an era of multi-polarity given the ability of the superpowers to 'manage' crisis as an aspect of their embryonic detente... ."38 Thus, although Canada remained involved in U.N. peacekeeping throughout this period, the era of self-interest marked a dramatic shift away from the past focus on peacekeeping as a central element of Canadian internationalism.

A new foreign policy theme that became important during this period was that of social justice. This new emphasis was at least a partial indication that despite the government's desire to focus foreign policy on domestic concerns, Canada had not rejected the principle of internationalism entirely. In accordance with this theme, "the government pledged to advance the well-being of mankind globally by supporting economic and social development in the Third World and by encouraging states to observe basic human rights."³⁹

In stark contrast to the theme of social justice was that of economic growth and it was the one most emphasized in the 1970 white paper. It proposed a new emphasis in Canadian foreign policy on the expansion of trade world-wide and the diversification of Canada's reliance on foreign investment in the interests of domestic economic development and the securing of sovereignty vis-à-vis the United States. This new emphasis was reflected, inter alia, in the decision to integrate the Trade Commissioners Service into the Department of External Affairs. While economic interests had always had a prominent, quiet place in Canadian foreign policy, the open emphasis now given to commerce appeared to reflect a new "hard-nosed" approach this era of international relations.

³⁸ Tucker, 112.

³⁹ T.A. Keenleyside and Patricia Taylor, "The impact of human rights violations on the conduct of Canadian bilateral relations: A contemporary dilemma", *Behind the Headlines*, November 1984, 1.

It is generally considered by most people that despite the new modesty in terms of its global role that characterized Canadian foreign policy rhetoric during the Trudeau period, there is little indication that the era of self-interest actually marked an overall rejection of Canadian internationalism. Michael Tucker feels that Trudeau recognized the importance of internationalism just as much as Pearson, but simply took another approach to the concept. "For Pearson this was through activities in the military-security realm, in alliance memberships [NATO] and through peacekeeping. For Trudeau this was through environmental and arms control measures, and development assistance to the Third World."⁴⁰ Tucker notes that the rejection of Pearsonian internationalism was based not only on the changing nature of the international system and the U.N., but also on concerns regarding the ad hoc nature of past policy. He also points out, however, that as hard as Trudeau tried he could not dramatically alter this ad hoc approach to foreign policy. Policies continued by and large to be "a product of a series of decisions or moves made in response to rather momentary opportunities and exigencies facing foreign policy decision-makers in both their domestic and external environments."⁴¹

The last period to be discussed , 1980-88, can be labelled as an era of increased attention to national interests, with an emphasis on the growth of bilateral international relations as the best way to promote these interests. This period has seen an end to the clear distinctions between economic and political power and the result has been to create a more unpredictable, unstable, dangerous world in which the cold war of East-West competition poses "less threat than the multitude of states that" have "acquired enough independence either to play super powers off against each other or to be used by other powers as pawns and proxies in pursuit of greater interests."⁴²

⁴⁰ Tucker, 32.

⁴¹ Ibid, 15.

⁴² Dewitt and Kirton, 76.

The emerging economic reality of the 1980's has been a particular spur to "bilateralism" in this last period. Due to the increasing industrialization of the Third World and the dominance of regional trading blocs, Canada found itself becoming a less and less attractive trading partner in the developing global economic community. Essentially, Canada was driven into a mix of political relationships motivated by economic need and the recognition of its potential inability to compete successfully for developing markets in the future if its past policies were adhered to. "To secure... long standing relationships, the policy of bilateralism demanded the coherent political pursuit of relationships that would include economic interactions. At a minimum this required the injection of a political dimension into relationships that were essentially economic and the use of political processes to create the conditions for economic exchange."⁴³

Although economic factors have always been a concern of Canadian foreign policy, there can be no doubt that in the 1980's this has become a dominant motive underlying the government's approach to international affairs. This emerging economic emphasis was apparent in the last Trudeau government's focus on the National Energy Program, the reshaping of the Foreign Investment Review Agency, and the possibility of negotiating sectoral free trade with the United States as instruments for achieving economic growth and sovereignty. More recently, this focus has become even more apparent in the preoccupation of the Mulroney government with the consummation of the free trade pact with the United States, with GATT and G-7 negotiations on trade and other economic matters, and with the dismantling of barriers to foreign investment in Canada.

By examining the development of Canadian foreign policy in this manner it is clear that Canada has undergone a number of transformations in its approach to international relations over the years. It is also apparent, however, that even though Canada has shifted

⁴³ Ibid, 79.

its focus to some degree as the government's approach to foreign policy has evolved, Canada has never completely abandoned the concept of internationalism. It has been modified and adapted to fit the goals and objectives of various periods, but it has never been completely forgotten.

Indian Foreign Policy

The first period of Indian foreign policy, 1947-62, was dominated by Nehru's view of non-alignment, the policy which his government implemented following India's independence. Before discussing Nehru's approach to foreign policy, however, it is necessary to define exactly what non-alignment is not. One of the most common misperceptions of individuals is to assume that non-alignment and neutrality refer to similar foreign policy positions. This assumption, however, is not correct. Neutrality is a concept that has existed since the early city state relationships of the ancient Greeks. From the fifteenth to nineteenth century neutrality evolved to become an important feature of international law. This law was intended to protect the rights and duties of ships at sea that were not involved in other nations' conflicts. "Over a few hundred years there emerged-- in international law, both in custom and in treaty-- recognized rules of neutrality."⁴⁴ However, by the time of the Second World War, this position of neutrality became out of date. The concept of staying out of war, neutrality, was now only possible for certain nations which were "favoured by geography or were sufficiently armed so that invasion would be more costly than the value of conquest to the invader."⁴⁵

⁴⁴ Brecher, The New States of Asia, 113.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

Obviously, India had no hopes of achieving a policy of neutrality as the basis of its early foreign policy. Geographically, its size and position in South Asia made it far too important to be ignored by either of the super powers and its army was also not sufficiently powerful to deter invasion by certain belligerent nations. The position of neutrality also implied a passive policy of not getting involved in the prevention of war, and this was not a correct characterization of the strategy of non-alignment that Nehru developed as India's foreign policy. "By definition non-alignment is a pragmatic policy of independent action. It is simply a refusal to make any advance commitments, political or military, to any nation or bloc."⁴⁶ Furthermore, "the term neutrality may connote that the country which adopts such a policy has no positive opinions on the issues which divide the blocs."⁴⁷ If India were a neutral nation, it would not take sides or speak out on issues that involved other states and their aggressive actions. Although India's handling of the 1956 Hungarian crisis may have fallen into this characterization, this discussion will make clear that, for the most part, India has not taken a passive approach to international affairs. Therefore, neutrality and non-alignment should not be confused when examining Indian foreign policy.

As in the evolution of Canadian foreign policy, the bipolar nature of the post-war period contributed greatly to India's evolution of its concept of non-alignment. India's status as a middle power allowed it to play a mediatory role in terms of the super power split of this period. It was Nehru's desire to preserve peace and avoid war that helped contribute to the creation of non-alignment. He felt it was India's responsibility to avoid the extreme rhetoric and policies of the United States and the Soviet Union, and saw non-alignment as the contribution that India could make to help promote peace and draw nations together. Nehru believed that "joining one bloc or the other would hasten a drift towards

⁴⁶ R. Hardgrave and S. Kochanek, *India: Government and Politics in a Developing Nation*, (Toronto: Harcourt Brace Jahanovich, 1986), 338.

⁴⁷ Appadorai and Rajan, *India's Foreign Policy*, 35.

war. On the other hand, if India remained non-aligned she might be able to exercise some influence in both blocs and avoid the outbreak of war."⁴⁸

Nehru's policy of non-alignment was focussed on this preservation of peace in the South Asian region and throughout the world. However, the colonial legacy that India had experienced also contributed to the adoption of non-alignment. "It is true that anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism, which were prominent features of Nehru's foreign policy, flowed out of the history and the tradition of the Congress struggle for independence."⁴⁹ Nehru firmly believed that India now had to choose its own destiny and formulate its own policies. It was this colonial experience that left Nehru and many other Indians with a fierce desire for independence in all government matters. Furthermore, Nehru felt that it was "his duty and in India's national interest to join in the struggle against colonialism, imperialism, and racial discrimination in every possible forum."⁵⁰ This desire for independence thus helped lead India into its non-alignment policy.

The pursuit of non-alignment, much like the implementation of Canadian internationalism, was also guided by a mix of idealistic and pragmatic motives. Much of the discussion to this point has centred on some of the more idealistic principles of non-alignment. Nehru, however, also had several pragmatic motives in following this non-alignment policy. Nehru made this point very clear when he stated that "whatever policy we may lay down, the art of conducting the foreign affairs of a country lies in finding out what is most advantageous to the country. We may talk about international goodwill and mean what we say. But, in the ultimate analysis, a government functions for the good of the country it governs."⁵¹

⁴⁸ V.B. Karnik, "Jawaharlal Nehru: Foreign Policy" in India's Defence and Foreign Policies, (Bombay: P.C. Manaktala and Sons Private Ltd., 1966), 15.

⁴⁹ Ibid, 11.

⁵⁰ Gangal, Indian Foreign Policy, 154.

⁵¹ Edwards, 49.

First of all, Nehru saw non-alignment as a way to secure large amounts of aid from the Soviet Union and the United States. Nehru realized that both of these superpowers would want to gain influence in the area of the Indian subcontinent and that both would try to get India to reject its non-alignment position. Nehru knew that both superpowers wanted India to join their alliances and, therefore, neither nation would be willing to cut off aid for fear of pushing India into a closer relationship with the other power. The end result was that India managed to secure economic assistance from both the United States and the Soviet Union.

Another pragmatic motive behind pursuing non-alignment was the prestige that Nehru hoped to achieve for his new nation-state. Nehru openly tried to spread the concept of non-alignment to several other emerging countries. Most of the time he appealed to other new countries that had also just ended their colonial legacies. Nehru stated that India's "freedom would not be secure until the torch of freedom had been lit in so many lands which were under foreign rule. Therefore, when India became independent he considered it his duty and in India's national interest to join in the struggle against colonialism, imperialism, and racial discrimination in every possible national form."⁵² By pursuing this policy, Nehru was successful in transplanting the concept of non-alignment to a great number of states, most notably those new post-colonial nations throughout Asia and Africa. Nehru also wanted to expand the influence of India by becoming the leader of these new non-aligned states at the U.N. . He wanted India to become a prominent mediator in global conflicts and felt that this goal could best be accomplished by being the head of this new non-aligned bloc. By achieving this, Nehru managed to capture the prestige he desired for India and also managed to further India's own security through a "defence by friendship" policy.

⁵² Gangal, Indian Foreign Policy, 154.

It is clear from the above that Canada and India shared certain common objectives and approaches to foreign policy in this first period. First of all, both states were among the pre-eminent middle powers of the post-war period. India, "for much the same reasons as Canada, with the added fact of being the first and most prized colony to gain independence, ... found itself a leading middle power."⁵³ Apart from the general middle power mediatory roles that both countries conceived for themselves, however, Canada and India also shared similar attitudes on decolonization. St. Laurent and Pearson, much like Nehru, believed that the "movement towards the self-determination of all peoples was irreversible and that it was in Canada's interest, as well as its responsibility, to help the emerging nations."⁵⁴ Pearson made it clear that if "the west provided material aid... only or primarily for cold war motives, we are likely to fail in achieving any good or permanent result. If, however, we do so out of friendship with our Asian and other neighbours, then we shall succeed in improving the political atmosphere as well as in promoting human welfare."⁵⁵ Although the areas in which Canada and India cooperated in international politics after the war appeared to indicate altruistic approaches on the part of both to global affairs, it must always be remembered that this posture was combined with pragmatism. Their policies were "often enunciated in lofty and moralistic terms [but they] reflected a mixture of idealism and self-interest."⁵⁶

The similarities in foreign policy between Canada and India, however, began to diverge by the 1960's. Although Canadian policy continued to follow a pattern of internationalism with only moderate changes throughout this period, by 1962 Indian policy had shifted from an international focus to one guided more by regional and domestic

⁵³ Thakur, "Change and continuity", 412.

⁵⁴ Thomson, "India and Canada: a decade of cooperation", 408.

⁵⁵ Rajan, 378.

⁵⁶ Robert Han'grave, India under Pressure--Prospects for Political Stability, (Boulder Colorado: Westview Press Incorporated, 1984), 113.

concerns. The significant event that profoundly altered Nehru's non-alignment policy and India's perception of itself was the Chinese victory in the Sino-Indian border war of 1962. India's defeat marked a dramatic re-evaluation of the country's non-alignment policy and altered its approach to foreign policy until the 1971 border war with Pakistan. With China's victory "India's military weakness had been exposed, and in military defeat it suffered a decline in international prestige."⁵⁷ India could no longer hope to share the Asian continent with her northern neighbour and it was obvious that after the war "the domestic setting, the external setting, and the pattern of Indian thinking changed."⁵⁸ As a result, this second period of Indian foreign policy marked a dramatic shift away from its international role of the past.

India's domestic and regional focus was further sharpened by the events that unfolded in Pakistan throughout this period. Accompanying the traditional dispute over Kashmir was the continued American build-up of Pakistan and the friendly relations that developed between China and Pakistan. Although India gave a relatively strong showing in the 1965 border war with Pakistan, it was clear by this point that non-alignment, as envisioned by Nehru, was undergoing a major transformation. Domestic and regional security concerns following the 1962 defeat led India to begin to accept military assistance from both the Soviet Union and the West. This was viewed by many as a direct departure from Nehru's goal of remaining aloof from the struggle for influence by the two super powers in the South Asian region. Furthermore, India also began to doubt its role as a middle power and, subsequently, it shifted its focus away from multilateralism via the United Nations. The drift away from Nehru's conception of non-alignment was also evident with the Tashkent agreement between India and Pakistan that followed the 1965 war. Moscow's key role in negotiating an end to the dispute, something that the West had

⁵⁷ Hardgrave and Kochanek, 347.

⁵⁸ Kapur, "Indian foreign policy", 231.

failed to do, marked the first signs of a significant Indian drift toward the Soviet Union. These developments were compounded by the fact that Nehru and Krishna Menon, the two main catalysts of Indian foreign policy since independence, were no longer participants in India's international affairs. These events thus clearly marked the beginning of a new era in Indian foreign policy.

By 1971, however, India had managed to regain much of the confidence in its status as a global and regional power that had been lost following the 1962 border war. This third period in India's foreign policy, 1971-80, marked a renewed belief in the country's abilities as a pre-eminent middle power, but, surprisingly, this era also reflected a continuation of the neo-isolationist policy that had dominated period two. There were two significant factors that contributed to India's development of non-alignment during this period. The first factor was India's new perception of security at this time. India's defeat of Pakistan in the 1971 war, stemming from the secessionist struggle of the eastern wing of Pakistan and the subsequent emergence of Bangladesh, meant that India was now the dominant power in the region. The 1971 Indo-Soviet treaty of friendship, contracted to deter a Chinese intervention in the Bangladesh war of secession, and the 1974 Indian nuclear explosion, although arguably major steps away from Nehru's vision of non-alignment, also contributed to India's feeling of security within the Asian region. As a result of these developments, then, many of the dominant regional security concerns that India had following 1962 were eliminated.

The second significant event that contributed to the changing nature of Indian non-alignment during this period was the continued emergence of Indira Gandhi. By 1971 Indira Gandhi had been successful in securing her own position within the Indian government. Her aim had been more power for the Prime Minister and her advisers, and not negotiated authority or shared powers between Mrs. Gandhi and her constitutional

opposition at the centre and state levels.⁵⁹ By 1971, this goal had been achieved, and it meant that Indira Gandhi was secure in Indian politics, and that India was secure in its South Asian military-political relations. Mrs. Gandhi's strong neo-isolationist preferences in foreign policy and her new-found strength and security within her own government, along with the factors already discussed, meant that Indian neo-isolationism continued to grow throughout this third period of Indian foreign policy.

The 1980-84 period of Indian foreign policy saw the beginnings of new moves toward re-establishing Indian internationalism, accompanied by attempts at trying to address some of the past shifts away from non-alignment that had occurred. "Mrs. Gandhi sought with some success to enhance Indian security and to refurbish its non-aligned credentials by establishing more balance in India's relations with the two super powers and by continuing efforts to normalize relations with China and Pakistan."⁶⁰ The motives behind these efforts were new international and domestic economic and security concerns. Internationally, India wanted to improve its access to the high technology and investment capital of the western world and also enhance its regional security in terms of China and Pakistan. Domestically, however, Indian internationalism was driven by fear of the rising militance of the country's Sikh movement. India, throughout this period, made new efforts to seek out actively those countries that could help deal with the increasing threat to domestic security that the Sikhs posed. The reality of the seriousness of this situation became clear with the government's raid on the Golden Temple in Punjab and the assassination of Indira Gandhi by Sikh bodyguards in 1984. Obviously, finding interested support in dealing with the domestic Sikh issue now ranked high among the objectives of Indian foreign policy.

⁵⁹ Ibid, 234.

⁶⁰ Walter K. Andersen, "India in 1982: Domestic challenges and foreign policy success", *Asian Survey*, February 1983, 111.

The period that has evolved since 1984 can be described as the Rajiv Gandhi era of Indian politics. Rajiv had never been considered the political successor to his mother's leadership of the Congress party. His brother Sanjay, until he died in a helicopter crash in 1981, had always been groomed to take over the family's political legacy. Despite his newness to politics and his somewhat dubious leadership abilities, Rajiv has, to this point, been relatively successful in pursuing an active and fruitful approach to foreign policy.⁶¹

The first indication of Rajiv's impact on Indian foreign policy was his commitment to the renewed internationalism that was started by his mother in 1980. Gandhi's first sign of success in the pursuit of these goals was in terms of India's rapprochement with China. Questions involving the border region between these two countries remain, but the succession of Rajiv was clearly accompanied by a continued warming in relations between India and China. The pronouncements "both by the Indian and Chinese governments after the inauguration of the Rajiv Gandhi administration [reflected] more than diplomatic niceties. They [manifested] a positive frame which had... emerged in recent years for a steady development of India-China relations."⁶²

Furthermore, recently, India has also made new headway in developing closer relations with Pakistan. It has been obvious to observers that since Benazir Bhutto's election, Rajiv has "been courting [her] openly. He sent her a congratulatory telegram on her electoral victory. He dispatched, in secret, a key aid to sound out the possibility of an early meeting. They met just after Christmas and signed an agreement not to attack each other's nuclear facilities."⁶³ Subsequently, as a result of that Christmas meeting, "India

⁶¹ For more information on Rajiv's leadership, see Richard Gwyn, "A nice man in an un-nice land - Gandhi the reluctant leader", *The Toronto Star*, February 25, 1989, A-9.

⁶² Manoranjan Mohanty, "India-China Relations", *India Quarterly*, January-March 1985, 17.

⁶³ Gwyn, "A nice man", A-9.

will [also] sponsor Pakistan's re-entry into the Commonwealth after a 17 year absence."⁶⁴ Accompanying these successes in terms of China and Pakistan, Rajiv has also displayed a renewed Indian internationalism in terms of forging stronger links with the Commonwealth, an institution towards which his mother had displayed a great deal of indifference. Clearly, then, contemporary Indian foreign policy has made a serious commitment toward a renewed internationalist approach to non-alignment.

From this discussion it is clear that the foreign policies of both India and Canada have gone through a number of changes throughout their evolution. It is also clear that during certain stages the foreign policies of both countries have shared a number of similarities. These similarities, however, have also been accompanied by a number of differences in international goals and objectives. It is apparent that the earliest and latest periods of Indian and Canadian foreign policy have shown the most similarities while there was considerable divergence over a long middle period. As the following chapters make clear, the evidence suggests that the similarities and differences that have existed in Canadian and Indian foreign policy have had a direct bearing on the degree of closeness of this bilateral relationship at various moments in history.

⁶⁴ Richard Gwyn, "Gandhi-Bhutto meeting heralds the 'Year of Asia'", The Toronto Star, January 29, 1989, H-1.

Chapter III

The Indo-Canadian Political Relationship **1947-57**

From the preceding discussion of Canadian and Indian foreign policy, it is apparent that the common perceptions of their middle power status and the similar approaches to international affairs that both countries shared during the period to 1957 provided the foundation for a strong early political relationship. The global political reality of this period gave these emerging post-war middle powers an important role in world affairs at this time and positive relations between them were viewed as being beneficial to world stability. M.S. Rajan has even gone on as far as to say that "the development of close and cordial relations between India and Canada [was] one of the most notable features of post-war international relations."⁶⁵

A number of events reflected the common perceptions that both countries had of their global roles during this era and contributed to the strong, bilateral relationship. One of the first indications of this cordial relationship was the implementation of the Franchise Act of British Columbia following India's independence in 1947. This Act, which extended the right to vote to the province's East Indian community, had been something that Nehru had been interested in for some time. The telegrams that were exchanged following the passing of the Act gave a good indication of India's and Canada's desire to cement warm

⁶⁵ Rajan, 384.

relations. A telegram from Nehru in New Delhi stated that India "would like to convey to P.M. of Canada, to Premier of B.C., and to yourself [St. Laurent], my appreciation and thanks for action taken by legislative assembly of British Columbia in passing bill enfranchising Indians. I hope this is forerunner of increasingly friendly relations between Canada and India."⁶⁶ Canada's reply to Nehru also echoed a positive attitude, stating that the Canadian government hoped that "friendship between India and Canada will be strengthened by this action."⁶⁷ Although this may have been a relatively small event in the global affairs of these two countries, it nonetheless set a positive tone for future interactions between the two countries.

A more significant factor that contributed to a strong relationship during this period was both countries' membership in the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth connection between India and Canada, which will be evident throughout the three periods of this study, was first solidified during this era. India's membership in the Commonwealth, however, almost did not materialize. As John Kirton points out, "former colonies of the United Kingdom become members of the Commonwealth neither automatically nor through pressure but through the voluntary choice of a free and equal country."⁶⁸ Following India's independence, there was some question as to whether the country even wanted to join the organization. There was a general feeling of hostility in India toward Britain because "it was popularly believed that the British had cheated Congress of its full inheritance by encouraging the Muslims to demand a separate state for Pakistan."⁶⁹ Before the question of India's role in the Commonwealth ever materialized there were already

⁶⁶ House of Commons Debates, Hansard, 3rd Session, 20th Parliament, April 24, 1947. (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1947), 2355.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Kirton, 2.

⁶⁹ Peyton V. Lyon, "Introduction", in Canada and the Third World, 5.

negative feelings toward that organization, both within government, and among the general public as well.

The first clear sign after independence of India's reluctance to join the organization came during the 1948 Commonwealth Conference. Although India saw a number of short and long-term advantages of staying in the organization, such as its being a means to maintain the loyalty of the British-trained civil service and to obtain the trade, finance, and aid contributions that would accompany membership, the Indian government still had reservations about the status that India would have in this association. The particular stumbling block that first emerged at the 1948 Conference was how India could retain membership while at the same time changing its constitutional status, as Nehru desired, to that of a republic. For this to occur, however, a change in the "Royal Style and Titles" which bound members of the Commonwealth to an allegiance to the King or Queen had to occur. Nehru, at the 1948 conference made it clear that India wanted to remain in the organization and would accept the role of the King, but only "as the symbol of the free association of the Commonwealth countries."⁷⁰ He also declared that India "adamantly refused to have any part of an association in which the former imperial symbols would have a place. The Crown- the Emperor-King, British subjects- all such concepts redolent of the imperial connection were cleared away by India's assertive republicanism."⁷¹

Canada was anxious to see the nature of the Commonwealth link changed in order to facilitate continuing Indian membership. This position stemmed not only from St. Laurent's and Pearson's perception of the Commonwealth as a bridge between the continents and races of the globe, but also from the pragmatic view of the Commonwealth as a means of "assisting the newly independent nations such as India, Pakistan and Ceylon to develop the democratic institutions, as well as the economic and social conditions that

⁷⁰ Munro and Inglis, 102.

⁷¹ Lyon, 6.

would prevent them from falling prey to communism."⁷² Because of India's size and strategic position, Canada saw India as one of the dominant nations of South Asia and hoped its participation in the Commonwealth would allow the West to influence its political development. Australia, New Zealand and several other countries, however, were opposed to this "special treatment" and did not view India's membership in the Commonwealth as important enough to warrant changes in the King's title as was discussed at the 1948 Conference. As a result of their opposition, the status of Indian Commonwealth membership was put over to the 1949 Commonwealth Conference, which was principally called to deal with the question of India's remaining in the Commonwealth after becoming a republic.⁷³

At the 1949 meeting, Canada fully supported Nehru's position and made it clear that "other member countries should recognize the King as 'Head of the Commonwealth', but, since they did not participate in his choice as sovereign, they were free to decide whether or not to accept allegiance to him as their own head of state."⁷⁴ Pearson played a role, albeit a rather insignificant one, in the drafting of the Conference's final declaration and described his contribution and the importance of India's membership in his memoirs. Pearson noted:

So far as I was concerned, my part was easy to play. Once we had decided in Ottawa to support the inclusion of republican India in the Commonwealth and once India accepted the Crown as a symbol of that association, All I had to do was help with suggestions to meet the difficulties raised by Pakistan, South Africa, and the 'down-under' countries. ... This was one of the most important landmarks in the history of the Commonwealth. It was the critical moment in her post-war development. Had we been unable to solve the

⁷² Thomson, Louis St. Laurent, 267.

⁷³ Modifications had been made to the King's Title in 1948 to try to keep India in the Commonwealth as a republic. Nehru returned home to consult his cabinet and ultimately decided that, unlike Ireland and Burma, India would remain in the organization. New Zealand and Australia were opposed to the new direction for the Commonwealth and the 1949 Conference was called to deal with this issue.

⁷⁴ Thomson, Louis St. Laurent, 267.

problem of India's admission as a republic, we would not have the Commonwealth we have today with all the members of Asia and Africa.⁷⁵

The similar positions of Canada and India on this Commonwealth issue are a good indication of the basis of the relationship that existed between them throughout this first period. Although Canada and India saw eye to eye on the republican issue within the Commonwealth, it was more a situation of corresponding foreign policy interests than any "special" relationship. India's Commonwealth membership was consistent with Canada's pragmatic view of the importance of the containment of communism in the region, with its natural support of self determination based on its own colonial experience, and with its idealistic goal of building international cooperation via a multilateral association. For India's part, the importance attached to the Commonwealth stemmed from its pragmatic need for aid, trade, and defence assistance as well as from its idealism and tolerance toward former colonial states during this time. While Canada's role in the 1949 conference was a positive contribution to both the development of Indo-Canadian relations and the Commonwealth, the outcome ultimately reflected the convergence of these countries pragmatic/idealistic approaches to foreign policy rather than any significant "special" bilateral relationship. In sum, the solution reached at the 1949 Commonwealth Conference was consistent with both Canadian and Indian foreign policy goals.

The importance of the role of India and Canada in the Commonwealth throughout this period should not be underestimated. A great deal of Canadian activity in South Asia during the 1950s was a direct result of Canada's Commonwealth ties with its Asian members. The Indo-Canadian relationship in this period was even described as something that was vital and necessary in the Commonwealth and world affairs of the 1950s. As one observer noted, this relationship "made a signal contribution to the unity and the stability of

⁷⁵ Munro and Inglis, 106.

the Commonwealth by saving the latter from being divided on many an explosive issue, along East-West or racial lines."⁷⁶ A strong indication of the importance of the Commonwealth was noticeable with Canada's decision to become involved in the Colombo Plan. At a Conference of Commonwealth external affairs ministers in Colombo, in January 1950, Nehru appealed for massive economic and technical aid to the new nations of Asia, and also for recognition of the communist government in Peking, as the only ways of influencing future developments in Asia. Although Canadian recognition of China was not forthcoming at this particular time, Canada responded to Nehru's call for a substantial aid program in the region. Escott Reid has described the relevance of the Commonwealth tie to the Canadian decision to involve itself with South Asian development:

In 1951 Canada for the first time in its history committed itself to give grants to poor countries to help them speed up their economic development. This decision to join the Colombo Plan may well not have been the result of a special relationship with India but it is clear that it would not have taken place if these countries to be helped, India, Pakistan, and Ceylon had not been members of the Commonwealth.⁷⁷

Canada's aid efforts to India during this first period of the bilateral relationship should not be underestimated regardless of the motives that may have existed for its contributions. In fact, this development assistance was one of, if not the most, important aspects of the bilateral relationship at this time. India was the number one recipient of Canadian aid from 1947-57, obtaining close to \$200 million that equalled 55.2% of Canada's development assistance program during this period. Although there has been criticism from many sources regarding Canadian development assistance in India and other

⁷⁶ Gangal, India and the Commonwealth, 53.

⁷⁷ Escott Reid, "Special relationships: Canada, India and the United States", Canadian Forum, December-June 1982-83, 18.

developing nations, the importance of Ottawa's assistance efforts cannot be underestimated in terms of the overall bilateral relationship between these two countries.

The Canadian aid program and the Colombo Plan are discussed at greater length in Chapter 6, but it should be recognized at this point that, much like the 1949 Commonwealth Conference, Indo-Canadian agreement on the importance of this aid program was largely a result of the compatibility of their foreign policy objectives. Canada saw aid as fulfilling the goal of alleviating poverty and thereby containing communism in developing Asian countries. It was, in short, one reflection of the foreign policy of functional internationalism practiced during this period. For its part, India's participation can be explained as a fulfillment of the non-alignment goal of securing aid from both the Western world and the Soviet bloc. As with the issue of Commonwealth membership, their convergent positions on the utility of the Colombo Plan contributed to a strong early Indo-Canadian relationship.

Another element in the Indo-Canadian relationship, evident throughout the various periods of interaction and prominent in the first period, was the Kashmir issue. Following the partition of India and Pakistan in 1947, one of the main problems facing the two governments was what to do with the states under princely rule. Under British rule they had been bound to the British central government by a series of treaties, but these had now lapsed. In most cases, accession of the princely states to either India or Pakistan was the logical solution to their status, since the vast majority were enclaves within one or the other of the new sovereign states of the sub-continent and lacked the resources and diplomatic capability to become independent states in their own right. The situation in Jammu and Kashmir was, however, much different.

The facts regarding Kashmir in this first period are relatively straightforward. The state of Jammu and Kashmir, the largest of the 600-odd princely states, before 1947, was

ruled by a Hindu Maharajah. Its population of about four million was 77 percent Muslim at the time of partition.⁷⁸ Fighting broke out when Pakistani tribesmen spilled into the region and the Hindu Maharajah turned to India for help, acceding to that country in order to obtain its military assistance in repelling the invaders. Pakistan, however, termed the accession a fraud and was extremely disturbed that Indian troops were used to halt the tribal invasion. Viewing Kashmir as its territory given its Muslim majority, Pakistan made a decision to support the tribesmen.

The Indian government on January 1, 1948 was the first government to bring the Kashmir situation in front of the United Nations Security Council. Essentially, the Indian complaint was against Pakistan's support for the tribesmen and India called for an end to Pakistani activities in Kashmir. The Indian government's argument "was based on the validity of the Maharajah's accession to India. Pakistan had no right to aid the tribesmen or to permit her materials to take part in the Kashmir fighting."⁷⁹ India wanted it to be made clear that as far as it was concerned Pakistan had no legal justifications or basis for its actions on the grounds of the Muslim majority within Kashmir. India "did not believe, as the theorists of Pakistan did, that before partition there had been two nations in India, one Hindu and one Muslim, that the partition of India was based on this two-nation theory, and that India was a Hindu state. India was not a Hindu state; it was a secular state."⁸⁰ Accordingly, India viewed Pakistan's claims to Kashmir based on religion, and its criticisms of the Maharajah's accession, as invalid.

Pakistan, not surprisingly, denied India's charges of assisting the tribesmen and made it very clear that it viewed the situation in Kashmir as a popular revolt resulting from

⁷⁸ Brecher, *The New States of Asia*, 180.

⁷⁹ Alastair Lamb, *The Kashmir Problem- A Historical Survey*, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1966), 55.

⁸⁰ Reid, *Envoy to Nehru*, 117.

the Hindu Maharajah's regime and accession. Both countries did manage to agree, however, that the best solution to the problem was to hold a plebiscite in which the citizens of Kashmir could determine whether India or Pakistan would take control of the state. The plebiscite idea, however, raised new differences between the two countries in terms of how the actual vote would take place. India wanted the withdrawal of all Pakistani troops and tribesmen before the plebiscite whereas Pakistan wanted a complete withdrawal of Indian troops and the establishment of some sort of non-partisan government to neutralize the influence of the Maharajah before the holding of the vote. In the Security Council of the United Nations a resolution was introduced in January 1948, calling on both sides to cease hostilities at once. This was to be followed by the formation of a United Nations commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP). The UNCIP was to "investigate the situation on the spot, to endeavour to help India and Pakistan to bring about law and order in Kashmir, and then to try to arrange for a plebiscite to decide the future of the state."⁸¹ This was to be accompanied by a complete withdrawal of Pakistani troops as well as a removal of the majority of Indian troops. Once a truce treaty could be agreed upon the plebiscite was to take place.

The plan, however, was rejected by Pakistan and only tentatively accepted by India, effectively grounding any U.N. plans for a plebiscite in 1948. A cease-fire in the region was, however, arranged and the UNCIP placed a group of military observers in the area, which came to be known as the U.N. Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP). Canada was a member of the UNMOGIP that was established at this time, creating yet another tie between Canada and India (and Pakistan).

In December 1949, the U.N. Security Council again tried to solve the Kashmir problem by getting its president to mediate the dispute, and Canada became directly

⁸¹ Lamb, 59.

involved for a second time in the Kashmir problem. The President of the Security Council at this time was a Canadian by the name of General McNaughton and, although he was asked to mediate as an independent observer of the U.N. and not as a Canadian citizen, there were certain factors which made this situation difficult for him. Although India had gained independence only two years earlier, it was generally recognized that Canada and India were already sharing a cooperative middle power role in world affairs that was contributing to a situation of fairly close bilateral relations. "This co-operation with India [had] led subsequently to service together on various... United Nations committees and special forces. It also made General McNaughton's task of working out the terms of the plebiscite in Kashmir in early 1950 at the request of the Security Council even more delicate."⁸²

The eventual proposals of the McNaughton mediation were rejected by Pakistan and India and subsequent efforts by the Dixon, Graham and Jarring Commissions that were set up by the Security Council also met with failure. As Lamb has pointed out in his assessment of the U.N.'s efforts in Kashmir, "it may be said that in the space of some seventeen years the United Nations made absolutely no progress at all in its quest for a final solution to the problem. It had played an important role in securing a cease-fire and the demarcation of a cease-fire line. ... Once the cease-fire had been achieved, however, there was really little beyond this that the United Nations could do."⁸³

A feeling of futility regarding Kashmir was also expressed by Pearson following his visit to Pakistan and India during his 1950 Colombo Plan trip. Pearson had difficulty understanding the incredible emotional intensity in which both countries viewed the Kashmir situation. After discussing this issue with both Liaquat Ali Khan, the Prime

⁸² Barrie Morrison, "Canada and South Asia," in Canada and the Third World, 16.

⁸³ Lamb, 65.

Minister of Pakistan, and Nehru, Pearson also realized that the American position, which was that if India were pushed a little harder it would yield and accept a U.N. proposal on the matter, was unfounded. Pearson, along with Britain's High Commissioner Sir Archibald Nye, came to the conclusion that an impasse had been reached by both sides and that any other U.N. efforts regarding Kashmir at this time were likely pointless. In his memoirs, Pearson pointed out that he "reported these conclusions to Ottawa and suggested that [Canada] should extricate [itself] from any responsibility [it] might have incurred because of General McNaughton's presidency of the Security Council in December 1949. ... [His] visit to New Delhi confirmed [his] feeling that there was not much hope now for a solution through the Security Council, and little possibility that any resolution of that Council would be acceptable to or make an impression on the Indian government. ... In short all the arguments [he] heard in Karachi were repeated in reverse in Delhi. It was all very depressing and baffling and fraught with danger to peace."⁸⁴

Despite the seemingly unbreakable impasse that existed at this time, there did appear to be a possible solution to the problem in 1953 when the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Mohammed Ali, visited India and he and Nehru agreed to a plebiscite for Kashmir in 1955. The positive environment for change, however, broke down as a result of the United States' arms supplies to Pakistan that began during this same period. Escott Reid, the then Canadian High Commissioner to India, has written that Nehru in August of 1953 "was for the first time prepared, in the interests of improving relations with Pakistan, to run the risk of losing the vale but that his willingness to make concessions to Pakistan... ceased to exist in or around December 1953 because of the negotiations between the United States and Pakistan for a military aid agreement."⁸⁵ Reid has further commented that the Indian

⁸⁴ Munro and Inglis, 117.

⁸⁵ Reid, Envoy to Nehru, 123.

government pleaded with the American government to halt these negotiations so that India and Pakistan could come to a successful solution to the Kashmir problem, but the Americans refused these pleas.

Any question as to Canada's position on the Kashmir issue was dispelled in 1954 when St. Laurent, at Nehru's urging, embarked on an Asian goodwill tour. It was speculated in the media that the Canadian Prime Minister might serve as an intermediary between India and the United States, and in view of the resentment in India of the U.S. military pact with Pakistan (December 1953) bear reassurances to Nehru from President Dwight D. Eisenhower of continued American support for India and its peaceful intentions in the region. Although these speculations were unfounded, St. Laurent was interested in doing what he could to improve India's perceptions of American policies, but he was also adamant that at no time would he openly criticize the United States for its interest in, and its military assistance to, Pakistan. This was evident at one point during the visit when, despite continued badgering by the Indian press, St. Laurent refused to break down and condemn the American activities in Pakistan. However, when the attacks against the Americans continued, he finally retorted: "You are free to criticize the United States government. I am not going to do so."⁸⁶

St. Laurent's actions in 1954 made it clear that, as strong as Indo-Canadian relations were at this time, Canada still attached far higher priority to its relationship with the United States. In fact, due to what amounted to India's rejection of the McNaughton proposal and its unwillingness to move toward a solution after 1953, Canada began to view India as being the main problem in terms of the Kashmir situation. Furthermore, "St. Laurent and Pearson believed that Nehru was unduly shrill in his protests against the

⁸⁶ Thomson, "India and Canada", 421.

United States' military aid to Pakistan... ."⁸⁷ Clearly, by 1954, Canadian sympathies were not with India in regards to Kashmir.

The Kashmir situation in this period offers a good indication of the changes that were to occur in the Indo-Canadian relationship as the foreign policy objectives of these two countries began to diverge. Canada's early position regarding Kashmir, including its support for the McNaughton proposal and its participation on UNMOGIP, were examples of its pursuit of the policy of functional internationalism and its commitment to the U.N. . However, Nehru's unwillingness to compromise on this issue, especially after the American arms agreement was signed in 1953, indicated that any role that India might have early on seen for the U.N. in Kashmir, was now replaced by a desire to contain Pakistan and maintain its position as the pre-eminent power of the region. By this point, with a U.N. role unattainable, Canadian frustration regarding Kashmir which had first been visible during Pearson's 1950 visit, was becoming well entrenched. Put simply, as differences in foreign policy objectives regarding Kashmir and Pakistan began to emerge, their bilateral relations deteriorated. While Canadian efforts on Kashmir in the early stages likely had at least some positive impact on the relationship, this was certainly not the case by 1953-54. Further, as various other issues developed where the objectives of India and Canada differed, additional strains on the bilateral relationship became evident towards the end of this first period.

Indo-Canadian collaboration vis-à-vis the Korean War was another prominent aspect of Indo-Canadian relations in the early post-war years. Following World War Two, Korea was promised by the major allied powers that independence would be granted some time in the near future. At the end of the war Korea was divided in two at the 38th parallel. This division was intended merely to allow for the disarming of Japanese troops by

⁸⁷ Reid, Envoy to Nehru, 259.

Russian and American forces. However, due to the disintegration of relations between the two great powers at this time, the line hardened into a political and economic boundary bisecting the country. Close to 20 million Koreans became confined to the south and about 9 million were living to the north of the parallel.

When conflict broke out on the Korean peninsula, a United Nations force was set up to resist the North Korean invasion of the south because of a Soviet boycott of the U.N. Security Council during this time. By September 1950, the U.N. forces in Korea had managed to reverse their lack of success in the war and were now actually in a position to pursue the North Korean troops across the Yalu river. The question now facing the U.N. was whether to risk the involvement of the Chinese by following the Koreans up to the Chinese border or to instead press for a negotiated peace. The Americans, much to the dismay of the Canadian government, pushed for a continuation of the fighting and eventually managed to secure a resolution advocating the pursuit of the enemy troops across the Yalu river. General MacArthur, the commander of the United Nations forces, sent the U.N. troops over on October 9th and a week later, they found themselves doing battle with Chinese units. "Since Peking was presumed to be acting with Soviet backing, a major conflict became once more a serious possibility."⁸⁸

The first indication of direct Indo-Canadian interaction on the Korean issue came with a U.N. resolution on December 14, 1950 which set up a three man-committee to examine prospects for a cease-fire. Pearson, Rau (the Indian delegate) and the United Nations President, Nasrullah Entezam of Iran, were chosen for this task. In January of 1951 the Cease-Fire Committee finally managed to reach an agreement on a basic statement of principles dealing with the necessary requirements to end hostilities. Although the Chinese responded to these proposals rather ambiguously, Pearson did not feel that this

⁸⁸ Thomson, Louis St. Laurent, 301.

was necessarily a bad sign. As India attempted to gain Chinese support for the proposals, however, the United States was at the same time pursuing a resolution in the U.N. to name China as the aggressor in the Korean conflict. Although Canada was later pressured into supporting this resolution, Pearson "made it clear to the Assembly that [the Canadian government] did not think the course was the wisest."⁸⁹ Thereafter, the Committee continued to search for a possible peace settlement throughout the years of fighting, but there is no doubt that the American attitude damaged the hopes for success of these efforts.

Another indication of India and Canada working together on the Korean issue was evident during the 1951 Commonwealth Conference. The Commonwealth was important because this organization gave Canada a smaller and more informed forum within which it could deal with the Korean issue with India, which was one of the few countries that had recognized the Peoples Republic of China. Thomson, in his biography of Louis St. Laurent, makes it clear that both St. Laurent and Nehru placed a great deal of emphasis on the role of the Commonwealth and its ability to bridge the gap between East and West. Thomson states that "just as Nehru served as an interpreter of the non-Western world, so Canada, together with Great Britain, took considerable pains to explain United States policies."⁹⁰ During the 1951 Commonwealth Conference, Nehru pushed hard for the other leaders of the organization to use their full influence in trying to negotiate a settlement of the conflict. The discussion that ensued, according to Thomson, led to a statement of principles that was submitted to the Peoples Republic of China, and after being reviewed by Peking, China came forward for the first time and stated that a cease-fire could likely be agreed upon. It was also decided by the Conference that as much pressure as possible would be placed on the United States government to accept a cease-fire agreement. Thus,

⁸⁹ Munro and Inglis, 170.

⁹⁰ Thomson, "India and Canada", 417.

"while it cannot be asserted that the Commonwealth 'bridge' solved the Korean crisis," Thomson believes that "it did contribute significantly to the solution."⁹¹

Despite these joint efforts to settle the Korean conflict, it became more and more apparent that any armistice plans would be linked to the issue of the prisoners of war situation that would develop following the end of the conflict. The original U.N. resolution on this issue (known as the 21 power resolution) was put forward by the United States and called for the recognition of the rights of all prisoners of war... to be repatriated [without] the use of force in their repatriation."⁹² Krishna Menon, the new Indian delegate to the U.N., however, made it clear that China and North Korea would likely not support the resolution, and subsequently he put forward an Indian one on this issue. The United States, feeling its motion was adequate to deal with the problem and believing that Menon was wrong in his criticism of it, refused to support the Indian resolution. Paul Martin, however, in his account of this issue makes it clear that Canada did what it could to change the mind of the Americans. He notes that the "American Secretary of State had a pride of authorship in his country's resolution and his personal dislike for Krishna Menon was no secret. ...St.Laurent exercised a moderating influence on Acheson [the U.S. Secretary of State], assuring him that Menon served as an important link with Peking and that [Canada] attached the greatest value to our close relations with India and its P.M., Pandit Nehru."⁹³ Menon and Pearson continued to work together to reconcile the American and Indian views on the POW issue. As Pearson notes in his memoirs, Canada eventually "succeeded in this and when the [Canadian delegation] went home for Christmas 1952 the Indian resolution, after a long and stormy passage, was a matter of record at the United Nations, together with the Chinese and North Korean rejections of the resolution."⁹⁴ Despite Chinese and

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² Martin, 150.

⁹³ Ibid, 152.

⁹⁴ Munro and Inglis, 185.

North Korean lack of support for the resolution, it was apparent that India and Canada had worked strongly together in an attempt to make this resolution a success.

By March of 1953, however, the Chinese and North Koreans indicated that they were now prepared to try to eliminate the differences that existed over the Indian resolution. The United States, on the other hand, responded to these new overtures by putting forward new resolutions in the U.N that were even more difficult for the Chinese to accept than the Indian proposals of a few months earlier in that they made still harsher demands on the North Koreans in terms of the POW issue. "Canada, and other countries that had sent forces to Korea to fight along side the Americans objected. Canada's objections were conveyed privately to the United States. India's protest was made publicly by Nehru on 14, May."⁹⁵ Within a month, however, the United States succumbed to the pressure of the complaints from these countries and as a result finally endorsed the principles of the Indian resolution. The Korean armistice was then signed on July 27, 1953.

After the armistice was accepted, the next issue that involved Canada and India in the Korean situation was India's proposed membership in the Korean peace conference. Most U.N. members, because of the importance of the Indian resolution in reaching an armistice, felt that India should be involved in any peace negotiations. The United States, on the other hand, was strongly opposed to any Indian involvement.

Canada, in a letter submitted to the United States State Department outlining objectives of the Korean peace conference, made it clear that it was:

essential that India should be invited to be a member of the conference and should be given the opportunity of taking an important part in its deliberations. India [had] contributed very considerably towards the solution of the prisoners of war question, and will be playing an important role as a member of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, in

⁹⁵ Reid, Envoy to Nehru, 46.

addition of course to being the largest and most important non-communist state in Asia.⁹⁶

India also made it clear to the United States that it attached the greatest significance to its participation in the conference. This was evident in the response to the American opposition by Raghavan Pillai, the Indian Secretary- General of the Ministry of External Affairs. He stated that if the American opposition to India's membership were to continue "the United States would be making a 'terrible mistake', a 'frightful error' the effect [of which] on Indo-American relations would be 'deplorable.'"⁹⁷

Despite this pressure the Americans continued to stand firm on their position regarding India's participation. On top of their dislike for Krishna Menon, they felt that the "presence of the Indians would incorporate extraneous issues in an already sensitive agenda, and might jeopardize the conference by antagonizing the South Koreans. In any case, New Delhi's relations with Peking were too sympathetic for American taste."⁹⁸ On 27, August 1953, the General Assembly voted on a Commonwealth resolution that was to provide for Indian membership. In the final vote, the United States, Pakistan, Greece, Taiwan and seventeen Latin American countries (excluding Mexico and Guatemala) all voted against the resolution. The final vote was 27 for, 21 against and 11 abstentions. The vote allowed the resolution to go before the General Assembly in Plenary session, but it was apparent that the resolution would not receive the needed majority of two-thirds and, therefore, the Indian delegation asked that it not be put to a vote. As a result, the issue of India's participation in the peace conference was over and it was clear that Canadian and Indian attempts to influence the Americans had failed.

⁹⁶ Ibid, 49.

⁹⁷ Ibid, 49.

⁹⁸ Stairs, 8.

Overall, Indo-Canadian cooperation on the Korean situation was one of the best examples of their positive bilateral relationship during this first period. Not only did it illustrate the similar objectives of both countries' foreign policies in the U.N., but it also indicated that Canada viewed its relations with India and the Commonwealth as being important enough to challenge the Americans on many of their positions both during and after the Korean conflict. Canada's "twin objectives of constraining the American threat to conduct an unlimited anti-communist crusade and enhancing the strength of the United Nations in its critical collective security function [were] largely shared by India, which provided a reinforcing scepticism of American interests, a crucial regional perspective, and a critical channel of communication with the Peoples Republic of China, not yet diplomatically recognized."⁹⁹ Clearly, Indo-Canadian relations played a key role in the eventual Korean armistice.

There is no question, however, that as important as Korea was for the strengthening of Indo-Canadian relations, it served to further widen the gap between India and the United States. Although Canada continually backed India on many of the anti-Indian positions of the United States, the Korean situation was not without some difficulties for Canada-India relations. It must be remembered that India, despite sharing many of the same middle power objectives and perceptions as Canada in the post-war period, largely viewed the Canadian government as valuable as a means of influencing the United States. As a result of the failure of Canadian efforts to persuade the Americans on the issue of India's participation in the peace conference, India may have slightly altered its image of Canada's importance in this regard. Despite this, however, the Korean situation still offers a good example of the similar foreign policy objectives of the two countries leading to a positive bilateral relationship at this time.

⁹⁹ Dewitt and Kirton, 54.

The significant event that marked the beginning of the end of the positive relations of period one was the Indo-Canadian joint participation on the Indo-China Supervisory Commissions (ICC) established after the Geneva Accords (1954), to supervise cease-fires in the newly created states of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos at the conclusion of France's protracted, unsuccessful struggle to reimpose its colonial rule in Indo-China after World War II.

After two months of bargaining, the negotiators finally managed to settle on the drafting of the Final Declaration of the Geneva Accords on Indo-China. The Accords set up three supervisory Commissions, one each for Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam. The question as to which countries would serve on the Commissions, however, was not dealt with until the final hours of the conference. The Americans, who had a particular concern regarding the situation in Vietnam, had always opposed the Geneva process for this area and were concerned with what they saw as the communist threat to this region, ie. the risk of the pro-Western successor government to France in South Vietnam being displaced by revolutionary forces, backed by Ho Chi Minh's communist government in North Vietnam. When it became apparent that the Commissions were going to be set up, however, the Americans wanted someone on the ICC to look after their interests in the region. The country they sought out for this cause was Canada.

The American motives for selecting Canada were made clear in a telephone message that John Foster Dulles, the American representative at Geneva, sent to Eisenhower after it was apparent that Canada was to be a member of the new ICC. The message stated that the supervisory Committee would be comprised of Poland, India and Canada and that it would function on the basis of unanimity which would put Canada in a position where it could block initiatives by the other members. In another phone call to Washington later that day, the U.S. Secretary of State offered his initial reactions: "Dulles said that such a commission was not particularly advantageous to us but that if the commission were given veto power, Canada could at least vote against Poland and India, and this would probably be to our

advantage in the long run."¹⁰⁰ Clearly, the United States saw Canada's participation as a way of securing its own interests rather than promoting peace in the supervisory areas.

There were, however, other logical reasons for the selection of Canada beyond this suspect American motive. As James Eayrs has pointed out, "Canada's ability to work amiably and productively with India, its capacity to field officers, both diplomatic and military, fluent in the *lingua franca* of the region, the proficiency at which its armed forces had been trained and equipped, its special relations with the United States which could be regarded as... offsetting to some degree the influence of the Soviet Union's pliable Poles- all these credentials served to provide Canada with the requisite salience for nomination."¹⁰¹ Even though Canada appeared, then, to be a natural choice for a number of reasons, the Canadian government still had several reservations about getting involved in the Indo-China Commissions. These concerns included the fact that the ICC was not a U.N. sponsored effort and that the potential did exist for Canada's being dragged into a prolonged commitment in a series of countries which had no real significance in terms of Canadian security interests. Despite these anxieties, however, the Canadian government found itself in a situation where it was, in effect, trapped by the image it had been conveying of itself as a middle power prepared to assume international responsibilities in the interests of advancing the cause of global peace and security. Thus, the Canadian government was left with little choice but to accept the invitation to participate, and it formally did so on July 28. When looking at other possible motives for both Indian and Canadian participation on the ICC, the American nuclear policy of this period has to be taken into consideration. Due to the economic crisis facing the Eisenhower administration, American defence policy became strongly centred on the use of nuclear weapons. The United States had decided that the most cost- effective way of maintaining its national

¹⁰⁰ Eayrs, 56.

¹⁰¹ Ibid, 150.

defence and global position was through the doctrine of massive retaliation, threatening the use of nuclear weapons against any aggressor state. As a result, conventional American forces had been cut dramatically in the 1950s and were in no condition to wage a successful non-nuclear war in South East Asia or elsewhere. Therefore, "any American intervention in Indo-China would inevitably have involved the use of nuclear weapons. ...This fact weighed heavily on the minds of both Canadian and Indian officials. It made the solidification of the Geneva armistice a vital and urgent necessity."¹⁰²

Another Indian motive for wanting to participate in the ICC was its desire of becoming a pre-eminent power in South Asia. India pragmatically viewed the Geneva Accords as being a way in which to limit super power involvement in the region. "The removal of the superpowers, in sum, would increase India's prestige and standing in the area and ultimately, would bring it closer to its overall goal of becoming one of if not the most pre-eminent power in the region."¹⁰³ This motive also played a role in India's recommendation that Canada participate in the commissions. India actually helped persuade Chou-En-Lai, the Premier of the PRC, that Canada be the Western representative on the ICC, arguing that the Canadians were the best that they could hope for in terms of an objective member. Although the closeness of the bilateral relationship at this time likely had something to do with this recommendation, India's national interests also have to be taken into consideration. The fact was that as long as the ICC existed, India could have at least some control over the direct involvement or influence of the superpowers in the region. With Canada as the Western representative, India could use the cooperative nature of its relations with Ottawa to ensure that difficult situations in the ICC did not necessarily lead to the demise of the commissions.

¹⁰² Ross, "Middle powers", 193.

¹⁰³ Thakur, "Peacekeeping and foreign policy", 127.

Of the three armistice Commissions that were set up, there was no question that Canada viewed the Vietnam Commission as being the most important. According to the Accords, Vietnam was to be divided into northern communist and southern non-communist zones. The agreement also called for: the withdrawal of all Vietminh forces from the southern zone; both regimes' agreement on the free movement of all citizens; refusal to allow the reintroduction of troop reinforcements, armed personnel, or new weapons; and the holding of elections to re-unify the country. It was generally hoped by the negotiators at Geneva that if these conditions were met, peace could finally be provided for Vietnam which had suffered through a long period of colonial domination and warfare.

The first few months of the Commissions were actually viewed as a success by both the Canadian and Indian governments. However, as time went by, and deadlocks began to emerge, much of the enthusiasm and optimism diminished. The first indication of a breakdown was evident with a cable from Escott Reid in January of 1955 which explained the growing disillusionment of the Indians over the utility of the ICC in securing fast, fair elections. He stated that the Indians suspected that "the United States intends to torpedo the settlement in Vietnam and that in particular the United States will use its best efforts to see that a free election does not take place."¹⁰⁴ Further, Reid made it clear that the Indians believed that Ho Chi Minh was the most capable leader in Vietnam and that if free elections were held he would ultimately win them. Finally, Reid's cable made the point that if the "Indians came to believe that the prospect for free elections in Vietnam was [going to be] frustrated by the United States and its friends," they were likely "to wash their hands of the results."¹⁰⁵

¹⁰⁴ Reid, Envoy to Nehru, 82.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

By March of 1955 it was apparent that both India and Canada realized that the Commissions were not likely to produce the speedy results that they had originally hoped for. When Krishna Menon visited Canada during this month, he discussed the state of affairs with the Under Secretary of State for External Affairs, Jules Legar. "Menon told Legar that he had 'noted with regret the passing of the honeymoon period of the Vietnam Commission when they worked together as a team.'"¹⁰⁶ In his report to the Minister (Pearson), Legar pointed out that there had, indeed, been a honeymoon period where Canada and India were extremely close regarding Vietnam, but that this period had ended. Legar, however, felt it was wrong to blame Canada for this development as Menon had done. He felt that the change had been inevitable and that "the degree of team spirit that existed in the first place was probably owing to the fact that in the early days the Commission had not come to grips with the more difficult problems. ... What the Under Secretary found most disturbing in Menon's remarks was their implication that in [Canada's] alleged lack of objectivity [Canada's] performance had been on a par with the Poles."¹⁰⁷

One of the key issues of the ICC that the Canadians and the Indians had different opinions on during this period was article 14 (d) of the Vietnam cease-fire agreement. This article called for a 300-day-long period of free movement between the north and south. Both the Canadian and Indian members of the ICC were well aware that the communist government of the north was blocking the attempted exodus of many citizens wishing to move to the southern zone. Local authorities in North Vietnam "refused to hand out exit permits under any conditions. [They also] stooped to kidnapping children to try to induce families to remain in the north, to instituting 100- per-cent 'wealth taxes' on would be

¹⁰⁶ Eayrs, 205.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

emigrants, and to 'billeting' soldiers with families who expressed an interest in leaving."¹⁰⁸

Although Canada never called for the strict implementation of 14 (d), it was clear that its attitude toward this issue was much different from India's. Along with the fact that the Indian members of the ICC felt that Ho Chi Minh would win any election in the country went the perception that the Geneva Accords were a "package deal" and could not be broken down on an article by article basis. Douglas Ross points out that because:

they believed the electoral 'settlement' provisions were a mandatory outcome of the cease-fire implementation process, the Indians were of the opinion that requirement of article 14 (d), that Vietnamese citizens be given the right to choose their zone of residence, was of little political consequence. ... Because Indian policy was premised on complete fulfilment of the Geneva package, they could not understand the depth of Canadian concern for the refugees- or the way in which it was expressed.¹⁰⁹

Furthermore, Ross also makes it clear that it must be remembered that "the Indians were quite conditioned to refugee problems on a scale of millions not hundreds of thousands. So why should they get upset?"¹¹⁰ Eventually, however, Canada gave up its attempts to push the ICC on the 14 (d) issue. Ross, who has written extensively on these early ICC experiences, believes that this Canadian concession was due more to fear of a Sino-American nuclear confrontation over Vietnam if the Geneva Accords unravelled than any affinity for the Indians' position on 14 (d). Rather than "press for strict implementation of the Geneva agreements, Ottawa followed a responsible but frustrating course of action which was necessary for the preservation of the original Geneva bargain,

¹⁰⁸ Ross, "Middlepowers", 205.

¹⁰⁹ Ross, "The dynamics of Indochina diplomacy", 65.

¹¹⁰ Ibid, 67.

in order to minimize the risk of nuclear war."¹¹¹ Realistically, the Canadian government saw Laos and Cambodia as the real prizes of the Geneva agreements, but saw little hope for democracy in Vietnam. "Like Paris and London, Ottawa could live with that result, but there were grave fears in the Canadian government that many elements within the American government could not."¹¹²

Although there is some general indication of continued Indo-Canadian support for each other on some ICC issues after this period, as discussed in Chapter 4, for all intents and purposes by 1956 the overall pattern of Indo-Canadian relations on the commissions was one of steady deterioration. The occasions on which the chairman "would side with the Canadian Commissioner against a dissenting or abstaining Pole became rarer as time passed. And with their mounting rarity, relations [between the] Canadian and Indian delegations and governments underwent further deterioration. ... As the divergence developed the early rapport between India and Canada was lost, to be replaced by sour mistrust."¹¹³

When looking at the motives for each country's participation on the Commissions, and the reasons for the subsequent breakdown in cooperation, it is apparent that these factors can be related to the roots of both state's foreign policies. In terms of Canada's original acceptance of the invitation to serve on the ICC, it is clear that this decision was consistent with the functional internationalism of this period. The Geneva Conferences came after Canada's successful involvement in Korea and in several U.N. supervisory roles (ie. the UNMOGIP). The ICC thus came at a time when internationalism was at a high point in Canadian foreign policy. Although Canada had some reservations regarding the potential problems of the ICC, the government still viewed participation as consistent

¹¹¹ See "Middlepowers", 195.

¹¹²

¹¹³ See 26

with its functional internationalist approach. Vietnam also offered India an opportunity to implement its approach to foreign policy during this period. Vietnam presented a situation in which Indian non-alignment, in terms of anti-colonialism and mediation between the super powers, could be practiced. In sum, both countries' justifications for involvement "were invariably couched in the language of 'responsible middle power internationalism' or the creation of 'neutralist zones of peace.'"¹¹⁴

The breakdown can be attributed to several trends that were developing in the Indo-Canadian relationship at this time. Canada was growing more and more disenchanted with Indian attitudes toward Kashmir and their efforts in the U.N. on this issue. This factor, combined with the Hungarian crisis, discussed in detail later, made Canada more likely to not support India on certain contentious issues. Further, St. Laurent had made clear during his 1954 visit to India, that Canada was not prepared to criticize American activities in the region. Yet, as Ramesh Thakur points out, American influence in the region was growing because the lack of U.N. involvement in Vietnam meant that there were fewer moderating influences on United States policy. Given that a basic goal of Indian non-alignment was to contain super power influence in the region, under such circumstances, Canadian and Indian interests were bound to clash. In sum, India's perceptions of the United States as an imperial power asserting its hegemonic interests in Southeast Asia, combined with Canada's continued movement toward American positions, meant that cooperation between the two on the ICC was unlikely. Reinforcing this development was the fact that the increasingly international character of the Vietnam war meant that the positions of India and Canada within the ICC became more and more rigid and there was increasingly less room for compromise.

¹¹⁴ Ross, "Middlepowers", 187.

There can be no denying the negative effect that the ICC experience had on Indo-Canadian relations. "The generally amicable relations between the Indian and Canadian political leaders and senior civil servants which had been built on cooperation in the Commonwealth conferences, the U.N., and shared concerns over Korea... began to deteriorate under the strain of divergent interests in the Indo-China International Control Commission."¹¹⁵ Thus, "within a few years Indo-China became a major irritant in Indo-Canadian relations and one of the principal causes of the erosion of the special relationship between India and Canada."¹¹⁶ A former High Commissioner in New Delhi described the ICC experience as contributing to a "profound distaste and contempt for Indian policy... and for the Indians [Canadians] served with."¹¹⁷ As the ICC experience dragged on "Canadians on the Commissions were [increasingly] angered and exasperated with the Indians and the result was an accumulation of bitterness against India."¹¹⁸ Much of this negative attitude did not become obvious until the later stages of the Commissions in the 1960s and 1970's. It is, however, worth pointing out at this point that "by 1973 nearly 200 Canadian foreign-service officers had served on one of the Commissions in Indo-China, about one-third of all the officers in the Canadian foreign service."¹¹⁹ With that experience an essentially negative one from the standpoint of most, the impact on Canadian policy towards India was profound, and detrimental in terms of sustaining the goodwill that had existed in the early post-war years.

Following the creation of the ICC in 1954, the next international event that had some impact on Canada-India relations was the visit to India of the Soviet leaders Nikita Khrushchev and Nikolai Bulganin in November and December of 1955. The Indian

¹¹⁵ Morrison, 32.

¹¹⁶ Reid, Envoy to Nehru, 69.

¹¹⁷ Eayrs, 206.

¹¹⁸ Thakur, "Change and continuity", 261.

¹¹⁹ Reid, Envoy to Nehru, 261.

government received the two Soviets with extreme warmth and allowed them to make several anti-western statements that would have been viewed as diplomatically improper in other countries during official visits. Escott Reid, the Canadian High Commissioner to India at the time of the visit, felt that a large part of the visit's success (and the permissiveness of the Indians) could be attributed to its timing. Relations between India and the United States had been steadily declining throughout this period due to the continued American aid to Pakistan and the distinct possibility that because of the President's illness, Richard Nixon would be replacing Eisenhower, who had enjoyed good relations with Nehru (and St. Laurent). Nevertheless, Reid made it clear in a telegram to Pearson that in his mind, the Soviets were taking liberties with some of their activities in India. He stated that the "Soviet leaders have done about six things in India which western diplomats here would have warned similar western leaders from doing. They have used the Indian Parliament as a forum for attacking countries friendly to India. They have in public speeches called India an 'ally'. ... They have in a public speech given full support to India on a controversy with a foreign government (Portugal over Goa). They have twice... warned India about what a nuclear bomb might do to a dam or a city."¹²⁰ In sum, in Reid's eyes, Khrushchev's and Bulganin's public relations tactics left much to be desired in terms of western perceptions of diplomatic protocol and there was a certain irritation over the willingness of India to allow this to occur.

Although the visit was not that significant an event on its own, Nehru's failure to publicly rebuke the Soviets for their statements, meant the visit contributed to the cracks in Indo-Canadian relations already emerging due to their mutual ICC involvement. As Reid has made clear, there had "already been in the minds of so many people of the West a

¹²⁰ Ibid, 128.

distorted picture of India , of Nehru and of Nehru's policies. The effect of the Bulganin-Khrushchev visit [was] to distort this picture even further."¹²¹

Despite the above problems in the Indo-Canadian relationship the Suez crisis of 1956 marked what was arguably the most positive interaction to take place between these two countries throughout this era, and justifies viewing this first cordial period of Indo-Canadian relations as lasting to 1957. Although the British and French aggression against Egypt threatened to break the Commonwealth apart, Canada worked hard to ensure that the organization did not split along racial lines. In addition to the positive effect that this had on Indo-Canadian relations in this association, Canada's role in the U.N. during the Suez crisis also marked a new, groundbreaking approach to peacekeeping, compatible with Indian foreign policy interests as well.

The situation regarding the Suez Canal first started in 1954 when the British government, under pressure from the United States, agreed to withdraw its troops from Egypt and pledged to place the canal under the control of the Egyptian government, even though it would still be owned and operated by the Suez Canal Company. The situation was dramatically altered in July of 1956, however, when General Abdul Nasser, the Egyptian President, decided to recognize the Peoples Republic of China and sign a large trade deal with that country. By this time, Egypt was also buying arms from the Soviet bloc countries. The Americans, due to their strong negative attitudes toward communism in general and China in particular, responded by withdrawing U.S. assistance for the Aswan Dam project, a major irrigation and electrification scheme on the Nile River, which was the centrepiece of Egypt's development plans. Not to be outdone, Nasser went one step further and on July 26, "the third anniversary of his regime, [he seized] the Suez Canal

¹²¹ Ibid, 141.

and [told] the United States at a mass rally 'Americans may you choke to death on your fury!'"¹²²

Prime Minister Eden of Great Britain was outraged at Nasser's actions and his impolite comments about the Americans, and immediately began formulating a plan to take back the canal. However, while "the British government was under heavy pressure from the United States and Canada not to resort to force, it was exposed to equally heavy pressure from the French to do the exact opposite. Already involved in a war with the Arabs in Algeria, where the National Liberation Front was receiving aid from Egypt, Premier Guy Mollet and Foreign Minister Christian Pineau were just as anxious as Eden to unseat Colonel Nasser."¹²³ Accordingly, a joint military operation by the French, British and Israelis was agreed upon in which Israel was to attack first and the British and French troops would intervene under the guise of separating the Israeli and Egyptian combatants and protecting the canal.

India, for its part, recognized that the potential for British and/or French armed intervention existed as early as August of 1956 and was immediately concerned about the problems this might raise in terms of its Commonwealth membership. Nehru had made it clear from the outset that if this intervention took place, he would have a tough time justifying India's continued participation in this organization. Once the Israeli invasion was under way and the British and French, on October 31, issued their ultimatum to Egypt regarding the protection of the canal, Nehru made his position perfectly clear once more. In a statement released following the British and French ultimatum, he stated that it was his government's view that the Israeli aggression, apparently to be followed by an Anglo-French assault on Egypt was "a flagrant violation of the U.N. Charter." He earnestly

¹²² Thomson, Louis St. Laurent, 458.

¹²³ Ibid, 463.

trusted that "even at this late hour this aggression will be halted and foreign troops withdrawn from Egyptian territory." Further, Nehru hoped that the "world community as represented in the United Nations" would "take effective action to this end."¹²⁴

Due to American anger over the lack of British and French consultation with the United States and due to Indian displeasure over the colonial nature of the British and French aggression, Canada now found itself in the situation where its functional internationalism policy was congruent with both American and Indian objectives regarding Suez. This fact is very apparent when one looks at Canada's activities in the United Nations during the crisis. The first indication was with the American resolution in the General Assembly on November 2, calling for an immediate cease-fire. The position that Canada decided to take on the resolution was important because of the possible repercussions that it might have in terms of the future of the Commonwealth and its reputation with the newly independent, post-colonial countries. Although Canada had a long history of close relations with both Britain and France, the Canadian government also recognized that if "all the white members of the Commonwealth lined up in the United Nations General Assembly with the United Kingdom... the chances of Indian withdrawal [would] be increased."¹²⁵ As it turned out, the vote on the American resolution of November 2nd was almost unanimous in calling for an immediate cease-fire. Only Britain, France, Israel, Australia and New Zealand voted against the resolution and Canada's abstention, although not signalling an overwhelming condemnation of British and French actions, was still a strong indication of a negative outlook on the colonial nature of the Suez aggression.

¹²⁴ Reid, Envoy to Nehru, 149.

¹²⁵ *Ibid*, 155.

Pearson, the Canadian representative at the U.N. at this time, felt that the United Nations could play a more effective role than simply passing a cease-fire resolution. Pearson also felt that Canada should try and do everything in its power to provide the British and French with a way out of the difficult situation that they had got themselves into. Pearson stated in his memoirs that his purpose, "if it proved feasible, was to have the U.N. take responsibility for bringing the fighting to an end. ... This was 1956 not 1876, and their course [Britain's, France's and Israel's] was doomed to failure and ultimate disaster, opposed, as it [was],... both by the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A., and by the Asian members of the Commonwealth."¹²⁶

While the debate on the American resolution was taking place, Pearson began working behind the scenes, with the Indian and Pakistani delegations, to draw up a proposal to keep the peace in Suez until a political solution to the crisis could be reached. The cooperation between Pearson and the Indian delegation at the U.N. was one of the highlights of this initiative. As the negotiations continued, it soon became apparent that one single text for the resolution could not be achieved. Pearson's concern was to avoid condemnation and simply get a resolution passed to establish a U.N. force that could be sent to Egypt, oversee a ceasefire and withdrawal of the British, French and Israeli forces. Vituperative language, would have jeopardized the support of the invading powers for such a peacekeeping proposal. India and Pakistan, on the other hand, were anxious to see Britain, France and Israel roundly condemned for their attack on Egypt's sovereignty. Given these differences, it was finally agreed that Pearson would make his proposal for the creation of a U.N. force (UNEF) concurrently with a nineteen-member Asian-African resolution condemning the invasion and calling for the withdrawal of foreign forces from Egypt. Canada and India would then throw their support behind each other's texts. The

¹²⁶ Munro and Inglis, 244.

result was that the General Assembly approved a U.N. force and made a still stronger demand for a cease-fire than had been the case under the U.S. resolution. Pearson, commenting on the Canadian proposal stated that the "Canadian draft resolution was voted on first and resulted in 57 in favour, none opposed and 19 abstentions (Soviet Bloc 9, Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Egypt, Israel, Laos, Portugal, Austria). We were very pleased. Although our resolution instructed the Secretary General to report back within forty-eight hours, in fact a United Nations Emergency Force had been created."¹²⁷

In this crisis, given the historical ties that Canada had with both Britain and France, it might have been expected that Canadian support would ultimately be given to these countries. After all, other Commonwealth countries such as Australia and New Zealand threw their support behind the British and French actions in the U.N. debates on the issue. Although St. Laurent could understand the British and French concerns regarding Nasser and the canal, the Canadian Prime Minister was disturbed at Britain's and France's armed intervention in Egypt. St. Laurent felt that "the decision to take matters into their own hands smacked... of old style imperialism; worse still, the deliberate decision to not take their friends into their confidence made a mockery of the much-vaunted system of consultation among members of the Commonwealth."¹²⁸

Both St. Laurent and Pearson recognized that the Commonwealth was still too valuable an institution to have it dissolve over the Suez issue and that India's membership was a necessity if the organization was to maintain its multiracial status. The UNEF initiative was thus critical because it provided a basis for the withdrawal of the invading forces without which the departure of India from the Commonwealth was almost certain.

¹²⁷ Ibid, 253.

¹²⁸ Thomson, Louis St. Laurent, 464.

Even so St. Laurent had to make the most "of his good personal relations with Nehru to discourage India from leaving the Commonwealth in protest over the British invasion of Egypt; he argued that the British conduct was regrettable but aberrational, and that the association was too valuable to be broken up on that account."¹²⁹ There was no doubt that Nehru was under great pressure to withdraw from the Commonwealth, but eventually, the "Indian leader overrode some of his own advisers and rallied to [St. Laurent's] point."¹³⁰

Despite the fact that Canada played such a significant role in the drafting of the UNEF resolution, Canada still encountered a great deal of difficulty in terms of gaining Egyptian support for Canadian membership in the peacekeeping force. India's support for Canada on this issue was, once again, indicative of the positive character of the relationship that was apparent throughout the Suez crisis. Pearson cabled Escott Reid in New Delhi in the hopes that Nehru might put in a good word to Nasser in terms of Canadian membership on the U.N. force. Reid made it clear to Pearson that Nehru did not need to be pushed on this matter. Reid cabled Pearson that he had seen "Nehru shortly before one o'clock for twenty minutes. The Indian government had, about three or four days ago, heard about the possibilities of Egypt's objections to the inclusion of Canadians. He had immediately sent a message to Nasser to say that he was much distressed to hear this and expressing the hope that Canada would be among the countries that would be chosen."¹³¹

Nehru believed that Nasser's main concern centred on the fear that Canadian troops would be mistaken for British troops which in turn could lead to problems in ensuring Egyptian public support for the U.N. force. General E.L.M. Burns of Canada, however, who was the commander of the U.N. force, believed that the "Egyptians had been encouraged to suspect that if the Canadians settled down along the Suez Canal the effect

¹²⁹ Thomson and Swanson, 81.

¹³⁰ Ibid.

¹³¹ Munro and Inglis, 267.

would be the same as if the Anglo-French forces had remained. In his assessment... the Egyptians clearly preferred a 'force of neutrals' and particularly a force composed of strong Afro-Asian contingents. This kind of force would in reality not have been a U.N. force but one which Egypt dominated."¹³² Despite the Indian efforts on Canada's behalf, Canadian troops were never introduced into the UNEF and Canada's contribution was confined to providing infrastructural support for UNEF.

In analysing the Suez crisis, two points immediately come to mind. First of all, the success of Canada in setting up the UNEF set the trend of internationalism in Canadian foreign policy for years to come. Pearson's success in establishing a cease-fire in the region, creating the UNEF and preserving the Commonwealth by preventing an Indian withdrawal reflected the functional internationalism that characterized Canadian foreign policy during this period. "Pearson's actions and the Nobel Peace Prize they earned provided both the culminating symbol of the internationalist traditions developed over a decade and an instinctive inspiration for Canadian diplomacy in the next ten years."¹³³ Second, the Indo-Canadian cooperation during the 1956 Suez Crisis was in contrast to the general pattern of relations that was emerging by the end of period one. India's participation in the actual UNEF force in Egypt was also a strong indication of both countries' similar, perceived middle power roles in the international community. Although Canadian attitudes toward the Indian positions on Kashmir and the ICC were damaging relations, overall there is no doubt that Suez made a positive contribution to the maintenance of warm bilateral relations.

Why did this occur despite the pattern of declining cooperation that was developing? Put simply, Suez, unlike the situations involving Kashmir and the ICC, offered a situation in which Canadian functional internationalism was congruent not only

¹³² Ibid, 268.

¹³³ Dewitt and Kirton, 57.

with Indian but also American objectives. In the cases of Kashmir and the ICC, as already discussed, Canada pragmatically decided that it was in its best interests to move away from India and support the Americans more fully in these situations as they developed. Suez, however, provided a simpler set of circumstances for the Canadian government in terms of its relations with India and the United States. The Americans were disturbed both at the lack of consultation of the British and the French and also at the fact that their aggressive actions appeared imperialistic and took place in a region in which U.S. interests were mounting. India, as has already been discussed in some detail, also had problems with the colonial nature of the British and the French actions. Therefore, Canada was not faced with a decision in which it had to try to accommodate its foreign policy objectives to differing Indian and American concerns. As a result, a positive environment for cooperation between India and Canada existed.

Ironically, at practically the same time that the British and French troops were beginning their invasion of Egypt, the Soviet Union was also crushing a rebellion that had been developing in Hungary. While Canada and India cooperated over Suez, their perceptions of the situation in Hungary were profoundly different and it was ultimately India's position on the Hungarian invasion that would effectively end the first period of cooperation between these two countries.

Since 1949 Hungary had been under the control of a very unpopular communist government installed by Joseph Stalin. When Khrushchev publicly denounced Stalin in February of 1956, the citizens of Hungary began to press for reforms within their own country. The situation came to a head on October 23, with a mass demonstration of high school and university students and factory workers in Budapest, who called for a neutral Hungary, free elections, and other democratic reforms. The Hungarian government under Gero ordered the Hungarian security police to crush the revolt; their efforts were unsuccessful and Gero finally called on Soviet troops for help. "Within a few hours they

were in Budapest and the next day, 25 October, Soviet tanks opened fire on a crowd of demonstrators in Kossuth square, killing many."¹³⁴

As a result of this action, the United States, and ironically, in light of Suez, Britain and France, all called for an emergency meeting of the U.N. Security Council which, except for the Soviets, registered opposition to the invasion. The Indian reaction, however, was not nearly as severe. This was made clear in a statement by Nehru on October 25, in which he said that he felt there were fundamental differences between the Hungarian and Suez situations and that in the former it was "not for us to interfere in any way even by expressing an opinion on the internal affairs" of Hungary and the Soviet Union.¹³⁵

Despite the fact that Canada and India were working closely together on the Suez matter in the U.N. and Canada had made it clear that it did not agree with the Indian position on Hungary, Nehru still refused to denounce the Soviets. It was also clear that Nehru felt that India's Commonwealth ties should not affect its position on Hungary. This fact may have been strengthened by the fact that several white member states in the U.N. voted against the November 2 cease-fire resolution pertaining to Suez. "Nehru was not prepared to listen to urgings from their governments or their representatives in New Delhi that he denounce the use of force by the Soviet Union to suppress the Hungarian revolution; he suspected them of wanting to divert his attention from what he considered to be the dangerous, arrogant, imperialistic aggression of Britain and France against Egypt."¹³⁶ Clearly, although Nehru saw Suez as a blatant colonial action, he did not view the crisis in Hungary in the same manner.

¹³⁴ Reid, *Envoy to Nehru*, 147.

¹³⁵ *Ibid*, 148.

¹³⁶ *Ibid*, 144-45.

By November 4, Soviet troops had launched what amounted to a full scale attack on Budapest and had overwhelmed the Hungarian resistance. Canada still hoped, however, that if India came out and condemned the attack, as they had with Suez, and rallied Third World support against the Soviets, the situation could still be peacefully remedied in the U.N. . . In a speech to UNESCO that Nehru made following the November 4 invasion, India, for the first time, mildly criticized the Soviets' actions. Although the Canadian government did not feel that Nehru's comments went far enough, it still felt that they were a step in the right direction. When Escott Reid saw Nehru the day after his speech at the airport, he conveyed this message to Nehru and made it clear that Canada was pleased with India's apparent shift on the issue. Nehru, in turn, reassured Reid that India had recognized the Hungarian situation for what it truly was and that his earlier comments had largely been a result of a misunderstanding of the facts by both him and his staff. Reid, in relaying this conversation to Ottawa, stated that Nehru had been fed these stories by the Soviet government and that he had been reluctant not to believe the information for several different reasons. Reid pointed out that:

Nehru had attached great hopes to the de-Stalinization process within Russia and in Russia's relations with its Eastern European satellites and to the relaxation of international tension which followed. Indeed, his whole approach to foreign policy had been based on his belief in [the] reality and permanence of the more liberal trends in Russia. He was now going through an intense internal struggle. Like any other man similarly placed he was tempted to grasp at any straw which might make it possible for him to postpone a complete re-examination of his foreign policy.¹³⁷

Reid believed, however, that in the end Nehru had come to grips with the situation and recognized the hostile and "colonial" nature of the Soviets actions in Hungary.

¹³⁷ Ibid, 160.

Any illusions regarding a change in Indian attitudes towards Hungary, however, were shattered by the events of the following week. The first indication of this was with India's approach to a resolution in the United Nations on November 4th condemning the Soviet military intervention in Hungary. India's abstention in the voting on this resolution caused a great deal of resentment in a number of western countries. In the eyes of many Canadians, India's abstention was "a cynical and shameful betrayal of the moral unity of the Commonwealth and indeed of all free nations."¹³⁸ India's U.N. position was made even worse, however, by the fact that on November 9, Nehru, in a speech in Calcutta, stated that "he accepted as valid the Soviet defence of their actions in Hungary which he had received from Bulganin the previous day."¹³⁹ Furthermore, Krishna Menon, on the same day as Nehru's speech, voted against another resolution in the U.N. that called for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary. Yugoslavia was the only other non-Soviet bloc country to vote against the resolution.

Inexplicably, however, by November 20, Nehru had completely, and finally shifted his position against the Soviet invasion of Hungary. In a statement to the Lok Sabha on this day, Nehru noted that there was "little doubt that the present movement in Hungary... [has] the great masses of the people behind it. ... Undoubtedly, the government in Hungary [before the revolt] was not a free government, was an imposed government. ... The Soviet army was there against the wishes of the Hungarian people. ... the majority of the people in Hungary wanted a change, political, economic, or whatever the changes were, and actually rose in insurrection... to achieve it but ultimately they were suppressed."¹⁴⁰ The debate in Parliament was also followed by the visit of an Indian delegation to Budapest which submitted a report that officially condemned the Soviet

¹³⁸ Ibid, 168-69.

¹³⁹ Ibid, 166.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid, 177.

actions in Hungary. By this point it was clear that India's perceptions of the Hungarian crisis had shifted to a view that was more consistent with its position regarding the simultaneous situation in Egypt.

Analysing the Hungarian crisis through the perspective of each country's foreign policies, it becomes clear why their positions differed, particularly in the initial stages. Principally, this had to do with Nehru's perception of non-alignment. In terms of Suez, it was obvious to India that the British and French actions were of a colonial nature and were directed towards a country which had just recently gained its independence. With anti-colonialism a basic feature of Nehru's non-alignment policy, the position India had to take in this crisis was clear. The posture dictated by non-alignment in the Hungarian situation, however, was not as easily defined in the eyes of the Indian government. As Michael Brecher points out, "Certainly it is always easier for Indians to identify themselves with Egyptians than with Hungarians. To most Asian and African leaders violence between whites and other whites is bad, but violence of whites against non-whites is infinitely worse."¹⁴¹ Furthermore, India viewed Hungary "as a Cold War dispute which, if exacerbated, would lead to higher level of tension between the Soviet and Western blocs. Suez was not. Suez involved a weak Afro-Asian state and two powerful Western states. ... This was a case that did not have the likelihood of aggravating the Cold War, unless the Soviets became directly involved."¹⁴² Therefore, India's foreign policy of non-alignment made it difficult for that country to perceive the Hungarian crisis in the same manner as Suez.

In terms of Canadian foreign policy, however, the situation was much clearer. Canada had made its opposition to Communism known throughout this period, and if the

¹⁴¹ Brecher, *The New States of Asia*, 119.

¹⁴² Ibid.

government was prepared to condemn aggressive actions by two long-standing friends and allies it was clear that it would readily take the same, if not stronger, actions toward the Soviet Union in view of its similar aggression in Hungary. What Hungary thus provides this discussion with is another example of how closely tied Indo-Canadian relations are to each country's broad foreign policy objectives during any particular period. Even though India eventually changed its mind regarding the Soviet role in Hungary, there is no question that its non-alignment policy made it difficult for India to view the crisis in precisely the same terms as Canada. As the foreign policy objectives of both countries continued to diverge during the 1950's, so too did bilateral relations.

No discussion of this first period would be complete without a short examination of the influence that Krishna Menon had on this bilateral relationship. Krishna Menon, India's chief delegate to the United Nations during most of this period, had a substantial impact on Indian foreign policy and thus on the Indo-Canadian bilateral relationship. In sum, "Krishna Menon helped the special relationship to flower" and "he helped it to fade."¹⁴³

In terms of the early stages of this period, Menon and Pearson had a strong working relationship at the U.N. This is particularly evident when looking at the role that Menon played in trying to reach an agreement on Korea. Escott Reid has stated that during this period "Krishna Menon was the brilliant constructive negotiator and draftsman. He went from delegation to delegation in New York, from capital to capital, and from ambassador to ambassador in New Delhi, working out his compromises, and drafting and redrafting formulas to embody the compromise. ... His achievements were remarkable."¹⁴⁴ It was also during this time, however, that features of Menon's

¹⁴³ Reid, Envoy to Nehru, 181.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid, 44.

personality became apparent that would alter his effectiveness in the future. The most visible factor was Menon's strident anti-Americanism and the Americans' reciprocal dislike for him. During the Korean negotiations Menon made no secret of his belief that the United States, as one could see in Korea, was just as expansionist (if not more so) as the Soviet Union. Another indication of this was during the Hungarian crisis in 1956. It was his belief that the Hungarian situation was justified due to the Soviet Union's right to maintain a number of satellite states on its borders. At the time of the crisis, Reid felt that Menon, for this reason, along with "his violent antipathy to the Americans" might refuse "to cooperate whole heartedly in a resolution demanding the immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops in Hungary."¹⁴⁵ This situation did materialize, as discussed earlier, and it thus provides a specific example of a situation where Menon played a direct role in contributing to the deterioration of Indo-Canadian relations.

To fully understand the impact that Menon had on the bilateral relationship throughout this first period, it needs to be made clear that as far as the United Nations was concerned, Menon had almost complete control over Indian foreign policy. By January 1954, this control had become so great that "there was no one in the Indian government, whether cabinet minister or official, other than Nehru himself, who could exercise effective control over Menon."¹⁴⁶ In Escott Reid's final telegram to Ottawa as High Commissioner to India, he made it clear that Menon's actions had deteriorated to such a level that he was now making absolutely no positive contribution to Indian foreign policy. The cable stated that Menon's "offence is compounded by bad temper, and sophmoric sallies. He also has a suspicion of the United States and a blindness to Russian crimes and ambitions which

¹⁴⁵ Ibid, 182.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid, 183.

Nehru does not possess, or possesses to a much more limited degree."¹⁴⁷ As a result it would appear that the days of Canadian admiration for Menon had vanished by 1956.

Although Krishna Menon continued to have an influence on Indian foreign policy until 1962, when he officially resigned, it is in this first period that his effect on the Indo-Canadian relationship was most apparent. Due to the importance that the United Nations had in both Indian and Canadian foreign policy at this time Menon was in a position to have a direct impact. Although he could be courteous and polite to Canada when he wanted to be, in many situations he viewed Canada as being no more than a pawn of the United States. This attitude was summed up best in comments that Menon made about Lester Pearson in an interview with Michael Brecher in 1966. In describing the former President of the U.N., Menon stated that there was no doubt that:

Lester Pearson had to be on the Western side. It's no reflection on him when I say that he had his limitations. Whatever happened he could not get away from the United States. ... They [the Canadians] didn't like us entering into every question. In my opinion Canada did not play a United Nations part. In all questions in which they were not particularly involved they simply voted with the Americans.¹⁴⁸

If this statement was an accurate reflection of Menon's true feelings regarding Canada's role in the United Nations, and chances are that it was, then obviously his perception of Canada was not conducive to sustaining a strong, positive bilateral relationship. The diverging foreign policy objectives of these two countries were magnified when viewed through Menon's anti-American eyes, only making Indo-Canadian relations in the U.N. more tenuous as this first period wound down. In sum, then,

¹⁴⁷ Ibid, 190.

¹⁴⁸ Michael Brecher, India and World Politics. Krishna Menon's View of the World, (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), 40.

Krishna Menon further contributed to the overall deterioration of relations by the end of this period.

Escott Reid has stated that Canada and India formed "a special relationship...in the first ten years of independence"¹⁴⁹ and another observer has gone so far as to say that relations "were so close and cordial that [people] spoke of an Indo-Canadian 'entente' and even an Indo-Canadian love affair."¹⁵⁰ When reviewing the facts of this relationship, however, these statements would appear to be exaggerated, especially in terms of the later stages of this period.

The reality of this relationship, even in its earliest stages, was that the cooperation between these countries was simply a result of India and Canada pursuing similar foreign policy objectives rather than their enjoying some kind of extraordinary "entente." Canada wanted to pursue a policy of functional internationalism and was seeking its own middle power status throughout this period. Canada saw the United Nations as a multilateral channel to fulfill this goal and viewed India, as a non-aligned state also seeking middle power status, as being the perfect complement to its objectives. After all, what better way to try to escape the shadow of the United States than by establishing close relations with an important non-aligned nation. India, on the other hand, as a newly independent, non-aligned country aspiring to be the pre-eminent power in its region, and to make a meaningful contribution to international affairs, also viewed the United Nations as one way to achieve its goals. It also saw Canada as useful since it was a means by which it could influence the global superpower situation via Canada's direct channel to the United States. Furthermore, the very nature of the bipolar world during this period ensured that middle

¹⁴⁹ Reid, "Special Relationships", 18.

¹⁵⁰ Thomson, "India and Canada", 404.

powers, such as India and Canada, would have fairly important and similar roles to play in global affairs.¹⁵¹

As this discussion has made clear, however, these common goals and perceptions of their international roles were not enough to lead to any kind of "special relationship" in this period. The fact was, that when Canadian and Indian foreign policy objectives converged on specific issues, there was a feeling of a strong bilateral relationship, but when they diverged that was not the case. The resolution of India's Commonwealth status in 1949, the launching of the Colombo Plan in 1950, the 1956 Suez crisis, most of the Korean armistice efforts from 1950 to 1954, and the earliest stages of cooperation in the ICC, were all examples of positive relations emerging out of these similar policy objectives. The situation in Kashmir, the 1956 Soviet invasion of Hungary, and the majority of the ICC experience represented, on the other hand, issues on which there were marked divergences in the two countries' positions and, accordingly, they placed strains on the bilateral relationship.

Period one admittedly marks the closest era of bilateral relations and Nehru, St. Laurent and Pearson did have close working relationships at this time. The bottom line is, however, that these two countries just happened to find themselves in circumstances where by and large their national interests converged. Indo-Canadian relations during this period were as a result close, but not "special". Canada and India were friends, but not lovers.

¹⁵¹ A study of Canadian voting patterns at the United Nations, undertaken by T.A. Keenlyside and Thomas Keating, also indicated very little numerical evidence to support any kind of "entente" on colonial issues. See Keating and Keenlyside, "Voting Patterns"

Chapter IV

The Indo-Canadian Political Relationship

1957-80

If the period from 1947 to 1956 marked a close Indo-Canadian relationship, that from 1957 to 1980 entailed a significant deterioration in the bonds between these two countries. This era saw a number of shifts and changes in terms of the evolution of their foreign policies and the gradual deterioration in relations was directly linked to the growing dissimilarity in the approaches to, and objectives of, Indian and Canadian foreign policy.

One of the factors that played a major role in the breakdown of the extremely close ties of period one, and that continued in this period to be a problem, was the on-going Indian and Canadian involvement in the ICC. Thakur's study on voting patterns within the ICC indicates that from 1956-59 India's support in the ICC was almost entirely with the North Vietnamese, detrimentally affecting the Canada-India relationship. For a period of time thereafter, while differences continued to exist in the ICC between the two countries, there was a more equal pattern in the voting of the Indian commission members. Two specific examples of this, and where Indian and Canadian positions converged over the early years of this second period, pertained to the Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission (TERM), which began in 1957, and the 1962 Majority Report of the ICC. These cases are examined first before the new differences in outlook that emerged after 1964 are considered.

The Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission (TERM) was probably the most obvious example of Indian and Canadian cooperation in the ICC during this period. The

TERM came to Vietnam from the United States and was supposed to be limited to identifying, cataloguing and shipping out all remaining French military equipment left over from France's colonial days in that country. What TERM did in reality, however, much to the displeasure of the North Vietnamese and the Poles, was to resupply the South Vietnamese army. Indian support for TERM, in fact, dated back to 1957, but it was during 1959 that its cooperation with Canada on this issue was the most crucial and obvious. "In the period of March through June 1959, the Indians supported the Canadians in blocking Polish efforts to set a firm date for the exit of TERM; instead, TERM was permitted to operate to the end of 1960."¹⁵² Thakur feels that India's support for TERM was directly linked to its motives for limiting super power influence in South Asia. India viewed the ICC as an essential tool for the pursuit of this goal and Thakur feels that its wavering support for both the North and then the South can be understood if it is examined in this context. In the early stages of the ICC New Delhi viewed the North as the weaker half of Vietnam and therefore supported Ho Chi Minh to ensure that the ICC would survive. By 1959, however, India viewed the balance of power as shifting to the North and began to tilt its support to the South. Essentially, in regards to TERM, India was supporting the re-armament of the South even though its past loyalty had traditionally been to the North Vietnamese.

The second factor that indicated a relationship of cooperation between India and Canada on the ICC during the early years of this second period was the ICC Majority Report of June 1962. The report "declared the DRVN [the North] to be guilty of aggression against the South, while merely chastising the RVN [the South] for violating the arms import and 'no-alliance' provisions of the armistice agreement."¹⁵³ While the charges against the South were serious, they hardly equalled those levelled against Hanoi.

¹⁵² Ross, "Middle powers", 204.

¹⁵³ Ibid, 205

The report thus seemed to validate the American and South Vietnamese allegations that it was the armed attacks of the North that required them to enter into an alliance and introduce new military equipment for the defence of South Vietnam. The Indian support for TERM and the Majority Report of 1962 indicated that India had significantly altered its approach to the ICC. This fact is made even more apparent when it is realized that on most of the important issues from 1959 to 1962 Canada and India voted the same way.

This new Indian position was a result of India's concern that the 1954 accord be maintained. As was made clear in the preceding chapter, India had a vested interest in seeing the ICC continue so that it could better attain its objective of becoming the pre-eminent power in the region by limiting and/or controlling super power activities in South Asia through the Commissions. Canada was also interested in maintaining the ICC as a tool to pursue its own foreign policy objectives during this period. The election of John Diefenbaker in 1957 saw a shift in Canadian internationalism to one of more independence from the United States. Although TERM could hardly be viewed as a good example of "independent internationalism" Canada's continued role in the ICC generally was compatible with that objective. By maintaining the Commissions, Canada could also hope to have some influence in controlling, or moderating, American activities in the region, especially regarding the use of nuclear weapons. Without the ICC Canada would have no ability or forum in which to try to influence American activities in Vietnam. As a result, both Canada and India had an interest in trying to maintain the ICC, and maintenance required cooperation on some issues to avoid deadlock.

Overall, the cooperation that occurred on the Commissions between 1954-62 "may be fairly characterized as both prudent and responsible. The original Geneva compromise was truly ambiguous, legally and politically. The Canadian and Indian governments attempted to exploit that ambiguity to make the armistice hold up in the way least likely to

entail risks of great power confrontation."¹⁵⁴ It is clear once again, however, that this Indo-Canadian cooperation had little or nothing to do with a special relationship. It was simply a pragmatic interaction in terms of backing up the South in order to maintain the armistice which was a necessity to achieving both countries' foreign policy objectives in Vietnam.

By 1964, however, it was clear that Canada's perceived role for itself in the ICC had begun to change. In the spring of 1964, Communist troops began a new offensive directed at the South and as a result, Canada recognized that using the ICC as a means to maintain the armistice in Vietnam was no longer workable. "From this point on its peacekeeping role became less important than its attempts" to use its ICC position "to foster a negotiated settlement, even though these [efforts] were shrouded in secrecy."¹⁵⁵ India, for its part, was never enthusiastic about this new perception of the function of the ICC.

As the conflict escalated and President Johnson began using the threat of extending the fighting into the North as an inducement to the North for peace talks, it became apparent that the United States would need a channel to Hanoi in order to carry out negotiations with the Vietminh. Not surprisingly, the Americans felt that Blair Seaborn, the head of the Canadian ICC delegation, was the simplest and most effective channel through which to carry out this task. From the outset, the Canadians defended their participation in these efforts as being the best way of securing peace now that the ICC had basically become a useless entity with the upsurge in fighting and the ever-increasing American presence in Vietnam. Although Canadian statements attempted to portray Seaborn as a neutral messenger and not simply as a tool of the American government, the reality of the situation appeared to indicate otherwise. The United States, regardless of what the Canadians may

¹⁵⁴ Ibid, 209.

¹⁵⁵ Charles Taylor, Snow Job: Canada, the United States and Vietnam (1954 to 1973), (Toronto: Anansi, 1979), 47.

have said, or felt, had a very clear idea of how Seaborn could be most effective in terms of their objectives in Vietnam. As Charles Taylor has noted:

Washington regarded Seaborn as its eyes, ears and mouth in Hanoi. Aside from transmitting U.S. messages, he was instructed to bring back political intelligence on the level of war-weariness among the North Vietnamese, on the state of their economy, on the respective influence of the Russians and the Chinese and on possible divisions among its leaders. While it is obvious that Hanoi would assume that Seaborn would be reporting to Washington on these matters, it is debatable whether the Canadian government should have allowed its envoy to be placed in such a compromising position.¹⁵⁶

As Seaborn's trips to the North continued, so too did the growing military presence of the United States in Vietnam. By this time it was apparent that the Americans were giving Seaborn messages to the North that were lacking any real quality or substance and as a result the DRVN began showing little interest in the Canadian channel of communication. The Americans had plunged themselves deeper into the Asian conflict in the hopes of forcing Hanoi to negotiate an armistice on U.S. terms, but the strategy was not working. Again, Taylor has aptly described Canada's situation in these circumstances:

Throughout this period the Canadian channel to Hanoi remained open and frequently in use. Especially in the early stages both sides saw some point in using the channel to signal their intentions to each other. Both sides also loudly maintained their deep desire for a peaceful settlement- always of course, on their own terms. But it was now clear that neither side ever had any intention of using the Canadian channel to start negotiations.¹⁵⁷

In January of 1966, Victor Moore replaced Blair Seaborn as the head Canadian delegate on the ICC in Vietnam. Due to the fact that Paul Martin, then the Secretary of State for External Affairs, still viewed the ICC as the most probable vehicle for peace, even

¹⁵⁶ Ibid, 57.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid, 76.

though its effectiveness had continued to deteriorate over the years, he was wary of using Moore as a U.S. messenger in the same manner as Seaborn. Accordingly, Martin went outside the ICC delegation and chose Chester Ronning, a Chinese expert and a former charge d'affaires in China in 1949, to try to keep the channels to the North open. Martin, in referring to Ronning's role and the non-effectiveness of the ICC in reaching a negotiated settlement, has written that since "the Poles and Indians had not replied to our enquiries about [a] peace initiative by a commission member, I directed Ronning to adopt as forward a position as he thought advisable."¹⁵⁸ As Ronning soon discovered, the only thing standing in the way of a cease-fire, as far as the North was concerned, was a commitment by the Americans to stop their military activities against the North.

After achieving this apparent breakthrough on his first visit, Ronning and Martin were optimistic that Canadian efforts would be successful. The Americans' response to the North's offer, however, was less than enthusiastic. Washington refused to stop its bombings of the North and, in general, was indifferent to Ronning's apparent breakthrough. Regardless of this, however, Martin encouraged Ronning to return to Hanoi in the hopes of keeping the channel of communication open. The North Vietnamese were not as excited about Ronning's return visit and felt that the Americans should have taken more action on what the DRVN saw as being a major concession on its part during the first visit. It was clear that the North Vietnamese had expected a reply from the Americans that consisted of some new substantial negotiating proposals, rather than a regurgitation of recent U.S. public statements. Obviously, they viewed Ronning's utility and importance with less enthusiasm than they had in the past.

Shortly after Ronning's second visit to Hanoi, Martin accepted an invitation by Andrei Gromyko to visit Moscow and Warsaw in November of 1966. Martin viewed these

¹⁵⁸ Martin, 438.

visits as a perfect opportunity to try to revitalize the moribund ICC and convince the leaders in both capitals that this was the best vehicle to reach a negotiated peace in Vietnam. In terms of the Poles, Martin described them as being attentive, but that their overall belief was that the Commission could accomplish nothing until the Americans agreed to stop bombing the North. Martin was pleased, however, that the two sides did manage to reach an understanding that "premature action by the Commission, or by any of its members would impair its usefulness, if and when the general prospects for peace improved."¹⁵⁹

Moscow, on the other hand, made no effort to hide the fact that it felt that the ICC was a useless and ineffective channel for achieving peace. "Gromyko reiterated the Eastern bloc's hard line, saying that the presence of American troops and the bombing of the North violated the 1954 Geneva agreements. Gromyko [also] felt that the Commissions' constituent powers differed too widely in their view of Vietnam's problems to ever agree; he maintained that it lacked the mandate to fulfill the mission [Martin] had in mind, and thought that a reconvened Geneva Conference would be inappropriate."¹⁶⁰ Obviously, in 1966, the Canadian government could not hope to receive any assistance from the Poles or the Soviets in using the ICC as an avenue for a negotiated peace in Vietnam.

Martin also visited New Delhi in January of 1967 in another attempt to mobilize the dormant ICC and try to convince the Indians to use their influence in Warsaw to help bring this about. However, Martin's efforts were met with a lack of interest on the part of the Indians. One of the reasons for Martin's inability to mobilize support was due to the growing Indian belief that Canada was nothing more than an intelligence-gatherer and defender of policy for the United States in Vietnam. Indeed, Canada was even coming under attack in the Canadian press for these reasons at this time and Martin admitted that the "difficulty in combating these charges was that, although grossly distorted and often

¹⁵⁹ Ibid, 444.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid, 445.

maliciously twisted, there was an element of truth in them."¹⁶¹ Accompanying these allegations were also criticisms that Canada was supporting and contributing to questionable arms supplies to the United States that were in turn being shipped to Vietnam to to be used in the escalating Asian war.

In any event, by 1966, all hope of using the ICC for a negotiated peace was dead. Canada, despite its repeated efforts to open negotiations, was ultimately also partly to blame for this outcome. As Taylor points out, "Canadian peace initiatives had either been scorned by the Americans or else perverted to serve their own military ends, and thousands of Vietnamese had been killed with the help of Canadian products." In the view of other countries, including India, Canada was "at best an apologist for the Americans," and at worst an ally "in a barbarous and senseless war. Above all Canada's acquiescence in the atrocity of the U.S. bombings made a mockery of Ottawa's claims [of playing] a constructive role in support of peace and as a bridge between the rich and poor nations."¹⁶²

The ICC remained "dead" until it became clear that the conflict was winding down and a new Commission would be needed to oversee the armistice. As the Paris negotiations got under way in 1972, it was becoming obvious that the Americans were pushing for Canada's involvement in a reconstituted ICC. As Canada became more and more aware of this fact, it made it clear that it would only accept that role if certain specific conditions were met. In an attempt to avoid the frustrations of the past ICC experience, Taylor makes it clear that Canadian officials exhaustively tried to:

recall every loophole, dodge and play which the Poles and the Vietnamese Communists had ever used against them. In its final form, their 73-clause document set out terms and conditions which were much more detailed and stringent than any that were ever announced [before]. If accepted in Paris,

¹⁶¹ Ibid, 448.

¹⁶² Taylor, 132.

it would have resulted in a peacekeeping force with real powers and built-in guarantees against obstruction. ... For most of the Canadians, their draft protocol was designed to give Ottawa an honourable and compelling reason for saying 'no' to Washington's inevitable request.¹⁶³

Despite these plans, however, it was soon clear that Canada was not going to have much say on the question of its participation in the reconstituted ICC. In fact, Canada was named as a member of the new ICC in the final Paris agreement before the Canadian government had even given its formal consent or before it knew the terms of its membership. Regardless of this, Canada eventually accepted its role just as the Americans wanted. However, its participation was not simply a result of U.S. pressure; it reflected as well Canada's perception of its own interests. Canada saw the new ICC as a way to aid the United States in withdrawing its troops, achieving the release of POW's and, basically allowing the Americans to leave Vietnam under some illusion of "peace with honour." The principal objectives from a Canadian standpoint were "to strengthen Canadian-American relations," and "win a few points for good behaviour."¹⁶⁴

When analysing the impact of the ICC on Indo-Canadian relations in the period 1957 to 1980, it becomes clear that, once again, both countries approached the situation in a manner that was consistent with their respective foreign policies and that as these objectives began to diverge, so too did cooperation on the Commissions. Up until 1962, both countries had an interest in seeing the ICC maintained. By 1964, however, Canada's perceived role for itself had changed in Vietnam. Canada now felt that the best use for the Commissions was as an instrument for fostering negotiations between the United States and North Vietnam to bring about a peace settlement. Canadian efforts to use Seaborn and Ronning to achieve this goal were consistent with Canada's traditional functional internationalist role as a middle power. However, by 1966-67, with Martin's visits to

¹⁶³ Ibid, 147.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid, 179.

Warsaw, Moscow, and New Delhi, it was becoming obvious that neither Indian nor Poland was interested in Canada's goal of seeking a negotiated peace through the ICC. Canada was thus actively pursuing its own internationalist approach to foreign policy, but no one, other than the Americans, who had their own reasons for encouraging Canada's efforts, was willing to pay much attention to it.

India's general indifference to Canadian efforts was also consistent with the changing nature of Indian non-alignment at this time. Following India's defeat in the 1962 Chinese border war, the Indian government began to seriously re-examine its policy of non-alignment and its global role as a middle power. Due to Indian fears of China and the continued United States support for Pakistan, India's focus shifted to domestic and regional security concerns from its past concerns with international mediation. Simply put, India did not have the time or patience to get involved in Canadian efforts that it saw as having limited chances for success as long as the Americans continued their bombings and build-up in Vietnam.

It is clear that by the time the new Commission was set up, Indian and Canadian perceptions of their respective foreign policy objectives in Vietnam were widely divergent. Canada had reasons for participating in the new ICC, related principally to its relations with the United States. On the other hand, the character of the new Commission (there was no place for non-aligned members) and India's increasing domestic and regional concerns left it uninvolved in, and largely indifferent to, the fate of the reconstituted ICC. As a result of these diverging interests, the ICC experience in this period, with the slight exception of the years leading up to 1962, can hardly be viewed as having made a positive contribution to Indo-Canadian relations. Indeed, as the war "in Vietnam took on the characteristics of a

struggle between Asian nationalism and American dominance, relations between New Delhi and Ottawa were bound to suffer."¹⁶⁵

Another aspect of Indo-Canadian relations that carried over from the preceding period was both country's continued membership in the Commonwealth. The most important feature of this organization from 1957 to 1980 was the dramatic transformation of its composition and hence of its preoccupations. As Frank Hayes has written:

The judgement was made, beginning with Ghana in 1957, that both the long-term stability of the African colonies and the continuation of their close economic and political links with Britain would... likely be safeguarded by a rapid transition to majority rule. ... By October 1964 the Commonwealth had twenty members, a dozen more than a decade earlier, eight of them African countries. With an African dimension came new expectations that the association would work towards resolving racial problems such as the one in Southern Rhodesia.¹⁶⁶

Canada's perception of the organization was fairly consistent throughout periods one and two. With respect to the years from 1957 to 1963, Thomson and Swanson have written that "during his term of office, Prime Minister Diefenbaker placed more emphasis on the British connection than St. Laurent had done, but he adopted basically the same attitude to the Commonwealth as a whole."¹⁶⁷ In particular, Diefenbaker continued Canada's role as a mediator between the "old" and "new" non-white Commonwealth members.

The first indication of this was Diefenbaker's role in the 1961 conference regarding the question of South Africa's status in the Commonwealth, and it was a role which had a positive impact on Indo-Canadian relations. In 1961 South Africa served notice of its intent to become a republic, just as India had in 1949. In accordance with the Indian

¹⁶⁵ Thakur, "Peacekeeping and foreign policy", 153.

¹⁶⁶ Hayes, 141.

¹⁶⁷ Thomson and Swanson, 81.

precedent, this necessitated South Africa's, in effect, "applying" for readmission to the Commonwealth under its new status. From the outset, Nehru, "while not questioning the constitutional precedent relating to the matter 'left the conference in no doubt as to India's detestation of apartheid. He emphatically declared that if South Africa was readmitted, the entire Commonwealth might disintegrate."¹⁶⁸ Diefenbaker, for his part, "took the position that if the Prime Ministers were unconditionally to accept South Africa's request to remain in the Commonwealth as a republic, their action would be taken as approval or at least condonation of racial policies which were abhorred and condemned in Canada. ...On this basis he took the stand that membership in the Commonwealth and qualifications for membership were inter-related."¹⁶⁹ It is clear, then, that the Canadian and Indian positions were similar.

During the 1961 Commonwealth Conference, several drafts of a final communiqué were submitted by South Africa, but Diefenbaker, along with several other non-white states, including India, objected to the language on the grounds that it did not go far enough in addressing the racial issue in South Africa. Nehru made it perfectly clear that if these shortcomings were not addressed, then the issue of South Africa's status in the organization would have to be placed under serious examination. Nehru "said that South Africa's policies were inconsistent with the basic principles of the Commonwealth, and he wanted this view incorporated in the Communiqué." Diefenbaker sided with this position and "after a brief adjournment Dr. Verwoerd [the South African representative] withdrew his application."¹⁷⁰

Diefenbaker's support of the non-white members of the Commonwealth, however, did not mean that he necessarily wanted South Africa out of the organization. He had

¹⁶⁸ Gangal, *India and the Commonwealth*, 38.

¹⁶⁹ Harnetty, 39.

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid*, 41.

hoped that more liberal elements in South Africa would eventually come to power leading to domestic political change, and even if this did not happen, he still had questions as to whether the Commonwealth was the place to deal with these types of issues. In fact, his "decision at the 1961 conference to support the position taken by the Asian and African members was not out of any desire to 'spearhead' an attack on South Africa, but was the result of Dr. Verwoerd's admitted refusal to make even token concessions. In such circumstances Mr. Diefenbaker had little option but to adopt the policy that he did."¹⁷¹

Although Diefenbaker initially hesitated at getting involved in this issue, he eventually played an important role in solving the dispute between Britain and the non-white Commonwealth on the issue of South Africa's re-admission. South Africa's refusal to make any significant changes in its position regarding apartheid and the Commonwealth's insistence on the principle of racial equality effectively sealed the country's fate as a member of the Commonwealth. Much like the St. Laurent government during the 1956 Suez affair, Diefenbaker, by siding with the non-white members, ensured that the organization would not be split on racial lines.

Pearson's role in the Commonwealth following his party's electoral victory in 1963 was also guided by the same approach as in 1961. A key example of this was Canada's position on the issue of Rhodesia. Rhodesia, during this period, was an exception to the general pattern of granting independence to the former colonial territories in Africa on the basis of black majority rule. While many other countries were gaining independence, Rhodesia remained under white minority rule and British control. In 1964, the white minority proposed that independence should be granted to the country over a four-year transition period, but that the general character of white control should remain.

¹⁷¹ Ibid, 44.

The Rhodesia issue became the focus of the July 1964 Prime Ministers meeting in London. Although there was some question as to whether this was truly a Commonwealth issue, Pearson felt some action was necessary in order, once again, to keep the organization from splitting along racial lines. "Evidently concerned about a racial split in a multi-racial association, Pearson requested the Canadian delegation to draft a declaration on race equality to which it was hoped all members might agree. ... Pearson proposed that the conference should re-affirm in the final communiqué the principles on which the Commonwealth was based and suggested this declaration of racial equality. The Canadian proposal was accepted."¹⁷² The purpose of the resolution was to try to discourage Great Britain from granting Rhodesian independence without black majority rule being previously granted. Much like Diefenbaker's position on South Africa in 1961, "Pearson... played an intermediary role at the 1964 meeting which prevented the association from splitting along colour lines."¹⁷³

This mediatory role also carried over to later Commonwealth meetings. In fact, Lester Pearson (and subsequently Pierre Trudeau) continued to push the Rhodesia issue in this forum and refused to accept the argument that this was an internal British matter and not one of Commonwealth jurisdiction. Ultimately, "Commonwealth pressure over the next decade and practical Canadian aid to the Commonwealth countries and movements surrounding Rhodesia, did much to prevent the international community from acquiescing in the acceptance of the white minority regime."¹⁷⁴ Although India did not play a significant role in terms of the Rhodesia issue, it should still be recognized that Canada's position, much like its stand on South Africa three years earlier, made at least some positive contribution to the Indo-Canadian bilateral relationship.

¹⁷² Hayes, 143.

¹⁷³ Ibid, 146.

¹⁷⁴ Kirton, 3.

The election of Pierre Trudeau in 1968 marked a transition in Canada's approach to the Commonwealth. When Trudeau first came to power, he viewed the Commonwealth suspiciously as an organization symbolizing the old British empire. As his experiences with the organization developed, however, Trudeau began to recognize the importance of the association as an effective forum for dialogue among its members.

While Trudeau did not play a prominent part in his first Commonwealth conference in London in 1969, on his return to Canada, he made it clear that he did recognize the importance of such an association in the world at that time.¹⁷⁵ He told the House of Commons on January 20, 1969, that the greatest strength of the Commonwealth was the "opportunity on a regular basis for men of good will to sit down together and discuss with one another the problems which affect them and the 850 million people whom they represent."¹⁷⁶

The 1971 Commonwealth conference in Singapore provided a better indication of Trudeau's recognition of the utility of the organization. The Commonwealth was once again split on racial lines over British arms sales to South Africa. Trudeau, much like his internationalist counterparts of the past, played a significant role in working with the African states in reaching a compromise on this issue. It was actually a Canadian contribution to the final communiqué that managed to settle the issue of the opposition of the African states. "The key part of the declaration of principles agreed upon by the meeting read 'No country will afford to regimes which practice racial discrimination, [any assistance] which *in its own judgement* contributes to the consolidation of this evil

¹⁷⁵ One critic, however, described Trudeau mainly distinguishing himself by sliding down the bannister of Marlborough House, the Commonwealth headquarters, and dating an attractive divorcee named Eva Titinghausen.

¹⁷⁶ Thomson and Swanson, 81.

policy."¹⁷⁷ Once again, then, Canada played a significant role in assuring that the Commonwealth did not split along racial lines.

As Hayes has written, the "Commonwealth provided Canada with a forum for collaboration and influence which permitted this country to broaden its contacts and enhance Canadian prestige in the Third World."¹⁷⁸ For these reasons, the Commonwealth presented the Trudeau government with an effective vehicle for practicing his new form of "internationalism in the Canadian self interest" that the 1970 review had advocated. Therefore, under his stewardship, as under those of Diefenbaker and Pearson, the Commonwealth remained an important focus of Canadian foreign policy. As important as the Commonwealth remained for Canada, however, as this period evolved, it became apparent that India no longer shared Canada's enthusiasm for the association. As a result, the strong Indo-Canadian ties of the past were also no longer evident. India still recognized that the Commonwealth offered substantial "benefits at negligible cost", that it guaranteed it "privileged relations in some thirty capitals throughout the world," that it was "useful for trying to win support for national objectives" and that it was "a precious source of development aid and other forms of assistance."¹⁷⁹ In terms of the historical Indo-Canadian relationship in this association it was also clear that India felt it had "made a signal contribution to the unity and stability of the Commonwealth by saving the latter from being divided on many an explosive issue along East-West or racial lines."¹⁸⁰ During Indira Gandhi's leadership throughout most of this period, however, the Commonwealth had a much less significant place than in the past in Indian policy and, accordingly, it did not serve as the forum it once had for Indo-Canadian cooperation. Indicative of this

¹⁷⁷ Stewart, 113.

¹⁷⁸ Hayes, 142.

¹⁷⁹ Thomson and Swanson, 81.

¹⁸⁰ Gangal, India and the Commonwealth, 53.

declining interest is the fact that of the four meetings of the Commonwealth held during her first eleven years as Prime Minister Indira Gandhi attended only one, that held in Kingston, Jamaica, in June 1975.¹⁸¹

It is not really surprising that this pattern of declining Indian interest materialized. India's focus, until 1971, was, as stated earlier, on domestic and regional security concerns rather than international fora such as the U.N. and the Commonwealth. Even after 1971, when India's role in global affairs again changed, attention to multilateral institutions like the U.N. and Commonwealth, was tempered by its new relationship with the Soviet Union. Obviously, then, the Commonwealth was no longer an important focus of the Indian government.

The changing nature of Indo-Canadian relations in this organization was further compounded by the changing nature of the Commonwealth's preoccupations during this period. Canada, due to the geographical location of the crises during this period, worked more closely with the African states than with India. One of these countries was Tanzania, which was a major leader on many of the African issues. Indeed, in the view of Clarence Redekop, Canada and Tanzania developed a "link, reminiscent of the Ottawa-Delhi axis during the Suez crisis of 1956."¹⁸²

In sum, although it is unlikely that Canada's role as a mediator in many of these contentious racial issues in Africa damaged the Indo-Canadian relationship in any way, it is clear that by 1971 Canada had expanded its relations within the association to encompass many new Third World states and this had affected the degree of its interaction with India. While Canada and India continued often to support each other's positions in the Commonwealth, there was no close working relationship during this period, other than in 1961, on the South African membership issue.

¹⁸¹ Gangai, "India and the Commonwealth", 716-17.

¹⁸² Redekop, 191.

In addition to these institutional linkages between Canada and India, there were a number of specific events that affected the overall relationship in this period. Two of these events were India's actions in Goa in 1961 and the 1962 Sino-Indian border war. While Goa and the 1962 war did not directly involve Canada, they are still relevant events to be examined due to their importance in the development of India's foreign policy and Canadian attitudes towards that policy.

In December of 1961, the Indian government, in what appeared to be a direct contradiction of the non-interventionist and conciliatory character its non-alignment policy, used force to remove the Portuguese from Goa as well as several other small enclaves along the west coast of India. The Indians defended their actions and declared that, unlike the withdrawal of Britain and France from similar ex-colonial areas, there appeared to be no peaceful solution to the Goa situation. However, as Peyton V. Lyon has written:

... claims by Delhi that the Portuguese were imposing great hardships upon the Goans, and were responsible for provocative incidents, were obviously inaccurate- and reminiscent of the propaganda that had accompanied the aggressions of Hitler and Mussolini. India's resort to force was thought by many in Europe and North America to be particularly inconsistent with her advocacy of non-violence and her support for the United Nations Charter.¹⁸³

When it became clear that India was going to invade Goa the Canadian High Commissioner in New Delhi, Mr. A.C. Campbell, expressed Ottawa's concern over the Indian government's actions. Although several other Western nations also registered their protests over the incidents in Goa, for some reason Canada's remarks made their way into the Indian press. Lyon notes that the Canadian comments "upset the Indian government, especially Mr. Krishna Menon, the controversial Minister of Defence, [and as a result], Mr.

¹⁸³ Peyton V. Lyon, Canada in World Affairs 1961-63, (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1968), 487.

Campbell heard complaints that Canada had sided with the imperialists when the chips were down."¹⁸⁴ Although Lyon also makes it clear that India's displeasure with Ottawa's position did not signal a major break in diplomatic affairs, it is not unfair to say that the Indian government's actions in Goa, and Canada's response to them, were early indications of the changing nature of the bilateral relationship in this period.

The Sino-Indian border war of 1962 also had an effect on Canada-India relations. Following India's independence, Sino-Indian relations, from India's perspective, were very strong. As Arthur Lall points out, Nehru openly referred to China as "our neighbour which has been our friend through the ages."¹⁸⁵ Thomson states that Nehru also felt that it was imperative that the western nations quickly recognize the new government in Peking. Thus at the Conference of Commonwealth External Affairs Ministers in Colombo in 1950, "Nehru appealed for... recognition by all Commonwealth countries of the Communist government in Peking, as the only means of influencing future developments in China."¹⁸⁶

China, however, had a slightly different perception of the Sino-Indian relationship due to the questions that existed between these two countries regarding the border in the Northern Frontier area. Nehru "believed that the problems of India's northern frontiers, which had so much occupied the rulers of British India, were products of the Imperial connection" and that they would disappear "with the last British troops and administrators."¹⁸⁷ Nehru felt that China would recognize the common history between the two nations and that their border problems would be readily settled once India gained her independence. Lall makes it clear that Nehru believed, especially in terms of China,

¹⁸⁴ Ibid, 488.

¹⁸⁵ Lall, 92.

¹⁸⁶ Thomson, Louis St. Laurent, 286.

¹⁸⁷ Edwards, 51.

that "a deliberate policy of friendship with other countries [went] farther in gaining security than anything else"¹⁸⁸ and thus that the pursuit of amicable relations with China would be sufficient to avoid a border clash.

China, however, did not share this sanguine attitude, and Chinese troops continued to build up in the border areas. Finally, in October 1962, the Peking government began an invasion of India's North-East Frontier Agency. China's major offensive in November easily overwhelmed the Indian army, and, as Diefenbaker discussed in his comments to the House in December 1962, the result of this Chinese offensive was to bring Chinese troops to within thirty miles of the Assam Plains, an area in India of great economic value and importance.¹⁸⁹

Canada's response to the conflict was, at least on the surface, one of complete support for the Indian government from the outset. Despite the somewhat more distant relationship that had been developing between these two countries, both sides of the House fully supported Canadian aid in response to the Chinese attack. In his comments to the House on October 29, 1962, Diefenbaker, on the matter of military assistance, declared that, if so requested by the Indian government, Canada would respond with aid. Diefenbaker stated that "speaking for the Canadian government, and I hope for all members of the House, we are deeply disturbed at the attacks which are being made at this time against India, a fellow member of the Commonwealth. India can rest assured that the Canadian government will cooperate to the fullest in helping that nation acquire those items which it needs to defend itself in this critical hour."¹⁹⁰ Pearson also made it clear that the Opposition favoured assistance to India and stated that "we on this side will certainly

¹⁸⁸ Lall, 93.

¹⁸⁹ The Department of External Affairs, "Diefenbaker's comments to the house re: Indo-China border conflict", *External Affairs* 12, December 1962, 386.

¹⁹⁰ House of Commons Debates, *Hansard*, 1st Session, 25th Parliament, October 29, 1962, (Ottawa: Queen's Printer 1962), 1006.

support anything the government can do to assist India through the supply of needed and available equipment, to meet the unprovoked attack upon her territory by a country with which India has been so uniformly friendly in recent years. Anything that can be done to show our support and encouragement for the Indians in facing what amounts to all out aggression, ... will I am sure receive the approval of all the people of Canada."¹⁹¹

As the conflict progressed into November, still without a formal declaration of war by China, Diefenbaker continued to pledge his support for the Indian government and his hope for a negotiated peace. The Chinese November offensive, however, drastically altered the situation in India to the latter's detriment and the Indian government continued, therefore, to ask for more Canadian assistance. In regards to this, Diefenbaker stated to the House on November 20, 1962 that "we have given, and intended to give, practical evidence of our support for India at this time. As I stated to the House on November 5th we have dispatched six DC-3 Dakota transport aircraft in answer to an urgent Indian request." New Delhi also requested "further assistance in the form of aircraft, clothing for their forces and other materials. In light of this additional information the government is at the moment urgently considering how we can best meet the Indian government's requests and the most expeditious way by which our assistance can be sent to India."¹⁹²

When examining Canada's actual contributions to India's needs at this time, however, it becomes apparent that Canadian assistance was not particularly significant. Although Canada did provide India with material aid, Canadian distribution of this assistance was hampered by a lack of information regarding the state of the war at different times and by a lack of access to the areas that needed the assistance the most. These differences would seem to indicate that the diplomatic channels to India were not as strong

¹⁹¹ Ibid.

¹⁹² House of Commons Debates, Hansard, 1st Session, 25th Parliament, November 20, 1962, (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1962), 1803.

as they had been in the past and perhaps even that Canadian efforts to get the material to India were only half-hearted. Canada's actions were consistent with Diefenbaker's "Commonwealth internationalism", but the 1962 Border War was not the burning issue of his administration. It has to be remembered that the concerns of the Canadian government at this time were focussed on the Cuban missile crisis rather than the invasion of India by China. The Diefenbaker government's preoccupation with its weakened position in the House of Commons following the Conservatives' 1962 election set back, may also have led to the relative indecision of Canada on the matter of assistance to India.

In terms of judging India's perceptions of Canadian assistance during the war, it is interesting to look at the views of S.C. Gangal. In 1970 Gangal explained that total "Canadian defence assistance, till the end of 1963, amounted to \$20.27 million. In addition, she promised \$12.5 million for sixteen Caribou aircraft." This was "only a modest percentage of India's total defence aid requirements," but it was "impressive enough in view of Canada's limited capacity and resources," and it "certainly helped to strengthen the friendly bonds between the two Commonwealth partners."¹⁹³ In a 1978 article, however, Gangal was less charitable in his assessment of the significance of Canada's contribution. He stated that it was "true that at the time of the Chinese invasion of India in 1962, Britain, Australia, and Canada offered prompt assistance to India. ... [The] Australian and Canadian assistance, however, did not amount to much and consisted largely of blankets and other non-lethal supplies."¹⁹⁴

However one evaluates Canada's support, there was, in fact, little that Canada, or any other state for that matter, could do to stop the inevitable Chinese victory, and India's defeat was a major turning point in its perception of itself in both Asian and world affairs.

¹⁹³ Gangal, India and the Commonwealth, 54.

¹⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 73.

"India, the largest, most populous, economically most developed, diplomatically most influential, and militarily strongest among [the new states of Asia] revealed grave weaknesses and limited capacity during the border war with China."¹⁹⁵ Clearly, India could no longer hope to live in "peaceful co-existence" with China and its poor showing in the conflict forced the Indian government into a major re-evaluation of its foreign policy.

Overall Canada's efforts vis-a-vis the Sino-Indian war cannot really be seen as marking a negative contribution to the relationship, but the failure to get India the goods it wanted as fast as it wanted them probably lowered Nehru's perception of Canada to a certain degree. It seems that this event, although incredibly important in terms of India's political development, had limited effect on the Canada-India bilateral relationship at the time. Its impact on the evolution of Indian foreign policy meant, however, that it did have implications for the interaction between these two governments over the longer term.

A further blow to the Indo-Canadian relationship came with the death of Nehru in May of 1964. Pearson, in addressing the House on May 27, 1964 regarding this event said:

the death of Mr. Nehru is a loss not only to India and her people, who knew him best, but a loss to all mankind. Among the leaders of this century no one made a greater impact on his time. No one has been more dedicated to the proposition that peace should prevail among nations and freedom should exist among men than the Prime Minister of India. ... As the leader of his country his aim was to bring social justice and dignity to India's common man. He inspired respect among his adversaries, affection in his friends and confidence in his followers and admiration of all men.¹⁹⁶

It is impossible to speculate what may have happened if Nehru had remained in office throughout the Pearson government with its commitment to internationalism, but the

¹⁹⁵ Brecher, *The New States of Asia*, 158.

¹⁹⁶ House of Commons Debates, *Hansard*, 2nd Session, 26th Parliament, May 27, 1964, (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1964), 1025

possibility does exist that there could have been a new strengthening of the Indo-Canadian relationship. Nehru and Pearson had always had a great deal of respect for one another and with Menon no longer in the picture (he retired following the 1962 military defeat), there is the possibility that relations could have improved, despite India's shift away from international involvement following the 1962 border war. There is no telling, then, what might have emerged in terms of the bilateral relationship had Nehru lived longer.

The next significant event in terms of relations between India and Canada was the 1965 Indo-Pakistan border war. The Indo-Pakistan relationship had been mainly one of hostility since the partition of these two countries in 1947. As was made apparent in the preceding chapter, "the main issue in dispute [was] the claims of both countries to the former nominally independent states of Jammu and Kashmir, a territory of approximately 86,000 square miles (including disputed areas) at the apex of the frontiers of Afghanistan, China, India, and Pakistan."¹⁹⁷

This dispute was the major factor that precipitated the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war. Tensions over Kashmir were heightened by the growing American influence in the region via Pakistan. India viewed Pakistan's decision to allow American bases in that country as aimed at itself not at securing Pakistan from communist aggression. As far as the Indian government was concerned the reason for the U.S. build-up of Pakistan militarily was, in the words of Rama Rao "for dealing with India and India alone, from a position of strength, not for fighting others."¹⁹⁸

In 1963-64, Pakistan, now with over a decade of American support behind it, began to force the Kashmir issue. As Hardgrave has described it, in April 1965, "following an increase in tension along the cease-fire line with Kashmir, an armed clash

¹⁹⁷ Cronin, 606.

¹⁹⁸ Rama R. Rao, "India and Pakistan", *India Quarterly*, January-March 1985, 30.

occurred in the Rann of Kutch in Gujarat over disputed boundaries in an area alternately marsh and desert but potentially rich in oil deposits."¹⁹⁹ Shortly after the outbreak of this conflict, the United States suspended military and economic assistance to both India and Pakistan in the hopes that stopping the inflow of supplies would bring a quick end to the war. A cease-fire was reached in June 1965, but in August Pakistani guerrillas were sent into Kashmir in an attempt to spark an internal rebellion against India. This time, however, the guerrillas received a heavy beating by Indian forces, and the United States and Britain, still hoping to bring about a quick end to the conflict, cut off all military aid to both countries.

At his point, the United Nations attempted to resolve the situation in Kashmir and, with the support of the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union, called for an immediate cease-fire, which India and Pakistan finally accepted in September. The Soviet Union, seeing a perfect opportunity to accomplish some of its own foreign policy objectives in the region, then stepped in to offer its services to help negotiate a resolution of the conflict now that a cease-fire was in effect. In January of 1966, Ayub Khan, the President of Pakistan, and Lal Bahadur Shastri, the new Prime Minister of India, accepted the Soviet offer and travelled to Tashkent to try to negotiate a settlement .

The Soviet Union had several motives in attempting to act as a mediator in this dispute. By pursuing closer ties with India, the Soviets hoped that in some way they could moderate China's bid for leadership in Asia. "The Soviet Union could not forget that some two-thirds of her own extensive territory was in Asia...to build up India as a countervailing force to China would be invaluable."²⁰⁰ Furthermore, the Soviets also saw these negotiations as a perfect opportunity to lure Pakistan away from its traditional pro-American position and to use Pakistan as another counterweight to China. Fulfilling these

¹⁹⁹ Hardgrave and Kochanek, 341.

²⁰⁰ Appadorai, 211.

objectives was obviously a major task and Tashkent was only "a beginning in that direction."²⁰¹

At the same time, India also had a growing interest in the Soviet Union as a means to secure some of its own regional and security concerns. The Indians not only shared the same fear of the Chinese as the Soviets, but were also faced with the reality of the suspension of American military aid as a result of the 1965 war. Although some "non-lethal" American supplies began to reach India again as early as March 1966, the cut-off placed the Indian government in an awkward situation regarding the maintenance of its own security. As a result, the Indians turned to the Soviets to fill this void.

The eventual Tashkent declaration did not provide any long-standing solutions to the situation in Kashmir, but it did manage to settle the dispute temporarily and it also helped to accomplish many of the security concerns of the Indians and the Soviets. The actual agreement provided that both countries would return to the positions that each had held before the August 1965 fighting, that the High Commissioner of each country would return to his post and normal diplomatic relations would be restored and that prisoners of war would be repatriated. More importantly, however, the Tashkent agreement helped bring both India and Pakistan closer to the Soviet Union.

Looking at the 1965 war from Canada's perspective, the important factor was not the conflict itself, but rather the Tashkent agreement that followed. Diefenbaker, then in opposition, made it clear that the Tashkent agreement had not gone unrecognized and that he saw the successful negotiations as damaging not only to the Commonwealth, but also to the West's goal of containing communism in the region. In a statement to the House of Commons on January 20, 1966, Diefenbaker declared that due to Tashkent, "the Commonwealth faces one of the most serious challenges to its continuing existence in its

²⁰¹ Ibid.

short but glorious history. ... It is a matter of serious consequence, as the effort is made to meet communism in all parts of the world, that we within the Commonwealth could not bring about a settlement and that it took the USSR to achieve something that we had not been able to attain."²⁰²

In September of 1965, the Canadian government had, in fact, offered to serve as a mediator between India and Pakistan in an attempt to bring about an armistice, but the Indian government had turned down the offer. This was extremely difficult for Diefenbaker to understand given the Commonwealth connections between these countries. Clearly, the fact that it could not play the role of the "helpful-fixer" as it had in the past, while the Soviet Union could, reflected poorly on the bilateral relationship. Another factor connected to the 1965 conflict that further contributed to the deterioration in Indo-Canadian relations, briefly touched on earlier, was the American suspension of aid to India and Pakistan in 1965 in the hopes of stopping the conflict at an early stage. As already mentioned, American non-lethal aid to India was eventually restored in 1966 and was increased in 1967 following two poor harvests. This reinstatement of aid was extended, however, "under new conditions that India should concentrate its development efforts on improving agricultural output. In short, the U.S. government began to tell India how to allocate its resources for development."²⁰³ Naturally, the Indian government's response was one of bitterness and resentment and this contributed to a further shift in focus toward the Soviet Union. This change in policy led the Nixon administration, which was at the same time strengthening its ties with Pakistan, to cut India's aid almost in half to \$439 million by 1970. While Canada not only maintained, but increased her level of support to

²⁰² House of Commons Debates, Hansard, 1st Session, 27th Parliament, January 20, 1966, (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1966), 54.

²⁰³ Morrison, 23.

India at this time, the American position on aid to India profoundly altered Indian perceptions, attitudes and policies towards Canada. Morrison has put it succinctly:

Canada was useful to the South Asian countries as an alternative source of aid-financial, technical and commodity-and continued to enjoy easy access to the offices of senior politicians and officials. But no longer was Ottawa regarded as the key to open doors in Washington. Moreover, as Moscow and Peking grew in importance, the advantage of having a friendly intermediary in Washington declined.²⁰⁴

Thus, along with the other problems already discussed, the overall effect of the 1965 conflict was hardly positive in terms of preserving close Indo-Canadian relations.

An even clearer indication of the shift in focus of Indian foreign policy away from the West, including Canada, was apparent in August of 1971 with the Indo-Soviet treaty. As was apparent with Tashkent, both the Soviets and the Indians were of the belief that closer relations with each other were essential to each country's overall security interests. The Indo-Soviet treaty was the culmination of efforts in this direction.

The 1971 Treaty also marked a new stage in India's foreign policy of non-alignment. Due to its on-going feelings of military insecurity, the Indian government had been searching for a way to balance the threat of China and an American-backed Pakistan. This concern took on new importance in face of the 1971 war of secession in East Pakistan as there was a risk of Chinese military involvement against India, which was supporting the secessionist forces. The Indo-Soviet Treaty met India's security needs in this situation and marked the first time that India looked toward one of the super powers to help it accomplish its defensive needs directly. What was "new about the Indo-Soviet Treaty

²⁰⁴ Ibid, 33.

[was] that for the first time India... acknowledged that it [could not] opt out of the power game."²⁰⁵

Defenders of the agreement point out that Indian non-alignment was forced to shift in this direction due to the changing military reality of the region during this period. These people feel that due to the continued presence of the Americans in Pakistan, and the early signs of U.S. rapprochement with China at this time, both India and the Soviet Union were left with no alternative but to conclude an agreement if they wanted to remain active and influential participants in the Asian region. As Sisir Gupta states in his 1981 analysis of the treaty, the

Sino-U.S. rapprochement [created] major problems for other powers interested in the region. Its implications for the Soviet Union [were] obvious enough. Faced with the possibility of parallel Chinese and U.S. moves to curb Soviet influences in the world. Moscow could not but seek new friends and allies to protect its interests. ... From India's viewpoint the situation [was] equally difficult. For in trying to improve their relations, two limited adversaries like China and the U.S. have not only to discover a common threat but also to devise areas of agreement to sustain a fairly high level of relationship. To the extent that United State interest in South Asia [had] been waning, its capacity to treat it as the area where Chinese aspirations could be encouraged [had] increased. And Pakistan, in the hour of its crisis [had] become the obvious area of agreement for these two Super Powers.²⁰⁶

In terms of India, it is clear that the above perception of U.S. and Chinese intentions, together with the United States' manipulation of military and other aid during and following the 1965 border war, led India to believe that it had little choice but to move toward the Soviet Union.

While India's decision was a defensible option in terms of its pragmatic recognition of its own weaknesses, it should be pointed out that, following 1971, many critics had

²⁰⁵ Sisir Gupta, "Not outside the contest: the Soviet-Indian treaty", in Sisir Gupta, India and the International System, 359.

²⁰⁶ *Ibid*, 360-61.

difficulty in accepting any description of India as being "non-aligned". Although India still described itself as a non-aligned nation, it would appear that Nehru's conception of what this approach to foreign policy entailed had been violated, for he had not envisioned India's entering into treaty relationships that had military implications with either super power. In sum, the "treaty was intended as a deterrent to Pakistan and China, but it also brought India into a greater dependency on the Soviet Union."²⁰⁷

What is surprising about the 1971 Treaty in terms of the Indo-Canadian relationship is the lack of a Canadian response to the agreement. It is possible, however, that Prime Minister Trudeau's visit to the Soviet Union earlier that year may have had something to do with this development. While in Moscow in May of 1971, Trudeau signed a communiqué with the Soviets that went a long way toward improving relations between these two countries. Trudeau, in his comments to the House of Commons on May 28, made it clear that Canada's past perceptions of the Soviet Union were no longer realistic in terms of present global realities and were also not consistent with Canadian foreign policy. It is possible, therefore, that Trudeau's visit to the Soviet Union may have defused some of the concern that might otherwise have emanated from the 1971 Soviet treaty with India. Peter Dobell has noted that in 1971, the Canada-India relationship "was gradually becoming more one of equals."²⁰⁸ Therefore, it is also feasible that, in view of the growing maturity of the Indo-Canadian bilateral relationship, Canada may have viewed the treaty as a result of India's trying to look after its own security concerns and, thus, not a matter that should enter into the bilateral relationship. Given the same security circumstances it is highly probable that Canada would have done the same thing.

²⁰⁷ Hardgrave and Kochanek, 343-44.

²⁰⁸ Peter C. Dobell, *Canada in World Affairs Vol. XVII, 1971-73*, (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1985), 177.

In regards to India's perception of Canada, however, it is also clear that the negative image of the Canadian government as a useful tool for moderating American interests in the region was entrenched by 1971. The 1971 treaty was a good indication that India had given up its hopes of having strong relations with the Americans. Even if India had wanted to use the Canadian channel, there were several other factors that made this possibility even more implausible. Gone was the Nehru/St. Laurent/Pearson link of the 1950s and early 1960s and in its place was a far less promising Indira Gandhi/Trudeau/Nixon combination. As a result, the 1971 treaty would appear to typify the development of the bilateral relationship in this period. Canadian and Indian foreign policy no longer had the same degree of compatibility.

Closely related to the Indo-Soviet treaty was the secession of East Pakistan and that, too, had a negative impact on Canada-India relations. Following the 1965 India-Pakistan war, the domestic situation remained unstable in Pakistan in the years leading up to 1971. Ironically, much of this instability was the result of efforts to establish democratic reforms in Pakistan. In 1969, General Yahya Khan replaced Ayub Khan as President of Pakistan and vowed to restore democracy in that country. The first and most significant step that was carried out was the granting of universal adult suffrage within Pakistan. This extension of the franchise marked a dramatic change in where the power base in Pakistan was located. Traditionally, the western half of Pakistan had always dominated and controlled government institutions. "West Pakistan, multilingual, with a martial tradition and a contempt for the 'effete' Bengali, had long exercised what was essentially an imperial relationship over the Bengali East."²⁰⁹ Furthermore, it had neglected the eastern wing economically leading to major disparities in the two wing's development. However, with the adoption of universal suffrage, the East now had 169 seats compared to 144 for

²⁰⁹ Hardgrave and Kochanek, 342.

West Pakistan in the national legislature. The circumstances were ripe for a correction of the historic misbalance between the two sectors.

In the December 1970 elections, The Awami League Party, led by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and with its power in the East, proposed a six-point program aimed at addressing the inequalities between East and West Pakistan and at bringing about the eventual autonomy of East Pakistan. During the election that took place at this time, Rahman managed to secure 167 of the 169 Eastern seats under the country's new seat redistribution. The West's Pakistan Peoples Party, led by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, won the next highest number of seats in the election, but did not obtain the same majority in the West that the Awami League had secured in the East. Faced with the likelihood of a national assembly dominated by the Awami League, Bhutto denounced the results and Mujib's six-point program. Yahya Khan bowed to Bhutto's pressure, postponed the convening of the national assembly and entered into talks with Mujib and Bhutto in an attempt to break the impasse. These talks, however, were used mainly as a cover-up in order for the Pakistan army to build up its presence in the East so that it could effectively impose the martial law edict that had gone into effect following the violent reaction in the East to the postponement of the meeting of the national assembly.

On March 25, 1971, Mujib was arrested by the Pakistan army and the Bengali population of the east reacted violently, forcing the Pakistan army into a situation where it had to react. "During the nine months of repression that followed, thousands of Bengalis were killed, and some ten million refugees, most of whom were Hindu, crossed the borders into north eastern India. The refugee movement created a situation that was economically, socially, and politically unacceptable for India. Moreover, there was the danger that the events in east Bengal might set off communal rioting in India."²¹⁰ India

²¹⁰ Ibid, 343.

now found itself in a situation where, unlike the Kashmir situation that had involved these countries in the past, it had become directly linked to the domestic problems that Pakistan was facing.

At the outset, the Canadian government responded to the situation with a great deal of sympathy for the position of India. Despite the deterioration in the Indo-Canadian bilateral relationship that had occurred by this time, Canada fully supported India in terms of its refugee problem. In his statements to the House of Commons on November 17, 1971, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mitchell Sharp, made it clear that democratic government should be restored in East Pakistan and that Ottawa would do everything in its power to help India cope with the refugee situation that had emerged. Sharp stated that:

Canada has shown its deep concern for the plight of the Pakistani refugees in India by the contributions made by the government... for their relief in the last few months. We have been concerned not only for the refugees themselves but for the government of India, upon whom the burden of responsibility for relief falls. ... Without additional assistance many of the significant development achievements which have been made over the past two and a half decades will be jeopardized, and unless renewed efforts to share the burden are undertaken by the international community the presence of large numbers of refugees will continue to aggravate the political tensions of the subcontinent.²¹¹

Canadian contributions to India in this crisis had equalled \$6.6 million to that point, but Sharp wanted to further supplement this total to \$22 million, coincidentally representing approximately one dollar for every Canadian.²¹²

²¹¹ House of Commons Debates, Hansard, 3rd Session, 28th Parliament, November 17, 1971, (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1971), 9635.

²¹² Sharp, 2.

Sharp, however, also made it extremely clear that aid alone was not the long-term solution and that ultimately Canada's efforts had to be directed at trying to re-establish democratic rule in Pakistan. In his statement he further pointed out that:

a political solution must be found which will allow the refugees to return to a secure and democratic society in East Pakistan. I regret, ... that at the moment I see little hope for an early resolution of the problem. Canada once again joins with other nations in urging upon the governments of India and Pakistan... restraint and forbearance in the face of the grave difficulties that must be overcome before a lasting settlement can be achieved.²¹³

Needless to say, West Pakistan did not react favourably to India's support of the refugees and the Bengali guerrillas who were still fighting the Pakistan army. Clashes on the India-Pakistan eastern border began to escalate in November of 1971 and in early December, Pakistani forces began pre-emptive attacks against India to cut off the Indian support for the rebels. The Indian government finally responded on December 3, following a particular air strike, with an invasion of Pakistan on both the western and eastern fronts in an attempt to defeat the Pakistani army and relieve itself from the refugee and security problems that were facing the country.

Following the invasion of December 3, Canada once again pledged its support for India, but began searching for a solution to the conflict within the United Nations. The Canadian government also made it clear that it still viewed the long-term solution to be the restoration of democracy in a united Pakistan. On December 7, the U.N. General Assembly passed a resolution calling for a cease-fire by a count of 104 votes to 11 with ten abstentions.

Canada's full scale support for India finally started to diminish when it became clear that India was not going to abide by this resolution. Recognizing the potential opportunity

²¹³ Debates, Hansard, November 17, 1971, 9636.

to finish off the Pakistan army, which was faltering badly in its efforts to deal with the Indian invasion, India refused to comply with the U.N. proposal. Escott Reid has pointed out that the Indian government, as a result of the friendship agreement signed with the USSR in August, relied "on the Soviet veto in the Security Council to protect it from an intervention by the U.N. which would have been supported by a great majority of its members."²¹⁴

Following the surrender of the West Pakistani forces in East Pakistan on December 16, 1971, India declared a unilateral cease-fire and immediately recognized the new nation state of Bangladesh in the former eastern wing.

Canada, although supporting the General Assembly resolution, had felt that it had not gone far enough in terms of trying to come to a long-term solution to the problem. It favoured the creation of a U.N. peacekeeping force to separate the combatants and indicated a willingness to supply troops if such a force came into being.²¹⁵ The idea of a peacekeeping force was, however, not favoured by India and was rejected by the General Assembly in favour of the cease-fire resolution that was eventually passed.

The most important development in this situation was the use of the Soviet veto on India's behalf to enable it to continue its assault on the Pakistani forces until they were defeated and the state of Bangladesh was declared. Canada and India were thus at odds with each other by this stage of the conflict, for Canada opposed a complete military defeat of Pakistan and the creation of a new state in the eastern wing. Instead, it favoured a ceasefire, which India opposed, and the intervention of U.N. forces, which India also did not want. There was thus by this time a wide divergence in their foreign policy objectives despite Canada's initial sympathy for the Indian dilemma at the outset of the struggle in the

²¹⁴ Reid, *Envoy to Nehru*, 245.

²¹⁵ Dobell, 114.

eastern wing of Pakistan. This divergence was further reflected in India's immediate recognition of the secessionist state of Bangladesh after the surrender of the West Pakistan army and in Canada's long hesitation in according recognition which did not come until the following year.

In terms of Indian foreign policy, it is clear that the 1971 border war marked a new period in India's approach to international relations. The outcome of the conflict and the creation of Bangladesh left no question as to India's status in the South Asian region. As one Indian observer has noted, the 1971 conflict "radically changed the subcontinental structure created in 1947. It cut Pakistan to size and doomed its efforts to claim and attain parity with India forever."²¹⁶ Escott Reid has also noted that the political instability within Pakistan further weakened that country's status in the region following the creation of Bangladesh. "The result was that by the mid-seventies India was able to put aside the fear that it had in the mid-fifties and later of a Pakistan, armed by the United States, invading India."²¹⁷ Clearly, as a result of the 1971 conflict and the treaty with the Soviet Union that same year, India's regional security concerns, which had been magnified as a result of its 1962 defeat by the Chinese, were put to rest. Its status had been reinstated and as a result of its new standing India was free to pursue a more active international strategy if it so desired.

In attempting to measure the effect of the 1971 border war on the Indo-Canadian bilateral relationship, it is apparent that it contributed to a further cooling in the relations between these two countries. In particular, no longer was there any evidence of their collaboration in the United Nations to resolve regional conflicts by means of peacekeeping forces. Indeed, in this situation India actually opposed U.N. intervention as at variance

²¹⁶ Kalim Rahadur, "India and Pakistan", *International Studies*, July-December 1978, 518.

²¹⁷ Reid, *Envoy to Nehru*, 250.

with its interests. Compounding this diverging focus was the fact that in the eyes of many observers, India's "cut throat" reliance on the Soviet veto in order to secure its own objectives had dramatically altered the West's (including Canada's) perception of that country. "The 1971 Bangladesh war... established India as a hegemonic power in South Asia. That it had used war... in Clausewitzian terms as an extension of diplomacy also led people in the west to conclude... that India was 'just another state' with identifiable interests and familiar techniques in statecraft."²¹⁸ According to Ramesh Thakur, the 1971 war meant that "the basis for a special relationship was... destroyed by this loss in perception [by Canada] of India as a qualitatively different state."²¹⁹

While it is the thesis of this study that a pragmatic perception of India should have guided Canadian relations with that country from the outset, such was not the case. The rhetoric of Indian diplomacy led Canadians to anticipate a particularly "high-minded" approach to foreign policy on the part of that country and that had contributed to the development of their early, close bilateral relationship. As it became increasingly clear that Indian foreign policy, like that of other states, was rooted in narrow self-interest, disillusionment gradually set in. Thus, "the Indian's impressive and decisive victory" against Pakistan in 1971, made possible by their new relationship with the U.S.S.R. and pursued in preference to a U.N. settlement and only limited gains, "gave credibility to the view of many in government that Canada had gone unnecessarily far in her support of India"²²⁰ over the years. There is no doubt then, that by the end of the series of events of 1970-71 a further decline had occurred in Indo-Canadian relations.

If there remained any question as to the status of this relationship in the 1970s, it ended with the Indian explosion of a nuclear device using Canadian materials in 1974.

²¹⁸ Thakur, "Change and continuity", 415.

²¹⁹ Ibid.

²²⁰ Lyon and Ismael, 43.

This event, when combined with the other factors that have already been discussed, marked the final end of close relations until the 1980's.

The Indo-Canadian nuclear relationship dated back to the earliest days of nuclear power. Allan MacEachen, in a document released in 1976, referred to the overall success of this venture: "Canada's nuclear co-operation with India began in the context of the Colombo plan. It had as its basis the belief that nuclear power could be vital to the equitable economic growth of developing countries. ... The genuine success achieved by Indo-Canadian co-operation in the development of nuclear power for energy, agriculture and medicine has proved the practicality of this approach."²²¹ According to Michael Tucker, "the personal and ideological dispositions of Canadian political leaders and atomic energy officials to foster closer relations with India during the 1950s marked the origins of a growing Canadian sense of a nuclear commitment to that country."²²²

The Canadian nuclear program concentrated on "peaceful" uses of nuclear power from its inception. Canada was one of the Big Three in the research effort during World War Two. After Hitler had conquered most of Europe the British programme was transferred across the Atlantic and part of it was set up in Canada at Chalk River on the Ottawa River.²²³ After the war, Canada decided it would not pursue a nuclear weapons capability, but at the same time decided not to stop its research program. Canadian research concentrated primarily on the new area of nuclear physics and the benefits that this energy could provide for mankind. Canadian research efforts were focussed on the peaceful uses of atomic energy, primarily the generation of electricity and medical research and treatment.

²²¹ Allan J. MacEachen, "Nuclear relations with India", Statements and Speeches, The Department of External Affairs, May 18, 1976, 1.

²²² Tucker, 204.

²²³ Robert W. Reford, "Problems of nuclear proliferation", Behind the Headlines, May 1975, 3.

It was during these early years that India acquired its first research reactor from Canada. In 1955 Dr. H.J. Bhabha, Chairman of India's Atomic Energy Commission, asked Canada for aid to help its fledgling nuclear program. In 1956, Canada announced that it would provide a nuclear research reactor to India and that at the same time it would train technicians to run it. The Canadian CIRUS reactor was, in fact, India's second research reactor. Its first was the British Aspara reactor which began functioning in 1956. "Under terms of a bilateral agreement, Great Britain... policed the safeguards arrangement to ensure that no fissile by-products were diverted to weapons use."²²⁴ This was necessary because it was readily recognized, even in these early years that any "...country that developed or acquired from others the ability to irradiate fissionable material or generate electricity from nuclear energy had the technical ability to develop nuclear weapons."²²⁵

The Indo-Canadian agreement signed on April 28, 1956 stated that India would only use the CIRUS reactor for peaceful purposes but, unlike the British agreement, it made no real mention of adequate safeguard measures. Michael Sullivan has written that:

The arrangements for safeguards ... were unique and it was probably because Canada was willing to provide its assistance with minimal restrictions and no controls over the fuel rods that India chose that nation rather than the United States or Great Britain for the technical assistance for its second research reactor. Under the agreement, CIRUS, which began operating in 1960, was not subject to any formal safeguards. The Indian government merely 'undertook' that CIRUS's by-products would be used for 'peaceful purposes.'²²⁶

²²⁴ Michael J. Sullivan, "Indian attitudes on international atomic energy controls", *Pacific Affairs*, Fall 1970, 357.

²²⁵ Noble, 42.

²²⁶ Sullivan, 358.

Dr. Bhabha insisted that India's word was a sufficient safeguard to members of the Commonwealth and expressions of "doubts only served to call into question Indian credibility."²²⁷ Nehru also made it very clear that India viewed safeguards "as yet another instance of big-power attempts to dominate the world by curtailing the legitimate aspirations of economically and technically underdeveloped countries."²²⁸ Nehru, however, also tried to ease Canadian and world concerns over India's potential nuclear capability by stating that "whatever might happen and whatever the circumstances, we shall never use this atomic energy for evil purposes."²²⁹ Eventually, both countries agreed that if future sales were completed, and at that time an international agency existed to implement and verify safeguards, then any new reactors provided at that time would comply with these regulations.

The first sign of potential problems came a few months after CIRUS began operating when Nehru told the National Development Council, that India was "approaching a stage when it is possible for us... to make atomic weapons."²³⁰ Despite his statement, Canada did little at this time to deal with this potential problem. It feared that any attempts to implement belated safeguards might lead India to turn to the Soviet Union, France, or Belgium for future aid that would be without any safeguards even if an international monitoring agency existed. The CIRUS reactor had also become "the crowning achievement of the Colombo Plan's first decade and its status made Canadian withdrawal impractical."²³¹ Therefore, it appeared that Canadian aid would continue under the negotiated conditions for the CIRUS research reactor.

²²⁷ Morrison and Page, 25.

²²⁸ Ibid, 25.

²²⁹ Jawaharlal Nehru, India's Foreign Policy: Selected Speeches, September 1946-April 1961, (New Delhi: Government of India Press, 1966), 507.

²³⁰ Sullivan, 359.

²³¹ Morrison and Page, 26.

In 1964, Canada provided aid to India for the Rajasthan Atomic Power Project (RAPP 1), the first of two envisaged nuclear power plants in that state. India, however, could not convince Canada to accept safeguards as weak as those applied to the CIRUS project. In both these cases, India agreed to the principle of international control and accepted the notion of IAEA safeguards under certain conditions. However, any attempts to implement retroactive safeguards on the CIRUS reactor were rejected outright by the Indian government. This decision, which was defended by India as a desire to develop a "self-sufficient" power source, was a strong clue to India's intentions for the by-products of the CIRUS reactor, for "'self sufficiency' [was] a codeword for the maximum avoidance of international safeguards."²³² In short then, Canada was in a position where it "exercised no continuing control over the use to which CIRUS's by-products were put, placing its trust in the word of India."²³³ It was this lack of early safeguards that led to the eventual Indo-Canadian conflict in this area.

India's nuclear policy took a dramatic turn with the decision to hold an underground nuclear test in May of 1974. The detonation occurred in the desert of Western Rajasthan and made India the sixth member of the exclusive nuclear club, the others being the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, France and China.²³⁴ It appeared that "it was with the Trombay Canada-India reactor that India isolated the plutonium necessary for the manufacture of its first nuclear 'device'. It also appeared that India used its own natural uranium- which it has in plentiful supply- to obtain its plutonium."²³⁵ The Indian explosion was, then, the direct result of Canada's failure to implement necessary safeguards at the beginning of the Indo-Canadian nuclear relationship. In sum, "Canadian

²³² Cronin, 597.

²³³ Sullivan, 358.

²³⁴ Hardgrave and Kochanek, 359.

²³⁵ Albert Legault, "Nuclear policy should be more open and less ambiguous", *International Perspectives*, January-February 1976, 8.

technological assistance was a catalyst in developing India's potential for becoming a flexible and independent nuclear power."²³⁶

The official Canadian response to the Indian explosion was one of "severe disappointment coupled with moral outrage and betrayal."²³⁷ Mitchell Sharp, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, on May 18, 1974 stated:

Canada has been consistently opposed to all forms of nuclear testing and we consider it most regrettable that yet another country has now conducted a nuclear explosion. This represents a severe set-back to efforts being made in the international community to prevent all nuclear testing and to inhibit the proliferation of nuclear explosion technology.²³⁸

Four days after the explosion, the Canadian government took four actions against the Indian state: (1) it announced the suspension of all shipments of nuclear equipment and material; (2) it recalled the representative of Atomic Energy of Canada from India; (3) it announced the suspension of co-operation on nuclear projects including all general technological exchange agreements with the Indian Atomic Energy Commission and; (4) it refused to refinance India's commercial debt related to the nuclear cooperation program. The suspension affected \$12 million of heavy water, a \$6 million turbo generator, and spare parts for RAPP 2. Further, Ottawa froze \$6.7 million in additional loans for the RAPP program and required that a further \$8 million in loans already extended be repaid immediately. Food and agricultural aid was to continue for humanitarian purposes, but other aspects of the Canadian aid program were to be placed under review.²³⁹

²³⁶ Morrison and Page, 26.

²³⁷ R.B. Byers, "External Affairs and Defence" in Canadian Annual Review of Politics and Public Affairs- 1974, John Saywell, ed., (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1975), 329.

²³⁸ Ibid, 329-30.

²³⁹ Ibid.

The Canadian government "was among the first to react to the Indian explosion, by suspending nuclear co-operation with India and by reviewing and strengthening safeguard conditions for Canadian nuclear exports to all countries and calling on other suppliers to do likewise."²⁴⁰ Seven months after the explosion Donald MacDonald, Minister of Energy Mines and Resources, indicated that Canada was prepared to continue nuclear cooperation with other countries but that these relations would be under much stronger safeguard measures. Safeguards were henceforth to apply not only to fissionable materials provided by Canada, but to all nuclear equipment and technology of Canadian origin. Canadian controls were thus to be much stricter than those established by the The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).²⁴¹

This new Canadian safeguards policy involved several aspects:

Canada required a binding treaty assurance from the recipient country that all Canadian nuclear material (uranium), facilities (CANDU reactors, heavy-water plants, fuel fabrication plants) and the technology associated with them, as well as any items or material produced in them, would be used exclusively for peaceful non-explosive purposes. ...Binding assurance was also required that IAEA safeguards or, in the event the Agency was no longer in a position to carry them out, Canadian bilateral safeguards would apply for the lifetime of the items and material furnished by Canada. ...Canada also required its prior consent before items, material or technology of Canadian origin were transferred beyond the jurisdiction of the receiving country. ...The policy also limited the use of CIDA (Canadian International Development Agency) funds for future nuclear cooperation to countries that had ratified the NPT. Irradiated fuel could be reprocessed for plutonium extraction ...only if Canada agreed that these operations were being undertaken in such a way as not to create a proliferation risk.²⁴²

Despite this hard-line approach, Canada did allow a one year grace period, later extended to two years, for uranium shipments to India under contracts already approved.

²⁴⁰ Noble, 44.

²⁴¹ Legault, 11.

²⁴² Noble, 44.

By this stage, Canada was also involved in discussions with India to resume nuclear aid assistance because the Canadian government feared that the termination of aid to India could lead to an end to the existing safeguards on the RAPP reactors. In fact, an initial draft agreement was reached in March of 1976 to resume this relationship. "Yet some two months later... and possibly in large measure as a response to the expressions of concern by Canadian parliamentarians" to the tentative agreement with India in March, "the Canadian government terminated the lengthy Canadian-Indian nuclear relationship."²⁴³

The government's position was summed up by Allan MacEachen in the House of Commons on May 18, 1976. "Canada has insisted that any cooperation in the nuclear field be fully covered by safeguards which satisfy the Canadian people that Canadian assistance will not be diverted to nuclear explosive purposes. This Canadian objective could not be reached in these negotiations."²⁴⁴ MacEachen also stated, in comments cited by Ashok Kapur, that in the present situation, "this undertaking would require that all nuclear facilities, involving Canadian technology, in India be safeguarded. We would be prepared to reach agreement with India on this basis only. In view of earlier discussions however, we have concluded that the Indian government would not be prepared to accept safeguards on other than the RAPP reactors which are already under international safeguards."²⁴⁵

India, for its part, defended its decision to hold the 1974 underground test and refused to admit that it had done anything wrong. "India argued that because its device was 'peaceful' and was made with native uranium, it had not violated the agreements safeguarding the Canadian supplied reactor."²⁴⁶ It felt that because the test was a "peaceful nuclear explosion", and the country had no intention of developing nuclear

²⁴³ Tucker, 208.

²⁴⁴ House of Commons Debates, Hansard, November 18, 1976, (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1976), 13615.

²⁴⁵ Kapur, "The Canada-India nuclear negotiations", 316.

²⁴⁶ Coit D. Blacker and Gloria Duffy, International Arms Control--Issues and Agreements, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1984), 165.

weapons, there had been no crime committed. "However, the Canadian government had made known sometime in advance, at the highest political level, that it would regard the development of any explosive capability as contrary to the spirit of its nuclear cooperation with India. Because there is no practical distinction between nuclear explosives for peaceful and non-peaceful purposes, the development of any nuclear explosive capability" was considered by Canada to be "contrary to the objective of nuclear non-proliferation."²⁴⁷ Canada "repeatedly made it clear that the production of a nuclear explosion equalled the production of a nuclear weapon."²⁴⁸ The official Canadian position on peaceful nuclear explosions was summed up in a statement by External Affairs Minister Mitchell Sharp. Sharp stated that the Canadian government recognized "no distinction between the development of nuclear explosions for so-called peaceful purposes and explosions for military purposes...and that the development of this technology by India" was "bound to have serious and widespread repercussions throughout Asia and the world."²⁴⁹

The Indian decision to conduct the underground test, and the hostile Canadian reaction that accompanied it, can largely be understood by the two nation's differing perceptions of their security interests and of the proliferation issue. India, for many reasons, felt that a nuclear capability was essential for its prestige and security in the South Asian region. The 1962 border war defeat at the hands of the Chinese and that country's subsequent explosion of a nuclear device were very damaging to India's perception of itself as a significant power. Despite India's success in the 1971 war, the Indian government still feared "that a nuclear armed China might possess the ability to 'blackmail' India in some future diplomatic confrontation. ... The perception of this danger was [also]

²⁴⁷ Noble, 44.

²⁴⁸ E.L.M. Burns, A Struggle for Disarmament. A Seat at the Table, (Toronto: Clarke, Irwin and Company Limited, 1972), 221.

²⁴⁹ Sharp in Morrison and Page, 24.

repeatedly reinforced as China proceeded with its testing of atomic devices during the years that the Non-Proliferation Treaty was being negotiated."²⁵⁰ China's nuclear capability thus "created a strong demand that India should develop her own nuclear defence."²⁵¹

Even though India had impressively handled Pakistan in 1971 there was also a fear of Pakistan's military potential in the future. India was still very much aware of continued U.S. support to that country and was becoming increasingly concerned with China's rapprochement with both Pakistan and the United States. "India [was] firmly determined to maintain its regional preeminence over Pakistan, all the more so in view of the close Sino-Pakistan relationship."²⁵² To make matters worse, the Indians could not achieve any security guarantees from the nuclear weapons states to step in and protect India if it faced a nuclear threat from another country. Dr. Bhabha thus believed that security concerns posed a serious threat to Indian stability and that "...the only defence against such an attack [appeared] to be a capability and threat of retaliation."²⁵³ That entailed developing a nuclear option, a cause "consistent with India's ambition to be a world power, an ambition Canadians [had] consistently overlooked."²⁵⁴

Canada, on the other hand, protected by geography from the risk of conflict with hostile neighbours, and inevitably fully under the nuclear umbrella of the United States as a shield against possible Soviet bloc aggression, had no need to develop its own nuclear military capability. Further, it perceived the spread of nuclear weapons as damaging global security since with proliferation the risks of such weapons falling into the hands of irrational leaders increased. In addition, if the nuclear club increased and Canada stayed non-nuclear there was the problem of its relative power status declining.

²⁵⁰ Sullivan, 354.

²⁵¹ Edwards, 56.

²⁵² Morrison and Page, 23.

²⁵³ Lalita Prassud Singh, India's Foreign Policy: The Shastri Period, (New Delhi: Uppal Publishing House, 1980), 30.

²⁵⁴ Morrison and Page, 23.

In addition to their differing security concerns, it should be pointed out that the Indian and Canadian governments both had very different perceptions of the utility of the IAEA and the NPT. Before discussing these attitudes, however, it is important to have a better understanding of what the NPT and the IAEA actually are. The 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was an agreement that attempted to limit the further spread of nuclear weapons amongst non-nuclear weapon states. The NPT, however, also stated "that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, including any technological by-products which may be derived by nuclear weapon states from the development of nuclear explosive devices, should be available to all parties to the treaty, whether nuclear or non-nuclear weapons states."²⁵⁵ Therefore, the agreement was designed to stop vertical proliferation but still allow for the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful or developmental purposes.

The NPT emerged because "the rapid increase in civilian nuclear power clearly established the need for such a treaty."²⁵⁶ This treaty, which was brought into force on March 5, 1970 had ten articles:

Article one provided that nuclear-weapons states [would] not transfer nuclear weapons or explosive devices or control over them, 'to any recipient whatsoever'; Article 2 was an understanding by non-nuclear weapons states not to receive them; Article 3 provided that non-nuclear weapon states [would] accept the safeguards of The International Atomic Energy Agency to verify their fulfillment of the obligations of the treaty... ; Article 4 stated that all parties to the treaty [had] the right to benefit from the peaceful uses of nuclear energy; Article 5 covered peaceful nuclear explosions and stated that an international body should provide them at cost; Article 6 represented an undertaking by the nuclear weapon states to 'pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race'

²⁵⁵ Text of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, re-printed as an appendice in Blacker and Duffy.

²⁵⁶ Bernard G. Bechhoefer, "Historical evolution of international safeguards and nuclear industry" in International Safeguards and Nuclear Industry, Mason Willrich, ed., (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1973), 39.

and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament. The remaining four articles were procedural.²⁵⁷

The IAEA, on the other hand, was created in 1957 as an American initiative during President Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace Program. One of the first steps taken by the IAEA was an attempt to develop some sort of informal system of safeguards which was essentially "an inventory of radioactive substances which would reveal whether any was missing."²⁵⁸ The system was also designed to allow international inspectors to visit various nuclear facilities within member countries to verify their reports to the IAEA to ensure that there had "been no diversion of materials from civilian to military purposes."²⁵⁹ The IAEA continued to evolve over the next decade as attempts to strengthen the safeguards function, largely at United States initiative, took place. The IAEA safeguards system did not become formally established, however, until March 30, 1961 when the Board of Governors approved an instrument which became known as the First Safeguards document.²⁶⁰ In 1962, the United States, Canada and Great Britain all handed over to the IAEA their responsibilities for administering safeguards with respects to their bilateral agreements for peaceful uses of atomic energy. This was then strengthened in 1966 with a three party arrangement between Canada, Japan and the IAEA. As indicated, the importance of the IAEA as a monitoring agency is reflected in the fact that it was entrenched in Article 3 of the NPT in 1968.

Indian beliefs in the inadequacies of both the IAEA and the NPT, however, are widely known. In 1956, India opposed the creation of the IAEA and throughout the years often voiced its displeasure with the nuclear safeguard agency. As Sullivan has described it:

²⁵⁷ Reford, 11.

²⁵⁸ Ibid, 10.

²⁵⁹ Joseph S. Nye, "Non-proliferation: A long term strategy", *Foreign Affairs*, April 1978, 605.

²⁶⁰ Bechhoefer, 35.

The only possible reason India could see for IAEA safeguards was to subject the poorer countries of the world to indirect discrimination by the more powerful nations supplying the nuclear materials...India 'regarded any restriction of its use of nuclear materials as a new form of economic colonialism.' Although India eventually joined the IAEA, it continued to fight from within against the establishment of an extensive system of safeguards.²⁶¹

The Indian government also "...demanded that a non-proliferation regime do more than commit the states without nuclear weapons not to acquire such weapons and the nuclear weapon states not to provide them."²⁶² India took the position that "...it was essential to stop both kinds of proliferation, and that a treaty which dealt only with the 'horizontal' kind would be discriminatory and ineffective."²⁶³ In sum, India felt that the IAEA safeguard system and the NPT were unfair to non-weapon states and did not address the problems that these states had with their own nuclear capabilities. Thus, "in the absence of a fair treaty leading to nuclear disarmament that in the interim, would guarantee India against nuclear attack by the Chinese or any other power, the [Indian] government refused to subscribe to the NPT."²⁶⁴

The Canadian government's position on the NPT and the inclusion of Article 3, on the other hand, was quite different. In terms of the formal NPT treaty the government recognized that the treaty had several weaknesses and that these problems were only highlighted by the decisions of many states not to adhere to the NPT agreement. Although 102 countries eventually ratified the NPT agreement, many nations, most notably France, China, India, Brazil, Chile, Argentina, Pakistan, Portugal, Israel, Indonesia, and South Africa, have not signed the treaty. Ottawa especially viewed Article 3, which entrenched

²⁶¹ Sullivan, 356.

²⁶² Blacker and Duffy, 155.

²⁶³ Burns, 216.

²⁶⁴ Morrison and Page, 27.

the IAEA in the NPT agreement, as one of the specific weaknesses in the NPT treaty and believed that this was highlighted by India's 1974 nuclear test. At the time of the Indian explosion "...the IAEA only had some seventy nuclear scientists to check 562 nuclear reactors in thirty-three countries. ...[Therefore], the IAEA was an organization much too small and provided with much too little enforcement power to do its job adequately."²⁶⁵ Despite the perceived weaknesses of the NPT, and its IAEA safeguards provisions, "Canada has always seen this treaty as the best instrument of control yet available- in the absence of a stricter and more comprehensive agreement or of general disarmament- for preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons."²⁶⁶

Canada's official position was outlined in statements by Allan MacEachen pledging Canada's support to both the NPT and the IAEA in the period immediately following the Indian nuclear explosion. He stated that Canada had "developed a valuable system of nuclear power generation and that... [it] should not be withheld from those whose energy needs can best be met by this method. We are deeply committed to the cause of international development but equally we are anxious to avoid contributing to the proliferation of nuclear weapons."²⁶⁷ Accordingly, he said that "a country's adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty" would "be an important factor in reaching decisions on the provision of Canadian government export financing in the nuclear field."²⁶⁸ In sum, MacEachen took the view "that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of nuclear weapons [remained] the best available barrier to an increase in the number of nuclear weapons states.

²⁶⁵ Byers, 271.

²⁶⁶ Legault, 9.

²⁶⁷ Allan J. MacEachen, "Two urgent U.N. problems: Peacekeeping and the control of nuclear proliferation", Statements and Speeches, September 25, 1974, 4.

²⁶⁸ Allan J. MacEachen, "The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, An essential shield", Statements and Speeches, May 7, 1975, 3.

... Canada ratified the...treaty conscious that it had weaknesses and that some states might not adhere to it. Nevertheless, we have given the Treaty our full support."²⁶⁹

Obviously, the Canadian and Indian governments had very different perceptions of their security needs, the utility of the NPT, the IAEA, and the usefulness of peaceful nuclear explosions. It was largely due to these factors that Canada suspended nuclear aid following the underground test. Why, then, did Canada attempt to re-open the Indo-Canadian nuclear relationship during a number of secret meetings in 1975? Allan MacEachen, in a 1976 statement, noted that Canada was in a dilemma over the possible outcomes of the suspension of this Indo-Canadian nuclear relationship:

The question is, do we get out now, or do we get out when we complete our current obligations; and in completing our current obligations, are we doing more for the non-proliferation system; and if we do get out now, do we leave that RAPP reactor unsafely guarded?²⁷⁰

The purpose, then, in attempting to continue the relationship was "to upgrade the existing safeguards on the RAPP reactor."²⁷¹ Once it was clear that this objective could not be achieved, Indo-Canadian nuclear cooperation was ended altogether.

It is clear when looking at this aspect of the Indo-Canadian relationship that Canada and India had profoundly different outlooks on nuclear weapons as a result of their differing foreign policy perspectives. There is also no question that these differences had a dramatic effect on the bilateral relationship at this time. Despite India's claims of its peaceful purposes and of threats to its security, the Canadian government did not view the Indo-Canadian relationship as more important than its proliferation concerns. Although some observers, noting Canada's interest in concluding reactor sales to South Korea and

²⁶⁹ Ibid, 1.

²⁷⁰ Tucker, 206.

²⁷¹ House of Commons Debates, Hansard, March 23, 1976, (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1977), 12065.

Argentina at this time, have put forth the hypothesis that the termination of aid to India was related to Canada's concern that these other sales go through, Canada's commitment to non-proliferation appears, nevertheless, to have been the main motivating factor in the Canadian suspension of assistance to India at this time.²⁷²

The Canadian government's decision to cancel completely the entire nuclear program was a good indication of where Canada perceived Indo-Canadian relations to be at this time. Throughout this second period of the relationship, bilateral relations had continued to deteriorate to the point where it was likely impossible for Canada to view India's concerns over the NPT and the IAEA sympathetically. As a result, Canada's reaction to the explosion was swift and forceful. The nuclear explosion, perhaps better than any other event, illustrated the divergence in foreign policy objectives that now existed between the two countries.

Following the nuclear issue, Indo-Canadian relations underwent a dramatic transformation for several years. Very little regarding the Indo-Canadian relationship was even written during this period. A former member of the Department of External Affairs in a position to evaluate the situation at that time, has stated that, "relations were more or less at a standstill from 1974 to 1978-79. We [the Canadian government] were concerned at the nuclear issue and took action." From Ottawa's viewpoint, the approach to the bilateral relationship was not one of indifference. However, in the view of this former diplomat, India "may have been indifferent to Canada."²⁷³

The first important event of this period after 1974 was Indira Gandhi's declaration of Emergency rule in 1975. The background of the emergency, in actual fact, dates back to 1974. Even though Indira Gandhi won a landslide victory in the Indian elections of 1971,

²⁷² For a further discussion see: Ron Finch, Exporting Danger: A History of the Canadian Nuclear Energy Export Program, (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1986).

²⁷³ From confidential correspondence with the author.

and this was backed up by a majority for the Congress Party in the state assembly elections a year later, her government faced a number of difficulties in the ensuing years. The influx of refugees after the 1971 Bangladesh war, the severe droughts in 1972 and 1973, and the lack of a clear economic program by the Congress government all contributed to growing political unrest at this time. The situation exploded in the state of Gujarat in 1974 when demonstrations and riots by those opposed to the Congress led to President's rule within the state. The response to this action, in turn, was further violence and a growing number of rebel leaders began calling not only for the downfall of the Congress party and the Indira government, but also for "total revolution" and complete change in Indian society.

Adding to the difficulties that threatened the effectiveness and legitimacy of Indira Gandhi's leadership at this time was her 1975 conviction for election-code violations. While the courts threw out the most serious of the charges against the Prime Minister, including those of bribery and intimidation, Mrs. Gandhi was found guilty of two, relatively minor technical violations of the election laws. As a result, her election in 1971 to the Lok Sabha was declared invalid. This placed her in a position where it appeared that she would have to resign as Prime Minister. However, in order to enable her to appeal her conviction to the Supreme Court, the sentence was stayed for 20 days. To make matters worse, the day after the court ruling, a long-time opponent of Indira Gandhi within the Congress Party began a "fast to the death" to try to end the year-long President's rule in Gujarat. With public and party pressure mounting, she was left with little alternative but to back down and grant elections in the state.

The elections in Gujarat were set for June, 1975, and four of the opposition parties managed to settle into an uneasy alliance, known as the Janata (People's) Front, to challenge the powerful Congress machine. The result was a massive Congress defeat. Due to this outcome in Gujarat, on top of her conviction for the election violations (at this time under appeal), many opposition leaders began to make calls for the removal of the Prime Minister and for the holding of new elections throughout the country. With her

political hold on the country thus in a precarious state, on June 26th, the day after a massive national opposition rally, Indira Gandhi, without consulting her cabinet, imposed Emergency rule in India. In an address to the nation on All-India Radio at 8:00 a.m. that day, Gandhi stated that the President had proclaimed an emergency and from that point on India would be under President's rule.

The terms of the State of Emergency effectively suspended all civil rights within the country. "By presidential order, the right of any person to seek constitutional protection through the courts was suspended. India's bill of rights was, in effect, abrogated. Persons arrested were not advised of the charges against them, nor were the police required to inform judicial authorities of the reasons for arrest. Newspapers were barred from publishing the names of those arrested. People simply disappeared."²⁷⁴ In sum, India simply ceased functioning as a democratic state in any western sense of the word.

Although the declaration of Emergency rule was viewed by many as a severe setback to the democratic tradition in India, some saw it as being an essential action that was needed to stop the backward direction in which India appeared to be heading. Interestingly, many defenders of the introduction of Emergency rule claimed that it was necessary in order to preserve democracy in India. One Indian academic, V. P. Dutt, stated in 1976 that insurrection and democracy could not co-exist. "One cannot follow insurrectionary methods, give open calls for uprisings, and yet claim the privileges of democracy. What was happening in India before the proclamation of emergency was the rapid build-up of insurrection, large-scale violence and disorder, and civil conflict."²⁷⁵ Indira Gandhi in an interview in Macleans magazine in October, 1975 also defended the imposition of Emergency rule as being essential to the restoration of peace and order in the

²⁷⁴ Hardgrave and Kochanek, 215.

²⁷⁵ V.P. Dutt, "The Emergency in India: background and rationale", Asian Survey, December 1976, 1125.

country. She asked, "do you want India to continue as a united entity or do you want anarchy? If you had the sort of anarchy we thought would come about, there would be no question of democracy anyway. It certainly wasn't a democracy when members of the legislature were intimidated and forced to resign, that's no description of democracy, and this was the planned program of some of these opposition parties."²⁷⁶ She also affirmed her continued belief in democracy and her conviction that it was the only form of government that could work in India "because we can only keep these divergent religious, language and cultural groups together if we have a full feeling of participation and involvement."²⁷⁷

In terms of Canada's response to the emergency, the most significant factor is perhaps the lack of any clear reaction. One would have expected to find emphatic denunciations of the suspension of democracy in India, but that simply was not the case. In fact, a confidential source in the Department of External Affairs who has viewed the file on this incident has noted that its contents "consist entirely of reports rather than any kind of official reaction on the state of Emergency."²⁷⁸ Furthermore, a Globe and Mail editorial actually praised India's efforts to maintain democracy in face of the many challenges it had faced over the years, and, in terms of the Emergency, took the position that Indira Gandhi was not completely to blame for the situation. On balance, the Globe sided neither with Indira Gandhi nor her opponents as the following passage indicates:

There is nothing very democratic about calling on soldiers and civil servants to disobey orders and force from power a Prime Minister who is still legally in office. Nor is there anything very democratic about ordering the arrest of political opponents under an emergency decree that, much like Canada's War Measures Act, authorizes their detention without trial. Both Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and the right-wing alliance of opposition parties that

²⁷⁶ Paul Saltzman, "Interview with Indira Gandhi", McLeans, October 6, 1975, 8.

²⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 10.

²⁷⁸ From confidential correspondence with the author.

opposes her insist they seek only to preserve democracy and the constitution. But their methods threaten to polarize political passions in the country and to damage beyond repair the basic consensus on which democracy depends.²⁷⁹

Particularly surprising is the apparent absence of any official response by the Canadian government. One possible explanation, however, is that the Trudeau government was reluctant to criticize India for implementing a state of Emergency, similar to that under the War Measures Act which Canada itself had used just a few years earlier. In the absence of definitive information, however, one can only speculate as to why the Canadian official reaction was so muted.

The state of emergency continued in India well into 1977. At that time, democracy was restored and new elections were called. Although the Emergency was likely the key reason for Indira Gandhi's defeat in the elections that followed, it needs to be emphasized that it was not the only reason. An important factor working against her indirectly related to the Emergency is the fact that, unlike 1971, she faced a mainly unified opposition. In 1977, "the increased bitterness towards Mrs. Gandhi, fanned by the long months in jail, and sometimes solitary confinement, gave the Opposition leaders a stronger common bond. Their party workers, who had been locked up, too, were naturally prepared to work for Mrs. Gandhi's downfall with single-minded dedication."²⁸⁰ In the past, the unity of the Congress party had always worked in favour of its members because of the disjointed and unorganized state of the opposition. Partly as a result of the Emergency, however, this was not the case in 1977.

A second factor that ultimately led to the Congress defeat in 1977 was the rise of Sanjay Gandhi, Indira's son, to the top echelons of the party, and this was a development

²⁷⁹ "Democracy Under Pressure", The Globe and Mail, June 27, 1975, A-6.

²⁸⁰ Amit Roy, "Why Mrs. Gandhi lost- Reasons behind the rout of the Congress government in India", The Round Table- The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs, April 1977, 163.

only tangentially related to the Emergency. Indira was grooming Sanjay as her heir and the Emergency provided the circumstances under which he could secure his position within the Congress Party. Sanjay's pet project was the sterilization campaign that he began in an attempt to curb India's ever-growing population. During the campaign, however, there was "no doubt that a number of atrocities occurred in which people were forcibly sterilized in order to meet family planning targets." Even today "the extent of the abuse is not known. There were enough genuine cases, however, to enable the opposition to whip up mass hysteria about the excesses,"²⁸¹ and that further contributed to the Congress's disadvantage in the 1977 election. The combination of the Emergency and the struggle of the Janata-led coalition to hold on to power after the 1977 election meant that the latter half of the 1970's was dominated by an Indian focus on its domestic affairs. Under the circumstances, there was inevitably little interaction with Canada on major international issues and a general drift in the bilateral relationship.

Another non-domestic factor at the end of this period, which led India to focus inward on its domestic and regional interests to the detriment of wider relations with countries like Canada was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. The invasion seriously detracted from India's feeling of security within the region. With the USSR threatening to gain influence in South Asia, the United States was inclined to step into the area in an attempt to contain this Soviet encroachment. "The invasion was followed by announcements by the United States of its intention to build up Pakistan's armed forces and by discussions of detente between the United States and China."²⁸² The invasion of Afghanistan thus saw "super-power politics" enter the South Asian region with a new surge, for the Soviet invasion was perceived by the United States as an attempt to expand

²⁸¹ Ibid, 166.

²⁸² Reid, Envoy to Nehru, 251.

its sphere of influence into the Indian subcontinent. As a result, the Americans, not surprisingly, made a move into Pakistan designed to illustrate to the Soviets that their claims to the region would not go uncontested.

In the ensuing struggle between these two superpowers for influence in South Asia, it became clear that India, now directly in the shadow of the Soviets and Americans, had renewed fears for its own security. Not only was the Indian government concerned about an increased American presence in Pakistan and continued American rapprochement with China, but "New Delhi was considerably uneasy at the realization that the Russians were at the gates of the Khyber Pass and that by its presence in Afghanistan, the USSR had become a South Asian Power."²⁸³ At the same time, however, according to the former Canadian diplomat mentioned earlier, despite the potential Soviet threat to the Indian subcontinent, posed by the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan the "Western reaction to Soviet actions seemed excessive to the Indians."²⁸⁴ In sum, then, the situation in Afghanistan did nothing to improve India's relations with the West, including Canada.

The latter stages of this long period were, then, dominated by new domestic and international pressures on India rather than by any new developments in the Indo-Canadian relationship. If anything significant can be pointed out about the relations between the two countries over the last half of the 1970's, it is probably the general indifference that each displayed for the other. In terms of trying to assess the overall state of relations in period two, it is apparent that from 1957 to 1980 there was a steady decline of the Indo-Canadian bilateral relationship. The foreign policy objectives that had started to grow visibly apart by 1957, continued to separate throughout this period until, by 1976, there was little similarity in focus whatsoever. Despite this fact, however, due primarily to Canadian internationalism, Diefenbaker's feelings regarding the Commonwealth, and Pearson's past

²⁸³ Hardgrave and Kochanek, 358.

²⁸⁴ Confidential correspondence with the author.

relations with Nehru, Canada still offered India political and financial assistance throughout this period. Even the Trudeau government, which renounced Pearsonian internationalism in its 1970 foreign policy review, offered India political and financial support as a result of the 1970-71 refugee crisis in India and earmarked India as a major aid recipient in the years that followed. In fact, Canada actually contributed more than \$1 billion dollars to India through its development assistance program during this period and the Indian government continued to be the number one recipient of Canadian aid until 1977.²⁸⁵

Regardless of these offers of support, however, it is clear that both Canada and India found shrinking use for each other because of their differing international objectives. In this period "the relationship was dominated less by the global issues that had concerned Pearson and Nehru and more by the continuing instability in the subcontinent, on the one hand, and by the political consequences of Canada's and India's membership on the [ICC] on the other."²⁸⁶ The ICC experience, despite some periods of cooperation, served as a constant reminder of the degenerating state of relations throughout this period and as a result "Indian policy was increasingly viewed with suspicion and contempt in Ottawa."²⁸⁷ Clearly, the 1971 Indo-Soviet treaty, the use of the Soviet veto in the 1971 war on behalf of India and, especially the 1974 Indian nuclear explosion, only served to harden these feelings.

India's policy in period two was one of neo-isolation, in which it reacted pragmatically to the challenges that faced it. Indian non-alignment, if it could still be called that, had little time for Canadian policies of internationalism, whether it was Pearsonian internationalism or Trudeau's approach to the concept, and when it did it was only for the

²⁸⁵ Source: CIDA Annual Reviews.

²⁸⁶ Kim Richard Nossal, "Canada's strategic interests in South Asia, 1947-87", in Canada and South Asia, 50.

²⁸⁷ Ibid.

purpose of exploiting Canadian efforts for India's own gains--especially in the post-Nehru era. Even the traditional areas of cooperation from the past, such as the UN and the Commonwealth, had become subordinated to other factors in the bilateral relationship during this period. If India and Canada had ever had a love affair in period one, there is no question that it was on the rocks throughout period two. Using this analogy, the 1974 explosion could probably be viewed as the equivalent of coming home and finding your wife in bed with your brother.

Chapter V

The Indo-Canadian Political Relationship

1980-89

By the beginning of the 1980's a new stage in Indo-Canadian relations was becoming apparent. Although Canada did not strongly respond to Indian efforts for a reconciliation in the relationship until 1985, it is clear that for the first time the Indian government had a direct interest in Canada in trying to deal with some of its domestic and regional security concerns. This period has also been marked by new shifts in the foreign policies of each country that have moved India and Canada into a new, more cordial stage in their relationship. In the words of a former diplomat at the Canadian High Commission in New Delhi, the 1980's marked a period where both countries "agreed to disagree on the nuclear issue but got on with other relations, especially commercial ones."²⁸⁸

A main cause of the strengthening of the bilateral relationship was the importance that the Indian government placed on the domestic security risks that it faced from its Sikh population. The Indian government recognized that this threat was not simply domestic, but emanated from the international Sikh community as well. For this reason India began to have a much greater interest in countries like Canada which have large Sikh populations of their own.

²⁸⁸ Confidential correspondence with the author.

There can be no denying the increasing importance of the Sikhs in Canada as an immigrant community. While the immigration figures in Table 1 do not distinguish among Indian immigrants on ethnic grounds, they do show the dramatic increase that has occurred in total Indian immigration over the past twenty years in particular, and a sizeable proportion of the yearly Indian figures represent Sikh immigrants. "The Sikh community has been increasing substantially each year through the 'family class' provisions in the immigration legislation, and by the mid-1980's Sikhs in Canada were estimated to number some 150,000."²⁸⁹ The significance of these numbers is compounded by the fact that the majority of these Sikhs have settled in key Canadian cities such as Toronto, Calgary and Vancouver, where their visibility and interaction with each other and the rest of the country's population has increased.²⁹⁰

It is not surprising, therefore, that the Indian government has taken a renewed interest in Canada due to its growing and vibrant Sikh community. In this regard Indian concerns in the 1980's have essentially centred on three main issues: first, the general increase in Sikh extremist activity as a whole; second, the growing support of a number of Canadian Sikh organizations for the creation of Khalistan (i.e. an independent State within India); and finally, the perceived indifference of the Canadian government towards the problem of Sikh extremism. In the early 1980's, for instance, the Indian government was concerned over reports that arms were being smuggled into the Punjab from Canada and also over rumours of terrorist training camps being established within Canada. India was also concerned about Canada's attitude regarding the provision of refugee status for Sikhs

²⁸⁹ Warden, 15.

²⁹⁰ The Sikh's distinctive religion and customs have made them an easily identifiable aspect of the Canadian immigrant population and hence often a target of racism within Canada, a pattern that dates back as early as the turn of the century. One particular example of this was the Komagata Maru incident in 1914, in which a boatful of Sikhs were refused permission to leave their ship in Vancouver, despite a serious health risk that existed, due to a fear of "Asian hordes" entering British Columbia.

Table 1- Emigration From India to Canada*

<u>Year</u>	<u>India</u>	<u>Asia</u>	<u>Global</u>
1946-50	918	5306	430,389
1951-55	947	28465	791,930
1956	254	N/A	113,270
1957	186	N/A	282,164
1958	325	N/A	124,851
1959	585	N/A	106,928
1960	505	N/A	104,111
1961	568	N/A	71,689
1962	529	N/A	74,586
1963	737	N/A	93,151
1964	1154	N/A	112,606
1965	2241	11,684	146,758
1966	2233	14,333	194,773
1967	3966	21,229	222,876
1968	3229	21,672	183,974
1969	5395	23,320	161,531
1970	5670	21,215	147,713
1971	5313	22,171	121,900
1972	5049	23,150	122,066
1973	9203	43,195	184,200
1974	12,868	50,566	218,465
1975	10,144	47,382	187,881
1976	6733	44,328	149,429
1977	5555	31,368	114,914
1978	5110	24,007	86,313
1979	4517	50,540	112,096
1980	8483	71,602	143,117
1981	8256	48,830	128,618
1982	8858	43,863	121,147
1983	7810	38,183	89,157
1984	5502	41,896	88,239
1985	4028	38,597	84,302
1986	6940	41,600	99,219

* India ranked in the top five countries for immigrants entering Canada from 1970 to 1986. In 1986 India ranked second behind the United States.

suspected of terrorist activities in India and the government's funding of various organizations that were viewed by India as having pro-Khalistan sympathies.

In fact, however, Canada, has made no secret of its support and sympathy for the Indian government in trying to deal with the Sikh issue and if the Sikh factor has "exercised a negative impact on the bilateral relationship during the 1980's", it has not been "because the overall interests of the two countries were divergent."²⁹¹ In fact, the common concern shared by these two countries marked a distinct improvement in terms of their bilateral relations compared to the preceding period. The thing that stood in the way of a dramatic, positive increase in relations during the early 1980's was the fact that, as far as India was concerned, Canada was not backing up its statements of support for India on this issue with concrete actions. As Bill Warden, the former ambassador to Pakistan from 1981-83, and the former High Commissioner to India from 1983-86 has pointed out, Canada "tended to regard this incipient extremism as simply another ingredient in the bubbling stew of Canada's immigrant politics. Moreover, the Sikh community, growing in size and concentrated in areas such as Toronto and Vancouver, was becoming more articulate and beginning to exercise political influence in its own right."²⁹² Thus, even though the Canadian government was under increasing pressure from India to recognize and act on its concerns, Ottawa was also under domestic pressure to do otherwise. For the time being, Canadian national self-interest outweighed the bilateral pressures from India that existed.

By the mid-1980's, however, there was a marked increase in the unrest and instability within the Sikh community in the Punjab. The climax of the Sikhs confrontation with the Indian government occurred when the Indian army attacked the Golden Temple in Amritsar in 1984.

²⁹¹ Warden, 16.

²⁹² Ibid.

The origins of this incident went back to 1981 when the leader of the Khalistan movement, Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale, secured himself in the temple, which was considered to be the most holy religious shrine by the Sikhs in India. From here he encouraged and directed terrorist activities carried out in the name of an independent Sikh homeland. At the beginning, Indian officials tried to downplay the significance of the situation and hoped that moderate factions within the domestic Sikh community would prevail. However, by the beginning of 1984 "the situation had become tense to a point approaching untenability. Hit squads directed from the Golden Temple became a daily feature and roamed as far afield as New Delhi. A centre of virtual open insurrection against the state had been created."²⁹³ Clearly, the government could no longer downplay the reality of the situation in Amritsar.

Although the Indian government recognized that Bhindranwale had to be removed from the temple, it was still conscious of the need to try to accomplish this with as little fanfare as possible. This fact was underscored in a meeting that Warden had with Rajiv Gandhi on the day the actual assault occurred. "Gandhi, in comments made as Indian troops were moving into position, emphasized that strict orders had been given to minimize violence and to avoid damage to the holy places. In particular, he said the 'holy of holies', the Akal Takht, was not to be entered."²⁹⁴ However, in initiating its attack, the Indian army soon became aware from the heavy resistance encountered that the Golden Temple had been turned into a fortress. The Indian army was eventually successful in removing Bhindranwale (actually, he was killed), but the conflict led to a large number of casualties on both sides and heavy damage to the temple itself.

It is apparent that the government's preoccupation with the Sikh security issue led it to take the action that it did against the temple in Amritsar. Indira Gandhi viewed this as being the most pragmatic way of dealing with Sikh extremism, and she did not expect the

²⁹³ Ibid.

²⁹⁴ Ibid.

fallout that developed following the army's actions. A collective outcry from Sikhs the world over followed the attack and demonstrations in countries like Canada were accompanied by riots and mass violence within India. The culmination of this chain of events occurred on October 31 when two Sikh members of the Prime Minister's personal body guard opened fire on her with automatic weapons as Mrs. Gandhi was being escorted to a television interview. Even though many Sikhs were appalled by the shooting death of the Indian Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi's assassination still brought a violent backlash against Sikhs throughout India. The assassination also served to embitter the majority of domestic and international opinion against the Sikhs and further heightened the isolation of these communities. "Whatever regret may have been felt by some Sikhs at the violent death of Mrs. Gandhi in October, [however], quickly turned to anger and more anguish as news emerged of the brutal massacres reminiscent for many of the horror of partition in 1947.²⁹⁵ The combined effect of the raid on the Golden Temple and the assassination of Indira Gandhi and the subsequent slaughter of Sikhs was to entrench further the militancy of the Sikh extremists and at the same time to augment the general resentment toward this community felt by the populations of both India and Canada.

The Indian government grew more and more displeased with the way the Canadian government handled the activity and influence of the pro-Khalistan community within Canada following these two events. India was particularly disturbed over the fact that the Canadian government failed to arrest the Sikhs who were involved in a July, 1984 attack on the Indian High Commissioner in Winnipeg following a demonstration sparked by the Golden Temple massacre. The Indian government also protested Canadian inaction over the burning of Indian flags by Canadian Sikhs, the continued existence of a number of Khalistan consulates that had been set up within Canada, and over the numerous

²⁹⁵ Ibid, 16-17.

demonstrations that occurred in front of Indian missions throughout the country. In effect, India began to seriously doubt Canada's professed commitment to deal with the extremist elements within Canada. "Coolness was evident across the board in bilateral contacts. There were suggestions that major Canadian commercial interests were at risk. A visa requirement was imposed. By the end of the summer of 1984 the relationship could only be described as 'delicate'."296

It is apparent, then, that a new stage in the Indo-Canadian relationship was developing during the first half of the 1980's in terms of the importance attached to Canada by India. India with its preoccupation with the Sikh issue began to pursue aggressively closer relations with certain countries having large Sikh communities. This step away from the "neo-isolationism" that the country had practiced since 1962 was also prompted by new efforts to achieve a balance in its relations with the super powers in the hopes of securing western technology and further enhancing its regional security. It was these Indian domestic concerns that led to positive steps on India's part towards improving Indo-Canadian relations in the early 1980's. In a switch from the pattern that had emerged in the past, India was now the suitor in the relationship.

Although Canada saw the policies of the two countries as similar on the Sikh issue it was apparent that the Canadian government was not prepared to go as far in dealing with this issue as India wanted. Two factors were responsible for this. First, Canada felt that the Indian government was exaggerating the threat posed to it by Sikh dissidence. Second, for domestic political reasons, Ottawa was reluctant to yield to India's insistence that it crack down hard on its own Sikh community. By the time of the Golden Temple raid and Mrs. Gandhi's assassination, it was, therefore, clear that even though both countries were

296 Ibid, 17.

concerned about this issue, they did not share that concern to the same degree, as their respective national interests dictated different approaches.

Any doubts within Canada regarding the importance of the Sikh issue, especially in terms of its impact on Canadian domestic and international affairs, came to a halt in 1985 with the Air India disaster and the terrorist explosion at Tokyo's Narita airport. This sudden realization of the apparent involvement of the Canadian Sikh community in extremist activities as the Indian government had warned was the case, combined with the elections of Brian Mulroney and Rajiv Gandhi and the growing economic importance that Canada placed on India, have all led to a new level of cooperation in Indo-Canadian relations over the latter half of the 1980's.

The central event that marked this shift was the explosion of the Air India jet over the Irish Sea in June of 1985, an act apparently perpetrated by terrorists operating within Canada. At the same time, a bomb exploded in Tokyo's Narita airport killing two and injuring several others. The bomb was destined for a departing jet but the timing mechanism led to its premature explosion and prevented the terrorist act from taking as many lives as the Air India disaster. The initial effect of these events on Canada-India relations was, however, negative. Warden has written that:

Canada's purported softness on extremism became the theme underlying all bilateral exchanges whether of a business, political or academic nature. By mid-1985, the political relationship had reached its lowest point since the bitterness and misunderstanding engendered by India's so-called peaceful nuclear explosion in the early 1970's. While a break in the relationship was never a major threat, the possibility of a long freeze and of a wind-down of burgeoning trade and economic activity had become real.²⁹⁷

²⁹⁷ Ibid.

As it turned out, however, the longer-term effect on relations was positive, for the effect of the events of 1985 was to awaken Canadians to what India had been trying to warn them about all along, the reality of the Sikh security threat. Canada now recognized that it was important to cooperate with India to ensure that similar events would not take place in the future. In their combined effort to combat terrorism, both governments cooperated fully in the ensuing investigation of the Air India disaster and placed a strong emphasis on trying to prevent the proliferation of Sikh extremism in both countries. Thus, in the end, the "Air India crash of June 1985 reawakened Canadian interest in the region and served as a reminder of the growing linkage between political developments in South Asia and this country."²⁹⁸

The most important indication of Indo-Canadian cooperation on the Sikh issue following the violent events of 1985 was the signing of an Indo-Canadian Extradition Treaty in February of 1987. External Affairs Minister Joe Clark, in a statement in New Delhi on February 13, 1987, made it clear that the Extradition Treaty was the most efficient way for India and Canada to deal with the terrorist threat facing both countries from the Sikh community. Clark made it clear that it was foolish to think that individual citizens could not have a dramatic impact on foreign relations. He went on to say that tensions:

in an area such as South Asia can be directly reflected into Canadian life and this can lead to both suspicion and violence. Here the link between regional, security and Canadian domestic concerns is particularly stark. My government is absolutely determined that Canada shall not be used as a haven for terrorists. The number of newcomers from India intent on using violence to achieve political aims in their country of origin is small indeed. Nonetheless, we take those people very seriously and the threat they represent has become one of our major security priorities.²⁹⁹

²⁹⁸ Arthur G. Rubinoff, "Diplomatic Overview", in Canada and South Asia, 39.

²⁹⁹ The Department of External Affairs, "Remarks made by the Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs, on the occasion of a Canada Day luncheon with Canadian and Indian business executives, New Delhi, February 9, 1987", Statement, February 13, 1987, 8-9.

The Extradition Treaty with India was the first example of a treaty of this type signed between Canada and a developing nation. The agreement covered crimes such as hijacking and drug trafficking, but "only those whose alleged crimes were serious criminal offences in both Canada and India would be subject to extradition under the treaty. Indian requests would be subjected to thorough consideration by the Canadian Department of Justice and a judicial decision to extradite would be reviewable by higher judicial authorities and by the minister of justice."³⁰⁰ There was no doubt that the Extradition Treaty marked a significant new stage in Indo-Canadian relations.

The Treaty, however, came under a great deal of criticism in the House of Commons for the potential abuses that might occur as a result of extending bilateral extradition powers into these areas. John Nunziata, the Liberal member for York South-Western, was the most outspoken critic of the new treaty. He stated in the House on February 6, that the treaty "will allow the Indian government to randomly terrorize and intimidate members of the Canadian Sikh community. ...Of particular concern...is the prospect of having the internal strife related to Punjab autonomy spill over into Canada. ...India also has a disturbing record of human rights abuses that adds to the apprehension felt by Canadian Sikhs."³⁰¹ In responding to Nunziata's statements, Clark told the House that if "there are misapprehensions among members of the Sikh community in Canada with regard to the extradition treaty, I am sure that a careful reading of the treaty will relieve those false apprehensions...There are a range of quite extraordinary safeguards in that treaty repeating the language of the Canadian Charter of Rights. ...There are plenty of

³⁰⁰ "India and Bangladesh: Clark Visit, International Canada, February and March 1987," in International Perspectives, May/June 1987, 10.

³⁰¹ *Ibid.*

safeguards."³⁰² Obviously, even if there were a potential for abuses, Clark was not prepared to let that problem stand in the way of the successful implementation of the Treaty and an improvement in Indo-Canadian relations.

Another illustration of the Canadian government's willingness in the latter half of the 1980's to put the bilateral Indo-Canadian relationship ahead of national domestic political concerns was evident with Joe Clark's letter to the Provincial Premiers in March of 1988 dealing with various Sikh organizations within Canada. In the letter Clark encouraged the provincial leaders to continue to accept invitations extended by Sikh groups in order to maintain and/or develop stronger ties to the community. The letter, however, also warned the premiers that as necessary as these ties were, there were still three Sikh organizations whose invitations should not be accepted. The letter stated in part that these:

three organizations are the Babbar Khalsa, the International Sikh Youth Federation (ISYF), and the World Sikh Organization. Some members of these organizations have also engaged in and promote violent activities aimed at Indian interests in Canada and elsewhere. The activities of these organizations have been a significant irritant in our relations with India. The government of India has taken particular exception when elected officials attend functions sponsored by these organizations. ...I would appreciate your cooperation in avoiding events and activities which could be perceived as supporting the Sikh organizations mentioned above or their objective in the creation of an independent Sikh state.³⁰³

In his comments to the House of Commons on March 10, 1988, Clark defended his actions on the grounds that Canada, as a responsible global power, had an obligation to take strong measures against any potential terrorist problem. Clark praised the majority of Sikhs within Canada, but also made it clear that the:

³⁰² House of Commons Debates, Hansard, 2nd Session, 33rd Parliament, February 16, 1987, (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1987), 3470.

³⁰³ "Speech in the House of Commons by the Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs, on a motion by the opposition concerning a letter sent to provincial Premiers on Sikh organizations", Statement, March 10, 1988. 2.

activities of a small, militant minority in the Sikh community represent the most serious internal security threat that Canada faces today. ...The Canadian government cannot remain silent when individuals or organizations advocate the use of violence for political ends.... My letter, therefore, asked our provincial premiers to avoid appearing at organized events or activities which could inadvertently lend their endorsement to the separatist objectives of these groups. ...As the Secretary of State for External Affairs, I would be delinquent if I did not take account of the foreign policy implications, particularly for our relations with a friendly government, on an issue which they regard as vital to their national integrity.³⁰⁴

Obviously, as a result of these statements, the Canadian government had placed its bilateral relationship with India above any of the domestic political fallout that would, and did, accompany a letter of this kind.

In further defending his actions, however, Clark did make a distinction between the three groups in terms of the levels of violence that each used. In looking at the World Sikh Organization, for example, Clark recognized that this group was much less violent than the others, but, because its constitution stated that one of the objectives was to strive toward the achievement of an independent Khalistan, the group was deemed not compatible with the Canadian foreign policy objective of preserving a united India. In terms of the other two groups, Clark made it clear that there was no questioning their terrorist motives. He noted that :...

in May, 1986, members of the Montreal area Canadian Babbar Khalsa were involved in a plot to place a bomb on an Air India flight from New York. Two were convicted and given life sentences. On May 25, 1986, four members of the International Sikh Youth Federation attempted to assassinate a visiting Punjab State Minister in British Columbia. ...[In India], members of that organization have been involved in aircraft hijacking and political

³⁰⁴ Ibid, 6.

assassinations, and the random indiscriminate killings of both Sikh moderates and Hindus.³⁰⁵

Despite Clark's efforts at justifying the government's position, there was still widespread opposition to his letter. Complaints included the charge that the letter appeared to associate the entire Sikh community with terrorism, despite the fact that one of the groups, the World Sikh Organization, had actually received backing by the federal government in the past. Mr. Clark also had difficulty in justifying his actions due to the fact that many of the provincial premiers, including Bill Vanderzalm in British Columbia, refused to support the government's request for a boycott of Sikh gatherings. Further, even the Indian High Commissioner in Ottawa distanced himself from the letter.

Perhaps the greatest difficulty that the letter caused for the government was the perception it created of official intolerance towards an ethnic community that had already been subjected to a fair share of racial prejudice throughout Canadian history. Sergio Marcher, a Liberal MP from York West, made this point clear in a statement regarding Clark's letter to the House on March 10, 1988. Marachi stated that:

this is more than a struggle for the Canadian Sikh community. Naturally they feel the most pain and they feel the challenge of overcoming the stigma of yet another attack. However, this struggle has manifested itself in other communities. This latest allegation, an official statement of the Conservative government, tramples also on the larger question of the principles underpinning our multiculturalism policy and the multiculturalism that is the reality of Canada.³⁰⁶

Although the Clark letter has doubtless strengthened bilateral relations between India and Canada in the short-term, its long-term effect could still be otherwise.

³⁰⁵ House of Commons Debates, Hansard, 2nd Session, 33rd Parliament, March 10, 1988, (Ottawa: Queen's Printer 1987), 13587.

³⁰⁶ Ibid, 13584.

Considering the opposition that arose to the government's action, it is quite possible that Canada will be reluctant to make similar gestures for India's benefit in the future. Thus, the government's domestic political concern to avoid alienating Sikh and wider Canadian public opinion, as it seemed to do in March, 1988, could act as a constraint on future close cooperation between Canada and India on the Sikh issue.

Another example of the new atmosphere in Indo-Canadian relations in the last half of the 1980's was their cooperation during the 1987 Commonwealth Conference in Vancouver, British Columbia. John Kirton believes that as strong as Canada's commitment to the organization had been in the past, the Mulroney government marked a new era of Commonwealth significance in Canadian international affairs. Kirton feels that much of this new Canadian internationalism can be attributed to Joe Clark, who had actively participated in the Commonwealth's role in securing independence for Zimbabwe during his short stint as Prime Minister in 1979-80. "Not surprisingly, when Clark took office as Prime Minister Mulroney's Secretary of State for External Affairs in September, 1984 he did so with firm convictions about the importance of the organization and the ways in which Canada could use it to good effect."³⁰⁷

Despite Canada's past ties to the organization, it was still surprising that Brian Mulroney, after his election in 1984, showed such an interest in this association. His lack of experience and interest in international affairs appeared to indicate that the Commonwealth would be one of the last forums that he would choose to pursue Canadian policy objectives. However, within the first few months of his administration he participated in the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Kingston, Jamaica and discovered that the organization presented him with an outlet in which he could

³⁰⁷ Kirton, 3. For a more in-depth discussion of Canada's "new internationalism" see Joe Clark, "Canada's new internationalism" in John Holmes and John Kirton, eds., Canada and the New Internationalism, (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs and Centre for International Studies), (forthcoming).

comfortably expand his knowledge of international affairs. There were, however, several other considerations, both national and personal that drew Mulroney's interest to the Commonwealth's Heads of Government meetings. They provided, in Kirton's words:

an arena in which Canada naturally assumed a large and influential role. As an English-speaking forum in which the United States played no part it enabled the Prime Minister to display his instinctive--North Americaness--without fear of being seen as merely a pale echo of the United States. An arena which placed a premium on private, personal, informal, consensus-oriented dialogue was ideal for utilizing the particular skills of a former labour arbitrator. And as an organization preoccupied with the question of South Africa, it was a perfect forum for Brian Mulroney's views on the one international issue about which he was most passionate.³⁰⁸

Mulroney's active stance on the South African issue was first visibly apparent at his second Commonwealth meeting, the one held in Nassau in 1985. With the support of the Prime Ministers of India, as well as those of Zimbabwe, Zambia and Australia, Mulroney sidestepped Britain's interests and took the initiative in strongly denouncing South Africa's apartheid policy and calling for active measures to be taken against that country. This stand was also echoed at the London mini-Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting on South Africa from August 3-5, 1986. Once again, Mulroney found himself with Gandhi (and Prime Minister Hawke of Australia) as one of the principal players. "Once again he generated common action on the South African issue, despite intense opposition from Thatcher."³⁰⁹ It was clear that, just like his internationalist counterparts in the past, Mulroney was prepared to take an active role in pursuing policies within the Commonwealth that were not only contrary to Britain's but which would also ensure that the organization did not split along racial lines.

³⁰⁸ Ibid, 5.

³⁰⁹ Ibid, 8.

The 1987 meeting in Vancouver provided Mulroney with the perfect opportunity to display his interest in both the Commonwealth and the South African issue. In a statement preceding the conference on February 13, 1987 Joe Clark noted not only the important role that the South African issue would take in Vancouver, but also how the issue had marked a new level of cooperation within the Commonwealth between India and Canada. Clark stated that:

in Southern Africa, we have made use of the Commonwealth as a key diplomatic instrument and have joined with India on a major diplomatic offensive to end apartheid. We all know that this task is fraught with great difficulties, both in terms of the recalcitrance of the Pretoria government and the differing approaches of nations opposing apartheid. But the challenge has served to draw Canada and India closer together diplomatically, and represents one example of a new vitality in the Commonwealth. It is with great anticipation that Canada looks forward to hosting the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting in Vancouver in October.³¹⁰

This new level of cooperation was also made clear in Rajiv Gandhi's speech on the opening day of the Vancouver Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting. Gandhi noted that India fully backed Canada's calls for sanctions against South Africa and stressed that forward movement should continue on the progress that had been made in that direction within the Commonwealth during the past two years. He further stated that ideally, "sanctions should be universally applied...because if they are not, one country may move in to pick up the trade and other business contacts that have been cut off by another country's adherence to sanctions."³¹¹ When responding to a question posed by a reporter on what could be done to deal with Great Britain's refusal to modify its South African position, Gandhi's comments reflected the new level of cordiality and respect that India had for Canada. Gandhi felt that the Conference could successfully deal with the issue of

³¹⁰ The Department of External Affairs, Statement, February 13, 1987. 8-9.

³¹¹ Jeff Sallot, "ANC violence understandable, Gandhi says", Globe and Mail, October 16, 1987, A-5.

sanctions because of the Canadian involvement in the issue. He stated that "Your Prime Minister has very clear views that are very similar to ours. With Brian Mulroney chairing the meeting we will move positively on sanctions."³¹²

The Conference's ensuing debate over the sanctions issue only served to push Britain farther away from the consensus among the other states within the Commonwealth. The first priority of Canada, India and a number of front line African states was to ensure that the positive movement towards sanctions made in Nassau and London was not reversed. Mrs. Thatcher, however, made it clear that she viewed sanctions as an ineffective way to handle the situation. She stated that sanctions "will not persuade Pretoria to dismantle its racial policies and will only cause it to dig in its heels; sanctions will hurt black workers, and apartheid will erode the economic growth in the country."³¹³ Thatcher, in the end, did make a commitment not to drop the limited sanctions set up at the two prior Commonwealth meetings, but she also made it very clear that any new efforts for sanctions would be vigorously opposed. While it was generally recognized that the maintenance of limited sanctions represented a concession by the British, it was also apparent that any other efforts made in Vancouver would not be dealt with by Britain in the same cooperative manner.

Despite Thatcher's stand on the issue, the remaining Commonwealth leaders called for broader sanctions against South Africa. A statement issued by the Commonwealth Secretariat on October 17, 1987 noted that with "the exception of Britain, we believe that economic and other sanctions have had a significant effect in South Africa and that their wider, tighter and more intensified application must remain an essential part of the

³¹² Ibid.

³¹³ John Cruckshank, Jeff Salot and Michael Valpy, "Monitoring of sanctions under review- Front line states propose agency to monitor South Africa sanctions", Globe and Mail, October 15, 1987, A-1.

international community's response to apartheid."³¹⁴ Although Canada did not come out and directly announce any new sanctions, the Canadian government did not rule this out for the future. Canada did, however, fully support the creation of an eight-member Committee of foreign ministers who were to meet over time and attempt to make further progress on the matter of sanctions. Joe Clark was chosen as the chairman of the committee, and it also included representatives from India, Nigeria, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Guyana and Australia.

In the final statement of the Conference, Brian Mulroney, openly criticized the British position on the sanctions issue, declared the Commonwealth meeting a success, and vowed to lead the organization's fight against apartheid. In comments presented in the Globe and Mail on October 19, 1987 Mulroney stated that "Despite the resistance of its founder, the Commonwealth will continue to share practical and moral leadership in the battle against apartheid.... We came here in an atmosphere where sanctions were to be set aside...that sanctions did not work.... But we have reaffirmed our commitment. ...There [was] considerable progress made in this area...despite a fairly open effort to discredit [those efforts], right from the beginning."³¹⁵ The article also made it clear that this sentiment was shared by Rajiv Gandhi:

At the close of the Conference, Mr. Gandhi compared Mrs. Thatcher to British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, who sought to appease and bargain with Nazi leader Adolf Hitler. The rest of the Commonwealth leaders are like Winston Churchill, Mr. Gandhi said, because they know that evil must be faced and fought. ...The leaders of Australia, Zambia, Zimbabwe and India [also] all attacked British officials for suggesting that Canada had hypocritically failed to live up to the trade-sanction commitments it had made.³¹⁶

³¹⁴ John Cruickshank and Michael Valpy, "Leaders urge new sanctions", Globe and Mail, October 17, 1987, A-1.

³¹⁵ John Cruickshank, "P.M. ready to lead Commonwealth in Apartheid war, Progress made on sanctions, P.M. says", Globe and Mail, October 19, 1987, A-1.

³¹⁶ Ibid.

Clearly, South Africa had once again brought India and Canada closer together, more so than any one issue within the organization since 1961. At the same time, however, a new distance had emerged between Britain and the remainder of the Commonwealth members.

Although the South African issue was at the forefront of the Vancouver Commonwealth agenda, the question of Fiji was also an important event dealt with during the Conference. Fiji had recently undergone a military coup following the election of a new government, made up of a majority of citizens of East Indian origin. This Indian-dominated government had itself replaced a government made up primarily of ethnic Fijians. The coup, engineered by Colonel Sitiveni Rubuka, had led to the cutting off of all ties with Britain and the declaration of the Fijian republic in September, 1987. The political dominance of the ethnic Fijians, comprising 47 percent of the island's population of 715,000 people had thereby been secured.

Not surprisingly, due to the large East Indian population within Fiji, India reacted very strongly to the coup and actively used the Vancouver Commonwealth forum to address this issue. Gandhi stated that the "constitutional crisis in Fiji raises grave questions which must not be ignored. ...Any counsel of inaction would be a mockery of all that the Commonwealth stands for."³¹⁷ An article in the Globe and Mail on October 19, 1987, however, indicated that there was a considerable difference between Indian statements and Canadian and other Commonwealth statements on this issue at the conference. The article pointed out that "Mr. Mulroney said the Commonwealth leaders 'viewed with sadness the developments in Fiji' and hoped that Fiji's people would resolve those problems in a peaceful way that is consistent with Commonwealth principles of non-discrimination on the

³¹⁷ John Cruickshank, Jeff Sallot and Michael Valpy, "Mulroney calls for leaders to unite against apartheid", Globe and Mail, October 14, 1987, A-1.

basis of race. If requested, the Commonwealth would 'be ready to offer its good offices' to resolve the problems in Fiji."³¹⁸ India, however, took a much harder line and made it clear that "India would block Fiji's readmission into the Commonwealth if the coup leaders adopted a new constitution with racial overtones."³¹⁹ India also made it extremely clear that it would not accept any efforts by Fiji in the future to gain readmittance to the organization.

The differences over Fiji between India and Canada may have been marginal, but it is still interesting to note them in comparison with the cooperation that existed on the South African issue. The new internationalism of Clark and Gandhi had found common ground on the South African issue and they thus worked closely together to bring about the result that both countries desired. Fiji, on the other hand, was a matter of great importance to India not only because it was a development within the Asian region which was of critical concern to it, but because of the effect of what had happened there on the welfare of the Indian community of the island and its possible implications for the large Indian populations in other countries. In Canada, by contrast, Fiji was a distant country and no particular Canadian interests were at stake in this crisis. Clearly, then, Canada did not share the same intensity of feeling regarding the developments in Fiji that India did. The Fijian issue, contrasted against that of South Africa, thus indicates how the degree of rapprochement between Canada and India depends upon the degree of the convergence in the two countries' perceptions of their national interests.

Interestingly, while Canada and India cooperated within the Commonwealth in addressing the human rights issue of apartheid in South Africa, in their own bilateral relations, the problem of human rights abuses in India was ignored. Judging by Canadian

³¹⁸ Jeff Sallot, "Commonwealth might take back Fiji", Globe and Mail, October 19, 1987, A-1.

³¹⁹ Ibid.

government statements in recent years and by the views expressed in parliamentary committee reports, the issue of human rights has assumed a relatively prominent place in Canadian foreign policy during the Mulroney years. The fact, however, that this aspect of Canadian policy has not been featured in relations with India, would appear to be another indication of the importance attached by Canada to building strong bilateral relations with India in the 1980's.

It has become increasingly clear that concerns over India's human rights record are justified despite its being the world's largest democracy. In general terms, the 1988 Amnesty International Report, which deals with the human rights abuses of various countries, points out that India has specific anti-terrorist laws and preventative detention legislation which are in violation of a number of basic human rights standards. The report states that "There were reports of torture or ill-treatment of prisoners from most states and dozens of deaths in custody. Dozens of people were also sentenced to death, and there was an unknown number of executions. Extra-judicial executions by police and army were [also reported] from various areas including Punjab, Manipur, and Uttar Pradesh."³²⁰ Even though other countries examined in the report had much worse levels of human rights abuses than India, the level of political repression that apparently exists in this country, often referred to as the "show case for democracy" in the Third World, is highly disturbing. It is even more disturbing that Canada has seemingly turned its back on these abuses, partly in order to maintain the closer relations that have now been established.

Not surprisingly, much of the abusive legislation that has been implemented in India has been specifically directed toward dealing with the perceived Sikh threat. The 1988 Amnesty International report notes that the Indian government has further strengthened detention laws that were already viewed as lacking many legal safeguards.

³²⁰ Amnesty International, Amnesty International Report 1988, (London: Amnesty International Publications, 1988), 158.

More specifically, the government has amended the National Security Act [NSA] to allow for detainees in the Punjab to be held for up to two years in comparison to one year for the rest of the country. "In amending the NSA, the government reintroduced provisions which had already been declared unconstitutional by [both] the Punjab and Haryana High Courts."³²¹ Furthermore, the government also tightened its Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act (TADA) under which 1000 people were detained within weeks of the implementation of President's Rule in the Punjab in 1988. The report also cites the misuse of the TADA provisions in the states of Gujarat, Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh and Jammu and Kashmir and the fact that shoot-to-kill orders have been extended to police in these so-called "disturbed" areas.

Canada's neglect of the disturbing human rights situation in India has been reflected in the mounting criticism in Canada over the potential for abuses under the Indo-Canadian Extradition Treaty. Should Canada, the critics ask, really be extraditing political prisoners back to a country with a pattern of human rights violations against a specific sector of its population? There is a risk, some in Canada feel, of extraditions occurring so that Canada will win political "brownie points" with the Indian government regardless of the human rights implications of such actions.

One specific example of Canada's neglect of the human rights aspects of a situation in the context of the Indo-Canadian Extradition Treaty came with the government's decision to refuse refugee status to Santokh Singh, a former member of the Indian army, now living in Princeton, Ontario. On May 17, 1988 the Globe and Mail reported that Joe Clark had sent a secret letter to the Department of Immigration requesting that the refugee status that had been granted Mr. Singh be overturned. Clark justified the review of Mr. Singh's status on the grounds that he was a suspect in a conspiracy to assassinate Rajiv Gandhi and

³²¹ Ibid.

on these grounds he should be returned to India. The Globe pointed out, however, that the only evidence that was sent by the Indian High Commissioner "to the Canadian government was that Santokh Singh had entered Canada with false identification and that there was some talk of his encouraging Sikhs to desert the Indian army."³²² There was no direct reference at all to his involvement in any assassination conspiracy and even though the original committee that allowed Mr. Singh into Canada had judged that "the applicant would be in danger if he returned to India, a subsequent review of the case by the Immigration Department overturned the decision."³²³

When confronted with the accusation that the Santokh Singh affair was an example of Canada's being more interested in friendly relations with India than in following a consistent immigration/human rights policy, Clark denied that this was the case. This denial, however, became suspect when it was disclosed that India never made any formal application under the Extradition Treaty for Santokh Singh's extradition. In fact, India's High Commissioner to Canada "insisted that the Indian government had never sought the extradition of Santokh Singh" since New Delhi did not have a case against him. He added that the Indian government "knew that this gentleman had false papers, and [tha'] there was some suspicion that he was involved in the desertion of Sikhs from the armed forces," but that was all the information New Delhi had regarding his case.³²⁴ From these comments, it is obvious Canada was not following any request from the Indian government in terms of the Singh affair despite Mr. Clark's claims.

In this instance it would appear that Canada sought the expulsion of Santokh Singh for whatever bonus it might contribute to the overall Indo-Canadian political relationship rather than because there was a direct and valid request by the Indian government for his

³²² Kevin Cox, "India denies pressure in refugee case", Globe and Mail, May 17, 1988, A-2.

³²³ Ibid.

³²⁴ Ibid, A-1 and A-2.

extradition. Michael Schebew, the spokesman on refugee issues for the Canadian section of Amnesty International, has made it clear that if this was the case, then it was a major violation of the human rights policy that Canada was supposed to be following. Mr. Clark "appears to be forgetting that a human life is at stake,"³²⁵ Mr. Schebew noted. Other individuals and groups also argued that the Singh affair was a dangerous indication of the Canadian government's willingness to put political concerns ahead of humanitarian considerations. Lorne Waldman, a Toronto Lawyer specializing in refugee rights, perhaps summed up the entire Singh situation best when he stated that Canada had international obligations in matters such as these which "should never be sacrificed over some minister's concerns for bilateral relations. What we have here is political considerations taking precedence over those that affect individual lives."³²⁶

Perhaps the Santokh Singh affair is a good indication of how far the Indo-Canadian relationship had been transformed by the latter half of the 1980's. As Bill Warden has made clear, the nuclear theme that had dominated the relationship and led to a breakdown in cooperation in the 1970's was now replaced by the Sikh security threat of the 1980's, sparking a strengthening of the political relations between these two countries. "India... seeing Canadian Sikh extremist activity as a serious threat, became acutely conscious of the need to develop a cooperative political relationship with Canada. The Canadian government, disturbed by accusations of being 'soft on terrorism' and faced with a growing threat to Canadian as well as Indian security, significantly intensified its efforts to curb unlawful activities by Sikh extremists."³²⁷

³²⁵ Graham Fraser, Victor Malarek and Robert Matas, "Ottawa persecuting Sikh's, critics charge", Globe and Mail, May 17, 1988, A-10.

³²⁶ Ibid.

³²⁷ Warden, 15.

As the following chapters will make clear, the aid/trade relationship between these two countries has also contributed to the strengthening of this bilateral relationship in the 1980's. In terms of aid, Canada's contributions to India once again began to increase in the 1980's following a mid- 1970's decline. The South Asian region, and India in particular, has also become an increased area in Canadian trade relations, so much so that Asia has now replaced Western Europe as Canada's second leading trading partner. These factors, along with India's economic desire to address the balance of trade problem, and Canada's commercial interests in opening up and maintaining potential Asian markets, have also contributed to an overall similarity in both countries' policy objectives in this period.

In sum, the strengthening of the bilateral relationship in this period can largely be attributed to converging Canadian and Indian interests in the 1980's. From a Canadian standpoint, however, the government's pursuit of stronger political and commercial ties with India has been accompanied by a tendency to ignore human rights issues in its relations with that country. That in turn is a reflection of how pragmatic interests rather than idealism has shaped the character of the relationship over the years.

Chapter VI

Canada-India Commercial Relations

India is a striking example of the paradox of the economic reality of South and Southeast Asia. Much like several other countries in the region India is blessed with the raw materials and industrial capability that rank it among a number of fast emerging Asian industrial powers. On the other hand, however, India is also faced with the problem of trying to help the large majority of its citizens who are desperately poor and are concentrated in rural areas. Indo-Canadian bilateral economic relations thus have two dimensions to them. On the one hand the two countries engage in a trading relationship out of which each seeks commercial benefits. On the other, Canada has long been involved in the provision of aid to India in its efforts to deal with its widespread poverty. These aspects of Indo-Canadian economic relations are examined in this and the following chapter.

Looking first at the commercial relationship, Joe Clark, the present Secretary of State for External Affairs, in an address to the Fifth Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference in 1988 made it clear that trade with all countries is essential to Canada's economic well being. He pointed out that "In Canada trade means jobs: we do not have a large domestic market to achieve efficient economies of scale. Instead, we rely on the free flow of trade between markets, be it across the Pacific, across the Atlantic, or anywhere else. Twenty-seven percent of our GNP is directly related to exports. One in three

Canadian jobs depends, in some form, on trade."³²⁸ Therefore, it would seem natural that Canada would strive for an open and vibrant commercial relationship, not only with India, but with all other emerging industrial countries.

In selecting areas in which to concentrate Canadian efforts at trade expansionism, the Asia-Pacific region has not surprisingly received considerable attention. The 1986 report of the Special Joint Parliamentary Committee on Canada's International Relations concluded that "...the Asia-Pacific region has emerged as the one area that deserves greater public and private efforts."³²⁹ The potential importance of the region was also recognized by Joe Clark in a speech in Edmonton on April 15, 1988. He made it clear that:

The Asia Pacific region has become a major centre for global economic development. Approximately 60% of the world's population resides in the region, and this proportion will approach 70% by the turn of the century. By that time, half of the global output of goods and services will originate in the Asia Pacific region. ... Since 1984, the Asia Pacific Region has emerged as the second largest regional destination for Canadian exports, edging out Europe for this position.³³⁰

The Canadian government has obviously recognized the commercial importance of the Asian region both now and for the future. Not surprisingly, Clark has made it a goal of the Canadian government "...to build on these ties to develop closer links, particularly in the area of trade and economic relations."³³¹

The first indication of Canada's emphasis on Asia's commercial potential came with the Trudeau government's 1970 foreign policy review. The Pacific Chapter of the review

³²⁸ Joe Clark, "Notes for an address to the Fifth Pacific Economic Conference", Statements and Speeches, October 22, 1988, 2.

³²⁹ House of Commons, Independence and Internationalism. Report of the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons on Canada's International Relations. June 1986, (Ottawa: Canadian Government Publishing Centre, Supply and Services Canada, 1986), 77.

³³⁰ The Department of External Affairs, "Trade in the Pacific Rim, Notes for a Speech by the Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs", Statement, April 15, 1988, 1.

³³¹ Ibid, 2.

stated that a goal of the Canadian government should be to pursue a more active commercial trade relationship with Asia in the hopes of offsetting the trade deficit that Canada had traditionally had with the United States and Europe.³³² At the time of the review, Canada was beginning to recognize that Japan was not the only large market of the region that offered potential. There was no longer the attitude that these countries were unable to hold their own in the international economy, and there was a general recognition within this country that Canada's role in Asia had to change to reflect this new situation.

Mark MacGuigan, in a statement on June 17, 1982, made it clear that the policy decision to focus on the Asia-Pacific market needed to become more of a reality in Canadian commercial relations in the 1980's. He stated that "while development assistance will continue to be an important element of our co-operative efforts we have been concerned that it should not be regarded as the main feature of the relationship." Rather, he wanted it to be clear that Canada and the states of Asia were "moving toward a new kind of mutually beneficial partnership."³³³ In a direct reference to Canada's negative balance of trade situation, MacGuigan also stated that Canada was "looking for greater recognition in [Asian] countries of its export capabilities." Canadian firms were anxious, he said "to participate in the ambitious development plans of [these] countries; notably, energy and resource development, transportation and telecommunications."³³⁴

This emphasis on Asia as a commercial outlet was, as previously indicated, continued with the Mulroney government. In a speech made by Joe Clark at a dinner in honour of the visiting Indian Minister of State for External Affairs in May of 1988, he made it clear that Canada viewed Asia as a strong economic region and that its potential for

³³² For a more detailed discussion, see Foreign Policy for Canadians, Pacific, (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1970).

³³³ Mark MacGuigan, "New forms of cooperation for Canada and ASEAN", Statements and Speeches, June 17, 1982, (Ottawa: Bureau of Information, The Department of External Affairs, 1982), 1.

³³⁴ *Ibid*, 3.

the future had to be recognized. He stated that the economic dynamism of these countries was "shaping the whole world economy. The Asian nations more than most, have embraced new technologies that transform our world. By the next century, the economies of the Asian countries will be more diversified than the economies of Europe, or those of North America."³³⁵ Obviously, the Mulroney government, much like the Trudeau government before it, believed that it would be in Canada's best interests if a strong commercial relationship was pursued with this region.

When looking at the actual statistics of Canadian trade with Asia, it becomes apparent that, to some degree, Canada's commercial goals are being met. Figure 1, which shows the percentages of Canada's worldwide exports and imports with the leading regions of the world, indicates several interesting features regarding the evolution of Canada's trade relations. The first and most notable feature is the overall dominance of the United States in Canadian trade relations. Since 1959 the United States has never comprised less than 60 percent of Canada's overall trade and in 1980 it peaked at 85.6 percent. This close relationship is not that surprising considering the geographical proximity of these two states. However, what this dominance means in terms of other trading partners is that it is extremely difficult for Canada to increase significantly the proportion of its world trade with them.

Figure 1 also clearly indicates the growth of the Asian region and the decline of Western Europe in terms of Canada's world-wide trade. As a result it is apparent that at least to some degree Canada's commercial objective of increasing its trade with the Asia-Pacific region has been realized. Joe Clark, in a speech to the Asia Pacific Foundation in October of 1988, noted the significance of this development. He stated that today "the

³³⁵ The Department of External Affairs, "Notes for a speech by the Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs, at a dinner in honour of the visit of Mr. K. Natwar Singh, India's Minister of State for External Affairs", *Statement*, May 15, 1988, 2.

National Library
of Canada

Canadian Theses Service

Bibliothèque nationale
du Canada

Service des thèses canadiennes

NOTICE

THE QUALITY OF THIS MICROFICHE
IS HEAVILY DEPENDENT UPON THE
QUALITY OF THE THESIS SUBMITTED
FOR MICROFILMING.



UNFORTUNATELY THE COLOURED
ILLUSTRATIONS OF THIS THESIS
CAN ONLY YIELD DIFFERENT TONES
OF GREY.

AVIS

LA QUALITE DE CETTE MICROFICHE
DEPEND GRANDEMENT DE LA QUALITE DE LA
THESE SOUMISE AU MICROFILMAGE.

MALHEUREUSEMENT, LES DIFFERENTES
ILLUSTRATIONS EN COULEURS DE CETTE
THESE NE PEUVENT DONNER QUE DES
TEINTES DE GRIS.

[REDACTED]



Asian Pacific region accounts for some 43% of our non-U.S.A. trade, compared to 34% for Europe. Five years ago the figures were reversed."³³⁶

Even though the figures presented in Figure 1 indicate only a marginal increase in the relative importance of Asia, bearing in mind the difficulties of accomplishing this in the face of such overwhelming trade with the United States, they reflect no mean achievement.

When looking at the figures in Table 2, however, it is also clear that Canada has not been successful in meeting the second half of its commercial objectives first outlined in the 1970 foreign policy review. The growth of Canadian trade with Asia has not been accompanied by success in using the Asian market as a means to offset deficits in trade with other regions. Although Canada had some success in the early years after the 1970 foreign policy review, the figures in Table 2 show that since 1983 there has consistently been a negative balance in Canada's trade with the Asian region. It is not a positive commercial sign for Canada that the one regional market that has been steadily expanding is a deficit area for Canada when looked at in total. It is true that Canada still maintains a positive overall global balance of trade, largely due to its steady surpluses in recent years with the United States, and it is also true that the imbalance with Asia is not yet as large as with Western Europe but, nevertheless, the failure to achieve surpluses in trade with Asia in recent years is disappointing in terms of achieving the goals of the 1970 review and may have serious implications for the health of Canada's worldwide trade in the future.

When specifically examining Canada's bilateral commercial relationship with India, it is also apparent that a good deal of emphasis has been placed on the development of this market. The National Trade Strategy, endorsed by the First Ministers in 1985, declared India a priority market and the Hockin-Simard committee, set up by the Mulroney government in 1986, supported this commercial strategy. The committee pointed out in the

³³⁶ Joe Clark, "Notes for a speech to the Fifth Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference", 2.

Table 2- Canadian Trade with Its Principal Regional Partners
(Thousands of Canadian Dollars)

	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987
North America							
Total Trade	108,463,159	103,751,626	128,225,478	150,866,577	164,269,923	167,474,871	170,880,025
Balance	-613,183	+8,012,961	+10,241,618	+14,530,187	+16,631,003	+13,221,681	+12,702,491
% of Total	67.4%	69.3%	78.34%	73.63%	74.49%	73.05%	71.8%
Asia							
Total Trade	14,371,195	14,247,766	15,260,140	20,081,599	21,225,807	24,037,364	26,875,357
Balance	+573,813	+1,884,706	-403,068	-581,763	-1,212,933	-3,689,228	-2,267,779
% of Total	8.93%	9.51%	9.32%	9.80%	9.62%	10.48%	11.3%
W. Europe							
Total Trade	18,167,098	15,542,077	15,074,531	17,939,047	20,440,773	23,677,996	26,063,366
Balance	+2,112,640	+1,489,401	+24,301	-2,096,407	-4,665,029	-6,018,806	-5,522,830
% of Total	11.29%	10.38%	9.19%	8.75%	9.27%	10.32%	10.96%
South America							
Total Trade	5,136,230	4,195,202	3,361,423	3,973,840	3,752,241	3,416,038	3,738,376
Balance	-1,352,748	-1,192,756	-731,787	-905,206	-1,037,961	-389,604	-547,072
% of Total	3.19%	2.8%	2.05%	1.93%	1.70%	1.49%	1.57%
Central America							
Total Trade	3,766,183	3,096,513	3,182,615	3,708,332	3,445,220	3,598,938	3,644,884
Balance	-18,123	-157,107	-368,891	-850,740	-568,108	-564,802	-478,818
% of Total	2.34%	2.06%	1.94%	1.80%	1.56%	1.56%	1.53%
Global							
Total Trade	160,818,446	149,680,527	163,674,607	204,896,606	220,500,307	229,244,830	237,700,956
Balance	+1,855,016	+13,969,121	+12,634,521	+13,976,614	+11,789,915	+4,221,940	+5,223,728

SOURCE- Statistics Canada, Exports and Imports by Country- 1969-87.

Ministry of Supply and Services, Ottawa: 1969-87

report that, when thinking of potential beneficial markets, India was not usually a country that immediately came to most people's minds. There was, its report said:

a gap between the Canadian public's image of that country, conditioned by poverty and underdevelopment, and its actual accomplishments, abilities and potential. It is not generally known that India has emerged as a net food exporter in recent years. In addition it has a modern industrial sector that is ninth [now tenth] largest in the world and a large sophisticated commercial market. ... Moreover, Canada is able to draw upon a number of links with India to develop a more substantial relationship. Canada's official aid program has been at work in India for over 40 years, while Canadian missionaries have been active for much longer. India is [also] Canada's fourteenth largest export market overall and is third after Japan and China in the region.³³⁷

The importance of India as a potential commercial market has been a theme repeated in several recent statements by Joe Clark. In a speech made to the Canadian Exporters Association on May 18, 1988, Clark pointed out that Canadians "know the impact of Japan, and the competition coming from the four tigers- Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong-Kong. But consider what will happen when those methods and that model are adopted by India and China. There are immense markets there and real and growing competition. Those present great opportunities for Canada, if we reach out to seize them."³³⁸ On another occasion, he said that India was "assuming an increasingly important role in the overall Asian economy" and ranked among "the top industrialized nations of the world." It had, he said, "the third largest reservoir of trained people in the fields of science and management and technology; it [had] abundant raw materials and a work force that included a high percentage of skilled workers, and a large and growing

³³⁷ House of Commons, *Independence and Internationalism*, 80-81.

³³⁸ The Department of External Affairs, "Notes for a Statement by the Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs, to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Council at the ministerial level", *Statement*, May 18, 1988, 1.

domestic market." In sum, India was, in his view, "a country where Canada and Canadians can and should do a lot more business."³³⁹

The actual Canada-India trade figures indicate, however, that despite the emphasis placed on the potential of this market, to date the commercial relationship has been very modest. Looking first at Canadian imports from India, Table 3 outlines the total yearly imports, the percentages that they comprised of Canada's worldwide imports and India's annual ranking as a source of imports over the period since 1945. The table discloses that during the 1945-55 period, Canada did have a strong import relationship with India. During this time, India never ranked lower than 7th as a supplier and, in the years immediately preceding and following India's independence, it ranked third or fourth worldwide. At the very start of the period examined, nearly 2% of Canada's global imports came from India. These early figures are a result of the collapse at the end of the war of traditional Canadian trade partners in Europe and the Pacific (especially China and Japan) and it is not surprising, therefore, that with the gradual recovery after the war of the economies of these countries, India progressively assumed a less important place as a source of Canadian imports. That is reflected in the table in the steady decline in India's position after 1950. In terms of its ranking, India has not been among the top 20 import markets since 1970 and has been no better than 30th since 1973. At the same time, the percentage of global imports coming from India has been consistently low. It has not been above one percent since 1950 and half of one percent since 1965. In 1987, India made up only .14% of Canada's imports and ranked 30th overall as an import market. Providing a market for Indian products is not only important to that country's economic development, it is essential to Canada's expanding its own exports to India over the longer term, for if India cannot sell its own goods abroad in large quantities, then it cannot earn the foreign

³³⁹ The Department of External Affairs, "Notes for a Speech at a dinner in honour of Mr. K. Narwar Singh, India's Minister of State for External Affairs", 2.

Table 3- Canadian Imports From India
(Thousands of Canadian Dollars)

<u>Year</u>	<u>Total Imports</u>	<u>Percentage of World Imports</u>	<u>Rank</u>
1945	30,567	1.92%	3rd
1946	27,877	1.44%	3rd
1947	42,249	1.64%	4th
1948	33,400	1.26%	4th
1949	26,232	.95%	5th
1950	37,261	1.17%	4th
1951	40,216	.98%	7th
1952	26,821	.66%	6th
1953	26,626	.60%	7th
1954	28,053	.68%	6th
1955	35,147	.74%	6th
1956	30,897	.54%	11th
1957	29,247	.52%	13th
1958	27,696	.53%	14th
1959	29,220	.53%	14th
1960	29,351	.53%	15th
1961	33,464	.58%	13th
1962	43,478	.69%	10th
1963	52,663	.80%	9th
1964	36,121	.48%	15th
1965	43,424	.50%	13th
1966	40,093	.40%	13th
1967	42,773	.38%	15th
1968	38,303	.30%	19th
1969	40,905	.28%	22nd
1970	40,097	.28%	23rd
1971	44,610	.28%	21st
1972	44,404	.23%	26th
1973	38,466	.16%	35th
1974	59,272	.18%	35th
1975	46,650	.13%	33rd
1976	66,755	.17%	32nd
1977	55,677	.13%	33rd
1978	65,117	.12%	33rd
1979	93,250	.14%	31st
1980	94,638	.13%	35th
1981	106,704	.13%	35th
1982	90,699	.13%	36th
1983	101,118	.13%	35th
1984	147,133	.15%	31st
1985	168,201	.16%	30th
1986	165,405	.14%	30th
1987	170,867	.14%	30th

Source- Statistics Canada, Imports by Country 1945-87, Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1945-87.

exchange with which to purchase expanding volumes of products from Canada and other countries. Thus, India's poor performance in the Canadian import market is likely, if not corrected, to serve as a restraint on the future expansion of Canadian exports to India.

Looking at the Canadian export side of the relationship, the trade figures are much more significant. According to Table 4, India has never ranked lower than 22nd as a Canadian export market and has been ranked in the top 20 in all but four years over the period 1945-1987. While more positive than the import figures, there are again several things that have to be taken into consideration when looking at these statistics. First of all, as with imports, Canada had its most significant export relationship with India in the years immediately preceding and following Indian independence. Up to 1951 India, while not ranking as high as in Table 3, was never lower than 8th in terms of Canadian export markets, and at its peak in 1945 it accounted for almost 10% of Canadian exports worldwide. Much like the import situation, these figures can be explained largely by the collapse of Canada's traditional export markets in the immediate post-war period.

Second, the significance of these figures is decreased by the fact that Canadian aid contributions are included in the export totals. India, as discussed in the next chapter, has consistently been a major recipient of Canadian aid. Due to the practice of tied aid, which requires that Canadian assistance be spent primarily in Canada, the annual export figures include goods and services provided from Canada with Canadian aid funds. The export figures for 1958 and 1959 are illustrations of this effect. What appears on the surface to have been a dramatic increase in exports to India (leading to a jump in India's ranking as an export outlet from 15th to 5th) was really just increased shipments of wheat under the aid program. In 1957 Canada's "exports" of wheat to India totalled only \$5.3 million whereas in 1958 the amount increased to \$40 million.

Third, the pattern of the export relationship that has developed since the 1970 foreign policy review is not encouraging. Although a main focus of the review was on increasing trade with the Asian region, it does not appear as though this has been the case

Table 4- Canadian Exports to India
(Thousands of Canadian Dollars)


Year	Total Exports	Percentage of World Exports	Rank
1945	307,460	9.55%	3rd
1946	49,045	2.12%	6th
1947	42,946	1.54%	8th
1948	33,697	1.09%	7th
1949	72,550	2.42%	4th
1950	31,520	1.01%	6th
1951	35,736	.91%	11th
1952	55,423	1.68%	9th
1953	37,186	.90%	11th
1954	17,689	.45%	17th
1955	24,688	.57%	15th
1956	25,714	.53%	13th
1957	28,991	.59%	15th
1958	79,109	1.63%	5th
1959	53,653	1.06%	9th
1960	36,814	.70%	12th
1961	43,330	.75%	12th
1962	29,632	.47%	16th
1963	53,899	.79%	15th
1964	64,041	.79%	14th
1965	58,452	.68%	15th
1966	107,661	1.06%	11th
1967	140,591	1.26%	8th
1968	111,255	.83%	11th
1969	95,551	.65%	12th
1970	129,842	.78%	12th
1971	142,809	.82%	12th
1972	101,770	.51%	14th
1973	155,992	.62%	13th
1974	126,218	.39%	17th
1975	202,137	.62%	15th
1976	154,522	.41%	16th
1977	135,790	.31%	21st
1978	257,954	.49%	14th
1979	225,784	.35%	21st
1980	357,303	.47%	17th
1981	346,154	.42%	19th
1982	288,131	.35%	22nd
1983	261,683	.29%	19th
1984	470,577	.42%	13th
1985	492,679	.42%	14th
1986	352,359	.30%	17th
1987	270,999	.22%	21st

Source- Statistics Canada, Exports by Country 1945-87, Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1945-87.

with India. Since 1973, even though the actual totals of exports have generally moved in an upward direction, there has been a fairly steady decline in the percentage of Canada's world exports going to India and in India's rank as a market. Furthermore, even though the Hockin-Simard report stressed the potential of India's market and the fact that it was 14th overall in Canadian exports in 1985, there has been an absolute decline in exports to India over the past two years. This has been accompanied by a decline in the percentage of world-wide exports going to India from .42% to .22% and of India's ranking as an export market from 14th to 21st place. Once again, this decline is even more significant when it is remembered that these figures are "padded" by the Canadian aid disbursements which actually increased in the 1986-87 fiscal years.

A further factor that must be taken into consideration when looking at these export statistics is the reality of India's economic position in the Asian market. Despite the emphasis placed on the fact that Asia has now surpassed Europe as a trading area and that India has great commercial potential, the reality is that India makes up only 1.6% of Canada's total Asian market. Whatever India's potential then, Canada's present commercial relationship with this country is not very significant.


A more encouraging example of India's deviating from the regional trend of Canada's commercial relations with Asia is apparent when one examines the balance of trade that exists between these two countries. Figure 2 reveals that the negative balance of trade that Canada has developed with Asia as a whole does not exist vis-à-vis India. A favourable balance of trade with any country indicates that it is a market of some potential commercial benefit for Canada. Thus, while the actual two-way trade relationship between Canada and India may not be that significant, India does appear, in a modest way, to be meeting one of the Canadian commercial objectives first outlined in the 1970 foreign policy review; it is a surplus area useful in offsetting deficits elsewhere. In terms of this one aspect of the commercial relationship, it can be argued that India is one of the "bright spots" in Canadian trade relations with Asia.



This trade imbalance has, however, come under a great deal of criticism from various Indian officials who feel that the "situation is not sustainable in the long-run and needs to be examined in the context of the north-south debate."³⁴⁰ While a negative balance of trade is beneficial to short-term Canadian commercial interests, it does little to provide India with the foreign exchange which is necessary to purchase Canadian goods. A negative balance of trade also does little to help promote the development of countries such as India. As Figure 2 points out, however, there has been a dramatic decline in Canada's favourable balance of trade with India since 1985. Although this may simply be another of the random fluctuations that have occurred in the trade balance throughout the history of this commercial relationship, the drop has been more dramatic this time. If a more equal balance in trade is emerging, that could be beneficial to the long-term growth of Canada-India commercial relations. However, if the current trend were to continue and Canada were to end up with a deficit in trade with India, that would be a further discouraging development in terms of the Asia-Pacific region fulfilling the goal of offsetting Canadian trade deficits with other regions, especially Western Europe. It would be particularly so, if this market ever grew to the size that it has been recognized as potentially having.

This potential problem of a future trade imbalance takes on added significance when one compares the general character of Indian exports to Canada with Canadian exports to India. As Figure 3 clearly shows, there is a wide disparity in the finished versus unfinished exports and imports in Canada's trade with India. Canadian imports are relatively evenly balanced between finished and unfinished goods which would suggest

³⁴⁰ Nanda K. Choudhry, "Introductory Remarks", in Canada and South Asia, 17.



that Canada is helping to develop India's primary and secondary industries. However, when looking at Canadian exports to India, this same balance is not apparent. Canadian exports are comprised very heavily of unfinished products. Although some progress has been made in the last two years there can be no doubt that this imbalance means that Canada is not finding markets in India where it most urgently needs them- in the manufacturing sector which is the most important for generating jobs and enabling Canada to achieve a diversified export portfolio.

Figure 3 also offers a good indication of the overall trend in the trade relationship over the last few years. Since 1982, there has been a steady growth in Canadian imports from India of both finished and unfinished goods. Canada's exports, however, have fluctuated throughout this period and there has not been the same healthy growth in finished goods exports. Thus, when the Canada-India trade relationship is examined from this perspective of finished versus unfinished exports, it appears that India is the greater beneficiary and that the long-term direction of the exchange may be helpful to its economic development and not particularly so to Canada's. This potential problem (from a Canadian perspective) is magnified further when a closer examination is made of the actual products that make up the commercial relationship. Looking at the export side of the relationship, first it must be recognized that its character has changed over the years. "A decade ago, the majority of Canada's trade was in CIDA financed agricultural products. ... In the 1980's, [however], Canada's exports to India have been in the form of primary and semi-processed commodities such as sulphur, fertilizers such as potash, pulp and paper and asbestos."³⁴¹ Figure 4 and Table 5 indicate the extent of Canada's present problem in trade with India. Figure 4 indicates that only 20.7% of Canadian exports to India in the contemporary period are end products. Table 5, which offers a more detailed breakdown

³⁴¹ Rahman and Balcome, 60.

[REDACTED]



- Food /Feed etc.
- Crude Materials
- Fabricated Materials
- End Products
- Special Transactions

Table 5- Principal Canadian Exports to India 1985-87
(Thousands of Canadian Dollars)

Food, Feed, Beverages and Tobacco	19,409
Ore, Mineral and Metal Concentrate and Scrap	204,109
Other Crude Materials	27,021
Fertilizer and Fertilizer Material	140,453
Oil Fats, Waxes, Extracts and Derivatives	187,875
Copper and Alloys	11,124
Zinc, Including Alloys	16,371
Other Fabricated Materials	259,442
Drilling, Excavating Machinery	51,909
Electric Generators and Motors	27,320
Other Special Industry Machinery	8399
Telecommunications Equipment	19,139
Lab and Medical Equipment	15,367
Soil Preparation and Fertilizer Machinery	22
Other Haying and Harvesting Machinery	98
Other Agricultural Machinery	169
Other End Products	120,669
Special Transactions	6715

Source- Statistics Canada, Exports by Country 1987, Ottawa:
Minister of Supply and Services, 1987.


of commodity exports indicates that ore, mineral and metal concentrate, scrap and other crude materials, along with fertilizers, oils, fats etc., dominate among Canadian exports. The fact that fertilizers, oils, fats, and waxes, are still important commodities in Canada's present aid program and that the Indian government, in one form or another, purchases more than 90% of Canadian exports to India indicate that a large chunk of these exports remain CIDA-sponsored products, purchased through tied aid.³⁴² The fact that India is obliged to buy these goods in Canada because of the tied nature of the assistance provided and that most of the goods furnished are unfinished products means that a healthy commercial relationship with long-term potential is not developing. India will likely not buy many of these unfinished products if they are not made available under the aid program in the distant future and no market for finished goods is being developed to replace them.

Examining the import aspect of the commercial relationship with India in more detail, it becomes apparent that the commodities involved are contributing to India's domestic industrial development. Figure 5 presents a general breakdown of these imports and indicates that end products and fabricated materials dominate this aspect of the trade relationship in the contemporary period. A further breakdown of these imports in Table 6 also makes it clear that Canada is aiding by its imports traditional Indian areas of industry. Outerwear, apparel and footwear dominate Canadian imports of end products and it is these items that have been the key to India's industrial base in the past. Even fabricated materials, such as woven fabrics, cotton, etc., and foodstuffs, such as coffee, tea and nuts, are also traditional areas of commercial importance to India.

Criticism from some Indian sources has been heard, however, in that Canada's import of these "traditional" items does not adequately reflect the changing nature of India's industry. "For example, whereas textiles account for only about 14% of India's global

³⁴² Ibid.

[REDACTED]



- Food /Feed etc.
- Crude Materials
- Fabricated Materials
- End Products
- Special Transactions

Table 6- Principal Canadian Imports From India 1985-87
(Thousands of Canadian Dollars)

Coffee	19,063
Tea	11,336
Nuts	12,570
Other Food, Feed, Beverage and Tobacco	37,738
Crude Materials, Inedible	17,551
Petroleum and Coal Products	19,677
Woven Fabrics, Wool & Hair	4672
Woven Fabrics, Cotton	6049
Woven Fabrics, Man-Made	469
Woven Fabrics, Mixed Fibres	1327
Other Woven Fabrics	17,134
Vegetable Oils and Fats, Essential Oils	5396
Natural and Synthetic Gem Stones	25,461
Leather and Leather Fabricated Materials	14,539
Other Fabricated Materials	24,055
Outerwear, Except Knitted	155,905
Outerwear, Knitted	5605
Other Apparel	10,707
Footwear	10,288
Home Furnishings	45,737
Other Personal And Household Goods	2569
Other End Products	46,691
Special Transactions	9935

Source- Statistics Canada, Imports by Country 1987, Ottawa:
Minister of Supply and Services, 1987.

export earnings, they account for a third or more of India's export earnings from Canada. World-wide, other manufactures account for 50% or more of India's overall export earnings; for Canada the corresponding figure is closer to 15 per cent"³⁴³ Conceivably, this could lead to long-range problems in terms of Canada's helping to expand Indian industry, especially if India's exports to Canada ever reach levels much higher than at present without a change in the export mix occurring. Nevertheless, India still has a much stronger balance of finished and unfinished goods in its half of the trade between these two countries. Even though Canada in volume terms enjoys the better commercial relationship at this time, the apparent trend in the balance of trade, the make-up of the goods exchanged and the contributions that they make to each country in maintaining and developing secondary industries (which are essential to economic success), suggest over the longer-term a trade relationship that may be of greater advantage to India.

Another factor that may lead to a further increase in Canadian imports from countries such as India is Canada's new, more liberal attitudes toward institutions such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the Multi Fibre Agreement. In a statement on February 13, 1987, Joe Clark made it clear that Canada saw the new Uruguay round of GATT as being an important tool by which to increase two-way trade between these two countries. Clark stated that the:

just launched multilateral trade negotiations would do much to enhance trade flows between Canada and India and indeed with the Asia-Pacific region as a whole. I have, therefore, urged in my meetings with my Indian colleagues that our two countries should work together in the new trade round to ensure a result which both achieves further liberalization of world trade and strengthens the multilateral trading system which is so essential to the health of the international economy.³⁴⁴

³⁴³ Choudhry, 17.

³⁴⁴ The Department of External Affairs, "Remarks made by the Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs, on the Occasion of a Canada Day luncheon with Canadian and Indian business executives, New Delhi: February 9, 1987", Statement, February 13, 1987, 2.

In sum, it is clear that, in order to have a successful commercial relationship with India, Canada is going to have to alter its trade approach with that country. Although the present situation is beneficial to Canada, it is clear that this reality is beginning to shift. The potential of a large market for Canadian goods is there, but the make-up of Canadian exports and imports and the deterioration in the positive balance of trade is weakening whatever commercial benefits Canada may have derived from its trade with this country in the past.

Chantal Tremblay, in a recent evaluation of the Indo-Canadian commercial relationship, made it clear that the industrialized, aid-giving countries are no longer able to dictate the terms of trade relations with emerging Third World states. She pointed out that "this is surely the case with India. The customer is calling the shots and we have to respond to this reality. In an era of information and its rapid transition, we have to approach these markets in a much more sophisticated way."³⁴⁵ In defence of the Mulroney government, Canada's recent efforts to build on the joint business ventures of Canadian companies in India, such as Bata shoes and Alcan, are probably a good indication of the more "sophisticated" approach that Tremblay referred to. However, as positive as these joint ventures might be in terms of bringing India and Canada closer together, and opening up areas for new Canadian markets, it is clear that substantial effort is going to be required in the future if Canada and India are to enjoy an expanding and mutually beneficial commercial relationship.

³⁴⁵ Tremblay, 25.

Chapter VII

Canada-India Aid Relations

Trade and commercial relations make up only one dimension of Indo-Canadian economic ties. Canada's development assistance program to India has represented over most of this period under study a considerably more important aspect of the relationship. The Asian region and India in particular, have been a main focus of the Canadian aid program since its inception. There is also no doubt, as indicated in Chapter 3, that at the outset the program was prompted by political considerations.

The Colombo Plan, which was Canada's only aid responsibility until 1958, was the result of a desire to stop the spread of communism, and India in the 1950's and 1960's was the principal recipient under this scheme. Before the Colombo Plan was initiated the battle to contain communism was already well under way in Europe with the Marshall Plan, but with Mao's victory in China in 1949, the Western nations became increasingly aware of the importance of Asia and the potential that the communist threat had in this region. In 1949 "the focus of imminent communist danger shifted... to China's soft, subcontinental underbelly. ...The Colombo Plan crystallized essentially to stop the Red and Yellow perils."³⁴⁶

³⁴⁶ Keith Spicer, "Clubmanship upstaged: Canada's twenty years in the Colombo Plan", International Journal, Winter 1969-70, 24.

Due to the fact that Canada industrialized rapidly during World War Two and suffered no domestic destruction, this country emerged as one of the richer states in the post-war period. As a result of this, Canada was expected, especially by its Western allies, to become involved in early development assistance programs. "At the Colombo meeting in Ceylon (now Sri Lanka), representatives of the United Kingdom, Ceylon, New Zealand, Canada, India, Pakistan and Australia launched the Colombo Plan for Cooperative Economic Development in South Asia, with the hopeful slogan, 'Planning Prosperity Together.'... the plan, which still operates today, was conceived as a six year cash program to build capitalist economies in Asia, a continent rocked by major post-war political upheavals."³⁴⁷

Lester Pearson, then the Secretary of State for External Affairs, justified Canada's role and participation in the Plan in his comments to the House of Commons on February 22, 1950 following the initial Colombo conference. He stated that "it seemed to all of us at the conference that if the tide of totalitarian expansionism should flow over this general area not only will the new nations lose the national independence which they have secured so recently, but the forces of the free world will have been driven off all but a relatively small bit of the great Eurasian land mass. ... If Southeast Asia and South Asia are not to be conquered by communism, we of the free democratic world... must demonstrate that it is we and not the Russians who stand for national liberation and economic and social progress."³⁴⁸

As Table 7 makes clear, over the history of Canada's aid program, India has received more bilateral assistance than any other country. The significance of the entire South Asian region is also made apparent from this table, for the top four aid recipients

³⁴⁷ Carty and Smith, *Perpetuating Poverty*, 27.

³⁴⁸ Spicer, "Clubmanship upstaged", 25.

**Table 7- Top Twenty Canadian
Bilateral Aid Recipients 1950-1986
(Millions of Canadian Dollars)**

1.	India	\$1854.2
2.	Pakistan	\$1165.92
3.	Bangladesh	\$1142.49
4.	Sri Lanka/Ceylon	\$435.41
5.	Indonesia	\$432.72
6.	Tanzania	\$285.03
7.	Kenya	\$272.29
8.	Cameroon	\$209.76
9.	Jamaica	\$207.48
10.	Senegal	\$192.77
11.	Ghana	\$190.92
12.	Niger	\$183.64
13.	Egypt	\$175.94
14.	Zaire/Congo-Kinshasa	\$163.716
15.	Tunisia	\$154.836
16.	Zambia	\$152.51
17.	Mali	\$135.28
18.	Ivory Coast/Cote d'Ivoire	\$129.89
19.	Malawi	\$126.81
20.	Nigeria	\$122.89

Source- Canadian International Development Agency, CIDA Annual Reviews 1960-87, Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1969-87.

over time have all been South Asian countries. The figures for India, Pakistan and Ceylon are high in part because they have been aid recipients for considerably longer than any of the other countries. The amount of aid disbursed to India and Pakistan, and also to Bangladesh (although the latter only became a recipient in 1971) is, however, so much higher than for all other countries that it is apparent that the figures reflect not only the length of time that these programs have been in existence, but the persisting prominence of these countries as aid destinations.³⁴⁹

To get an even better indication of the significance of Canadian assistance to India, it is necessary to look at yearly distributions to that country. Table 8 points out that not only has India received the largest total of assistance over time, but also that it was consistently the number one recipient of aid until the late 1970s. Through the 1950-60 period, when Canadian aid was almost exclusively under the Colombo Plan, India received an amazing 55.2% of all Canadian aid. The First Development Decade of the 1960's, known as the International Cooperation Decade, saw a diversification of Canadian assistance to a number of states due to the emergence of new, developing Commonwealth countries, international and domestic political pressures to aid the francophone African countries and American pressures to play a larger development role in Latin America. Appendix 1 on Canadian aid disbursements worldwide shows the effect of these phenomena. However, over the decade of the 1960's, this diversification had little appreciable effect on India. It remained not only the number one recipient, but its annual proportion of the aid budget was little changed from the 1950's. Indeed, in 1966-67, aid to

³⁴⁹ In measuring the aid figures government-to-government data were selected, instead of country to country figures because government-to-government statistics have been regularly reported throughout the history of CIDA's published Annual Reviews whereas country-to-country figures have not. Although the government-to-government statistics were the most consistent available there is a problem using them over the full period of this study, since prior to 1970 Canadian annual reports appear to have been based on a different 12-month period for computing the level of yearly government assistance. Nevertheless, these figures are the best available for analysing the Indo-Canadian developmental relationship in its entirety.

Table 8--Yearly Canadian Aid Contributions to India
(Millions of Canadian Dollars)

<u>Year</u>	<u>Cdn. Aid to India</u>	<u>% of Total Canadian Aid</u>	<u>Rank</u>
1950-60	199.52	55.2%	1st
1960-61	25.25	41.3%	1st
1961-62	25.33	47.8%	1st
1962-63	19.89	47.6%	1st
1963-64	20.07	45%	1st
1964-65	40.83	32.9%	1st
1965-66	56.97	43.9%	1st
1966-67	118.45	59.4%	1st
1967-68	90.01	43.9%	1st
1968-69	74.02	46.6%	1st
1969-70	88.61	41.6%	1st
1970-71	103.14	38.3%	1st
1971-72	101.49	35.8%	1st
1972-73	78.26	23.7%	1st
1973-74	69.28	18.8%	1st
1974-75	96.40	19.3%	1st
1975-76	98.91	18.8%	1st
1976-77	80.86	17.3%	1st
1977-78	57.16	10.5%	3rd
1978-79	31.91	5.7%	4th
1979-80	42.60	7.1%	3rd
1980-81	29.50	5.0%	4th
1981-82	37.25	5.5%	5th
1982-83	50.25	7%	3rd
1983-84	39.47	5.8%	3rd
1984-85	74.80	8.5%	2nd
1985-86	45.49	5.5%	3rd
1986-87	58.38	6%	2nd

Source- Canadian International Development Agency, CIDA Annual Reviews 1969-87, Ottawa: Government of Canada, 1969-1986-87.

India peaked at 59.4% of total Canadian assistance. While there were considerable yearly fluctuations in aid disbursements due to variations in the pace of project implementation and in India's need for food relief, in only one year over the decade of the 1960's (1964-65) did aid to India slip below 40% of world-wide disbursements. . Carty and Smith contend that a main purpose of Canadian aid has always been to replace U.S. assistance in certain countries when the latter is withdrawn as "political punishment". They thus believe that in "1969 after India had started securing military and economic support from the USSR, the Nixon administration reacted by drastically cutting its aid program to a government perceived as fickle. Canada tried to fill the gap by increasing the level of its support."³⁵⁰

While an actual increase in Canadian disbursements to India did occur from 1969-70 to 1971-72, when these figures are compared with the percentages that aid to India comprised of worldwide aid, it is clear that the absolute increases are somewhat misleading. Aid to India compared to the rest of the world actually began a steady decline at this time, dropping from 46.6% in 1968-69 to 35.8% by 1971-72. Although India continued to maintain its number one ranking and the actual dollar figures generally rose during this period, Canada clearly did not dramatically raise its aid to fill the gap of the American withdrawal. Although Carty and Smith are probably correct in assuming that Canada did have political motives during this period related to the developing Indo-Soviet ties, it is not apparent that they were as strong as the authors argue.

Canadian assistance to India in the Second Development Decade (1970-80), reflects much more dramatically the impact of the diversification of the development program that began over the preceding decade. Even though India continued to remain the top ranked recipient of ODA until 1977, the percentage that aid to India constituted of global aid

³⁵⁰ Carty and Smith, 40.

dropped from a high of 41.6% in 1969-70 to 5.7% in 1978-79. This emerging pattern, however, should not necessarily be viewed as negative in terms of Canada's development commitment to India. It simply demonstrates that Canada by this time had assumed developmental obligations worldwide as its aid bureaucracy and political and economic interests all increased. The reality is that annual disbursements to India remained high in the 1970's. Indeed, the fact that India did not suffer a major reduction in assistance following Canada's 1974 freeze of some aspects of the aid program in the face of India's nuclear explosion and the fact that India ranked lower than first on only three occasions in this period indicates that a fairly strong aid relationship continued throughout the 1970s.

Canadian ODA over the 1980's has consistently maintained the pattern of aid disbursement which was established at the end of the Second Development Decade. As a proportion of its global aid, assistance to India has ranged between 5.0% and 8.5% and although India has never regained its number one ranking, it has consistently been among the top five recipients of Canadian ODA. Once again, this more modest position that India has assumed can be explained at least in part as a result of Canada's continued wide dispersal of its assistance, and the emergence of Bangladesh as a principal recipient because of its vast and urgent needs.

Carty and Smith, however, also offer an additional explanation for the decrease in Canadian assistance to India. They believe that the "clear inability of aid programs to decisively win western allies in Asia has, over the years, made CIDA less pretentious and more cautious about its aid program. The severe embarrassment of India's explosion of a nuclear device in 1974...and India's use of both Soviet and Western aid has caused a cooling of Canada's traditional affinity for the country and a decline in its aid allocations from CIDA (1980 levels are less than half of 1976 disbursements)."³⁵¹

³⁵¹ Ibid, 47.

When aid is frozen or suspended it takes a while for the assistance for various projects "in the pipeline" to be finally cut off. It was awhile, therefore, before the effects of the 1974 explosion and the subsequent freeze on some of the Indian programs showed up in the Canadian aid figures. The deterioration in political relations is, however, apparent in the aid figures starting in 1977-78. India dropped from 17.3% of Canadian global contributions in 1976-77 to 10.5% the following year.

Further support for the notion of political considerations (different political motives in the 80's) being a factor affecting the level of aid is evident in the renewed interest that India appears to be receiving as the bilateral political relationship continues to improve in the 1980's. India, in the last three years, again appears to be receiving more attention in the Canadian ODA program. It has regained its second place ranking and in 1986-87, the percentage of total aid to that country rose to 6% from 5% in the preceding year. This increase suggests that as the political bilateral relationship has improved so to has Canada's aid contribution to India. While this increase hardly portrays the significant numbers of the early years of Canadian ODA, India's consistent top-five ranking and the large amount of absolute assistance it receives in comparison with most other countries still indicate a significant Indo-Canadian developmental relationship.

However, as important as this aid relationship appears to be, the overall Canadian effort has to be kept in perspective. The Canadian International Development Agency's response to the Winegard Committee's report on development assistance makes it clear that Canadian aid is a relatively small proportion of the total aid received by developing countries. Furthermore, the government's response also stated that eighty percent of the investment in development comes from the resources of developing countries themselves and "only twenty percent comes from external private investment, loans and official

development assistance."³⁵² Accordingly, the government said, "our expectations about what development cooperation can achieve should be realistic. Canadian efforts are a supplement to the much larger investment made by the developing countries themselves and by other countries and institutions."³⁵³

This reality of Canadian assistance is especially true when looking at India. India is "responsible for 94 percent of its own development budget. Only 6 percent is met by foreign aid, and of this amount less than 2 percent comes from CIDA."³⁵⁴ The reality of the minor overall Canadian contribution to Indian development is clear from the comparison of Canadian assistance to the total amount of aid reaching India over the period 1969-87 as set out in Figure 6. Considering that total assistance to India only accounts for 6 percent of its development budget, Canada's contribution, to the overall development effort in India is slim, indeed.

The actual significance, or perhaps insignificance, of Canadian aid to India is further made clear when aid from Canada is more closely compared with the assistance from other DAC countries. The figures presented in Table 9 point out that in the 1980's Canada has never ranked in the top five DAC contributors to India and at one point, in 1983, Canada ranked as low as ninth. Canada's sixth place ranking in 1987 was perhaps reasonable, but it was far below the five countries ahead of it in terms of absolute disbursements. The United States, the fifth ranked DAC contributor, gave India \$51 million (U.S.) more than Canada did--a difference equal to more than two thirds the value

³⁵² Canadian International Development Agency, Canadian International Development Assistance: To Benefit a Better World. Response of the government of Canada to the Report by the Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade, September 1987, (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1987), 9.

³⁵³ Ibid, 10.

³⁵⁴ Canadian International Development Agency, Canadian's in the Third World. CIDA's Year in Review 1982-83, (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1984), 54.




Table 9- Yearly DAC Bilateral Aid to India
(Millions of U.S. Dollars)

<u>Countries</u>	1969-74	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987
Australia	23.2	14.0	6.5	8.5	2.5	4.9	3.2	3.0	2.3	2.0	3.3	2.8	2.0	1.3
Austria	3.2	16.4	2.8	2.7	-8.4	8.8	2.9	1.1	-6.9	5.2	-3.8	-4.1	0.6	0.6
Belgium	12.7	24.9	-7.5	0.3	0.8	14.3	-2.4	19.9	-1.0	7.4	85.2	63.3	39.8	26.7
Canada	547.8	100.5	57.3	28.2	37.5	49.9	28.1	44.5	27.0	35.1	66.9	52.9	73.7	75.0
Denmark	24.9	4.5	7.8	13.0	21.3	17.2	25.2	23.5	22.3	42.9	30.1	23.9	38.1	41.6
Finland	0.4	--	--	-0.2	--	--	--	0.1	1.1	4.7	0.7	7.7	0.7	2.1
France	135.3	54.6	30.8	39.0	16.4	2.5	27.5	82.0	185.6	137.5	154.6	457.4	847.8	72.2
W. Germany	268.0	71.3	103.1	5.5	72.0	57.8	46.9	105.6	206.1	127.9	121.9	159.9	268.7	33.6
Ireland	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
Italy	30.3	-35.7	-19.1	33.3	-17.1	-11.7	25.3	17.9	8.0	-1.5	48.3	35.1	21.8	31.6
Japan	194.1	49.7	71.3	30.3	58.5	39.5	37.9	33.8	27.9	199.2	123.9	67.6	457.3	649.6
Netherlands	105.6	55.3	58.3	71.3	79.0	90.6	144.8	151.2	61.1	81.9	64.2	66.7	104.3	124.9
New Zealand	0.8	0.7	0.4	0.5	0.7	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.1	--	--	--	0.1	0.1
Norway	28.3	8.5	10.5	15.1	18.5	21.4	26.0	19.4	20.6	48.1	16.6	34.1	21.1	35.0
Sweden	85.6	83.4	100.9	49.2	51.4	73.1	62.3	46.6	58.1	51.1	53.3	75.1	225.4	220.1
Switzerland	24.4	12.6	0.4	13.0	-32.5	18.4	-13.6	26.3	20.2	29.9	28.3	14.7	10.2	23.5
U. Kingdom	879.6	145.4	189.2	106.6	209.8	284.6	220.6	403.1	-8.8	7.5	75.2	57.7	325.4	343.3
U. States	1588	214.0	113.0	-31.0	21.0	15.0	170.0	213.0	112.0	111.0	40.0	130.0	-110	126.0
DAC Totals	3841.8	820.1	725.9	385.1	531.5	629.0	804.9	1191.2	735.8	889.7	908.7	1245.0	2326.8	1807.4
Global Totals	5432.2	1832.2	1832.2	1048.9	1313.7	1281.8	2388.2	2341.2	2170.2	2193.6	3821.4	2506.8	3381.5	

Source- OECD, Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries,
Paris: OECD, 1979-1989.

of Canadian aid in that year. Japan, the number one DAC contributor to India, provided assistance totalling \$649.6 million (U.S.), \$574.6 million more than the aid from Canada.

In fairness to Canada, however, it should be pointed out that countries such as the United States, Japan, and the United Kingdom have more resources available to them than Canada does and, therefore, they should be expected to contribute more development assistance to countries like India. The terms of aid also need to be borne in mind and Canada's have always been generous. Loans to India up to 1986 were always at very concessional rates compared to most other donors and since 1986 Canada's assistance has been on an all-grant basis. It should also be pointed out that even though Canada has ranked as low as ninth overall it has never slipped below the half-way mark in terms of contributions from the 18-member Development Assistance Committee. However, despite these factors, it is apparent that Canada's assistance to India looks more substantial when viewed from the perspective of Canada's world-wide aid efforts than it does when seen from India's standpoint in terms of its global sources of development support.

Accompanying the above reality is the fact that there are also problems with Canada's bilateral assistance program that make it less than entirely conducive to effective Indian development. As previously mentioned, India is an interesting country economically. Although one half to two-thirds of India's population lives in extreme poverty, India is also the tenth-ranked industrial power in the world. As a result, Canada has and probably will always be tempted to use its aid to India to secure commercial advantages for itself.

It is apparent, when reviewing the evolution of Canadian bilateral aid to India, that this temptation existed long before India's emergence as an industrial power. Since the Colombo Plan's inception, the overall focus of Canadian assistance, other than food aid, has been on financing large capital projects. "Project aid is viewed favourably by donors

because they can maintain control over the use of funds. The visibility and prestige that can be attached to a particular project... are also positive attributes for the donor."³⁵⁵ Due to the tied nature of the Canadian aid program there is also the likelihood of future exports to maintain these projects, possible further development and/or expansion of existing projects, or the creation of other projects like them that might lead to commercial contracts for Canadian companies. Although there is basic agreement that this type of assistance is generally of lower economic or development value than, say, an untied program of grants to finance general imports, project financing has dominated most Canadian aid relationships.

Nowhere is this more evident than in India. Early Canadian aid projects were not only economically beneficial to both India and Canada, but were also used to promote both Canada's and the western world's perceived roles for themselves in the post-war period as the symbols of freedom and progress. "The assumption was that Asian hearts and minds could be swayed by the construction of conspicuous examples of western economic development. Canadian aid planners preferred large technically advanced and photogenic infrastructure projects to serve as both monuments of Canadian generosity and symbols of progress."³⁵⁶

The most prominent of the early, large-scale Canadian capital projects in India were related to the generation of hydro-electric power. Although early assistance also included aid in such areas as transportation (steam locomotives) and other energy sources (India's nuclear program), this discussion will focus primarily on these hydro-electric projects. One of the first of these, the Mayurakshi Dam, was the focal point and pride of early Canadian aid efforts. In an address to the Conference on Canadian Aid to Underdeveloped

³⁵⁵ Roger Young, "Canadian foreign aid: Facing a crisis of its own?", *Journal of Canadian Studies*, Winter, 1984-85, 34-35.

³⁵⁶ Carty and Smith, 46.

Countries in Ottawa in May of 1955, Escott Reid, then the High Commissioner to India, emphatically praised the project as an example of the positive benefits of Canadian aid and project financing. He stated that the Canadian government "gave the Indian government fifteen million dollars of wheat. The Indian government sold the wheat to Indian consumers. With the rupees it got for the wheat it paid Santal villagers and missionary workers from Madras and engineers from Calcutta to build the Mayurakshi Dam." When the dam was finished, he said, it would "irrigate 600,000 acres of land and increase the rice crops on this land by hundreds of thousands of tons a year. This is the magical process by which Canadian wheat is turned into Indian rice."³⁵⁷ Nik Cavell, in another address to the same conference, also praised the Mayurakshi project and stated at that time that it would be a major contribution to meeting the annual Indian food shortage. Canada, he said, "will supply the electrical generating equipment which will be used largely for electricity for cottage industries, the objective being to give employment to the cultivators during the relatively long periods when owing to the heavy monsoon rains, they cannot work their land."³⁵⁸

Although these projects, according to Canadian statements, could do nothing but positive things for long-term Indian development, the reality is that project assistance of this kind is usually inefficient both in terms of actual construction time and in meeting the initial objectives of the assistance. A classic example of some of the drawbacks to project financing can be seen with the construction of the Idikki Dam project in Kerala, which began in 1964 and was to be completed by 1973. The plan was to build a 560 foot arch dam, which was to be the tallest in Asia and was also to have an underground power-house

³⁵⁷ Escott Reid, "India's Development Programme," Conference on Canadian Aid to Underdeveloped Countries, May 27-28, 1955, (Ottawa: United Nations Association on Canada, 1955), 17.

³⁵⁸ Nik Cavell, "Address by Mr. Nik Cavell, Canadian administrator for the Colombo Plan", Conference on Canadian Aid to Underdeveloped Countries- May 27-28, 1955, (Ottawa: United Nations Association in Canada, 1955), 9.

with a capacity of 70 megawatts. However, as Clyde Sanger makes clear in his observations on the project, Canadian workers encountered problems from the outset. Besides obvious factors such as having to resettle the population that the dam displaced, early difficulties encountered included a delay in setting up the project, questionable use of the financing by the Indian government and problems in terms of tendering Canadian bids for project assistance due to the tied nature of the aid. Sanger points out that:

it took a year longer than expected to get the loan agreement signed between Ottawa and Delhi. The Canadian aid amounted to about forty-seven million dollars, of which nearly half was a 'counterpart' fund which Delhi had accumulated by selling Canadian wheat. All this money was in the form of either an interest free loan or a grant, as far as the Indian government was concerned. But Delhi handed the money on to Kerala State as a commercial loan, exacting interest up to six percent. ... The Kerala authorities had understandably taken their time about ordering equipment and materials which were, to them, expensive. There [were also] delays in getting some of the heavy equipment from Canada, and they were not sent with adequate spares because a maker who provided enough spare parts would have priced himself out of the tendering.³⁵⁹

Clearly, these problems detracted from the effectiveness of a project of this type. Focussing on capital aid projects also raises questions about the contribution of Canadian aid to meeting the needs of India's most disadvantaged peoples. While these hydro-electric projects have likely contributed to the overall development of India's industrial base, it is questionable as to how much they have contributed to solving the problem of the rural poor in the country. The fact that half to two-thirds of the population still lives in extreme poverty would suggest that little has been accomplished in terms of dealing with this predicament.

Despite this fact, the Mayurakshi, Idikki and still later the Kundah projects remained the focus of CIDA's project aid for many years. Even following CIDA's

³⁵⁹ Sanger, *Half a Loaf*, 82.

establishment of its 1975 development strategy, which went out of its way to emphasize rural assistance, these projects, although not mentioned by name, were defended as a way of dealing with the dualistic nature of India's economic situation. While this may be true, there can be no doubt that the long-term commitment to Idikki, and the even longer odyssey that occurred with the Kundah project (first started in 1955), have placed a substantial strain on Canada's overall assistance program in India. A clear example of this is the fact that in 1985-86, according to the CIDA review of that year, the Idikki project received \$59 million for the completion of an expansion program, although this was twenty years after the start of the original project. Arguably, more effective, efficient and appropriate forms of assistance to India could have been implemented.

In defence of Canadian project assistance, however, it should be recognized that this concentration of aid was partly due to India's early emphasis on its own industrialization. It should also be recognized that Canada has contributed a reasonable proportion of its aid to trying to deal with India's rural poor problem, especially in recent years. Canada had always had a tradition of large food aid contributions to India, but by the late 1960s it was realized that more attention needed to be given to increasing India's agricultural production so that wasteful food imports would not be required in the future.

One of the first steps in this direction was the Dean Bentley task force commissioned by CIDA in 1967. The task force was set up by Maurice Strong, the President of CIDA, who thought that there were several areas in which Canadian technology could be of assistance in addressing the long-term agricultural problems of India. There were some early misunderstandings, however, with Indian officials who felt that perhaps the task force was interpreting its role too widely. "The Johnson administration had tied American aid to broad changes, had used (and for periods withheld) shipments of PL480 wheat as a lever to extract performances from Indian agriculture in a

manner that was resented in Delhi. Some officials thought that Canada was trying to copy this approach, on a very minor scale."³⁶⁰

Despite these early problems, however, the task force was successful in determining two areas of Canadian expertise which were seen as particularly useful by the Indian government. Due to the fact that only one-fifth of Indian land was irrigated, the task force recommended that Canada contribute in the areas of dry-farming and hydro-geology in order to rectify this problem and complement the improved seed yields that had taken place. The group's final report also made it clear that "Canada could make significant contributions in higher agricultural education and technical and trades training, including food technology; in irrigation and land development schemes; in the provision of fertilizer and fertilizer components; in support for food technology and research, and through participation in plans to improve standards of nutrition."³⁶¹

One area in which Canada subsequently contributed a great deal of assistance was in meeting India's need for fertilizers. Although after 1965 there was an impressive increase in India's own production of fertilizers, in 1968 nearly three-quarters of the country's fertilizer requirement was still imported at an annual cost of \$260 million.³⁶² This was because, due to power shortages, delays in importing raw materials and government controls on marketing, India's existing plants were only operating at half of their potential capacity.

Although the best approach would have been for Canada to have tried to get these plants operating at 100 percent, fertilizers and other forms of infrastructural agricultural assistance slowly began to replace food aid as the centrepiece of Canadian development

³⁶⁰ Ibid, §7.

³⁶¹ Canadian International Development Agency, CIDA Annual Review 1967-68, (Ottawa; Queen's Printer and Controller of Stationary, 1968), 13.

³⁶² Figures taken from Sanger, Half a Loaf, 90.

efforts for the rural poor. This new focus was apparent in the 1973-74 CIDA Annual Review. The review pointed out that India, in its fourth and fifth five year plans (1969-74 and 1974-79), had placed much more attention on agriculture than on industrialization which had been the focus of its plans in the past. The review, in addressing the problem of India's rural poor, stated that development of this sector was crucial "because over two-thirds of India's 566 million people live directly from the land and agricultural assistance can most immediately benefit the very poorest among the population."³⁶³ The review also stated that Canada's agricultural assistance would take the form of loan arrangements to buy Canadian fertilizers, a continuation of the dryland farming research first proposed in the Bentley task force, the development of a number of Canadian bakeries in Bhubaneswar and Indore, and assistance in constructing port facilities for New Delhi's new harbour project. In terms of food aid, it was pointed out that relative self-sufficiency in foodgrains had been achieved in 1972, and food aid, which had been the largest component of Canada's assistance to India, began to taper off. In 1973-74, for example, \$15 million worth of rapeseed grain and oil was supplied, compared to \$41 million of food in 1971-72.³⁶⁴

This new emphasis on agricultural assistance in Canadian ODA to India was also part of a more general trend occurring in CIDA during this period. Throughout the Second Development Decade, the emerging pattern had been a focus away from the mega-projects of past assistance to concentrate more on the problems of the rural poor. After all, as Sanger points out, such aid is less exciting "but it is a reflection of maturity. If hydro-

³⁶³ Canadian International Development Agency, Annual Review 1973-74, (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1974), 13.

³⁶⁴ Figures taken from CIDA, Annual Review 1973-74.

electric dams are the diamonds of the springtime, this other stuff is the housekeeping of the summer."³⁶⁵

This theme of commitment to the rural poor has also been apparent in CIDA reviews of the 1980's,³⁶⁶ although at the same time, as indicated earlier, there has been a general flattening out of the overall Canadian aid effort in India. In the 1980's the traditional forms of agricultural assistance to India, like the provision of fertilizers, have been accompanied by an emergence of several new approaches to this problem. One of them has been attempts by CIDA to raise the incomes of small farmers so that they can afford to buy the food they so desperately need. To try to accomplish this, CIDA has been providing Canadian canola oil (a staple of the Indian diet) and then using the money from the sale of the oil to promote the creation of small growers cooperatives. Extension services and fertilizers are also provided to the cooperatives and oil processing facilities are being modernized. "As more cooperatives are established and oil seed production increases, more jobs will be created in the rural sector, farm incomes will increase and food imports will drop."³⁶⁷

The canola oil efforts have been accompanied by an attempt to deal with the energy requirements of the rural poor by implementing a biogas program which would produce methane as a by-product of burning the waste of human beings or animals. As the 1982-83 review points out, unlike kerosene, "biogas has a number of benefits that increase its value. The residue left over from the process is called 'slurry' and can be used as a fertilizer, a commodity in scarce supply....It also has the health benefit of disposing of waste in a sanitary way."³⁶⁸ To further aid in the implementation of this project, CIDA has also

³⁶⁵ Sanger, *Half a Loaf*, 80.

³⁶⁶ Canadian International Development Agency, *Canada in the Third World. CIDA's Year in Review 1981-82*, (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services), 33.

³⁶⁷ *Ibid*, 36.

³⁶⁸ Canadian International Development Agency, *Annual Review 1982-83*, 54.

entered into an agreement with local Indian masons to train them in the construction of the units used to produce the biogas.

The canola and biogas projects are just two of several projects that are aimed at improving the way of life of the most impoverished of India's citizens. Still other projects include efforts at reforestation, land reclamation and resettlement. As impressive as these projects appear to be, however, it has to be remembered that they represent only a very small percentage of overall Canadian ODA to India. Further, as Carty and Smith point out, recent annual reports suggest "a return to traditional, large scale infrastructure projects in the hydro-electric, transportation and resource development fields."³⁶⁹ A clear indication of this focus was in the 1985-86 CIDA Annual Review. Although the traditional discussion on aid to the rural poor was included, the energy sector received the majority of the attention in the report. Not only did this include continued assistance for the refurbishment and expansion of the Idikki project, lines of credit for goods and materials in the oil and gas sectors and spare parts for hydro-electric equipment, but there was also the announcement of a significant new joint program between CIDA and the Export Development Corporation. The review stated that CIDA was going to cooperate with the EDC in the construction of a 540 megawatt hydro-electric power station in northwest India, with CIDA providing \$217 million and the EDC \$403 million of the required funds.³⁷⁰

Although this project will likely help the Indian industrial sector, it is questionable how much benefit it will be to the rural poor. It is also a good example of the pressures placed on the Canadian government by the country's business sector which wants Canada to compete with the European credit-mixte approach to aid financing. Therefore, even though Canadian ODA to India is to some degree still directed toward those who need it

³⁶⁹ Carty and Smith, 48.

³⁷⁰ Figures taken from Canadian International Development Agency, Annual Report 1985-86, (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1986), 40.

most, it appears as if a shift away from the somewhat greater focus on the rural poor of the Second Development Decade may be occurring. The Mulroney government's emphasis on securing new markets of potential commercial benefit to Canada will also do little to change this emerging trend. Inevitably, therefore, many of the problems that have plagued Canadian aid efforts in the past will continue in the future.

One other aspect of the Canada-India developmental relationship deserves brief mention and that is the extent to which Canada has impeded Indian development through the acceptance of Indian immigrants with skills important to the developmental process.

When discussing the "brain drain" issue, most authors focus on foreign students who are educated in Canada and then decide not to return to their country of origin. As Clyde Sanger points out, the temptations for students to stay in Canada are enormous. "They have gone through a course of studies devised for North American life, they have seen the opportunities and the living standards here, and they have made a number of contacts. Even if they do return to their home region as they are bonded to do, they are quite likely to be disoriented and may soon decide to emigrate back to Canada."³⁷¹ This focus on the "brain drain" of students is, however, too narrow, for it does not take into account those who emigrate to Canada, taking with them skills they developed in their countries of origin in the Third World. Therefore, the best way to measure effectively the import of this phenomenon is to look at the numbers of immigrants coming to Canada from India within various occupational categories. Doing this should provide a good indication of whether or not Canada is draining off the Indian elites that are necessary for the development and successful functioning of Indian society.

Sanger, in his discussion of the "brain drain" issue, stated that accurate statistics for measuring this problem were not readily available, but it was his assumption that elites

³⁷¹ Clyde Sanger, "Canada and development in the Third World", in Canada and the Third World, 291.

Table 10- Indian and Global Emigration to Canada
Country of Last Permanent Residence for Elite and Other Immigrants Based on
Occupation*

	1965	1970	1975	1980	1984	1985	1986
<u>India</u>							
Elite	667	1131	776	237	128	110	168
Others	1574	4539	9368	8246	5374	3918	6772
Total	2241	5670	10,144	8483	5502	4028	6940
Percentage of Elite Immigrants	29.7%	19.9%	7.6%	2.7%	2.3%	2.7%	2.4%
<u>Global</u>							
Elite	18,382	25,507	25,700	15,092	11,856	9432	11,723
Others	128,376	122,206	162,181	128,025	76,383	74,879	87,496
Total	146,758	147,713	187,881	143,117	88,239	84,302	99,219
Percentage of Elite Immigrants	12.5%	17.26%	13.6%	10.5%	13.4%	11.18%	11.8%

Source- Employment and Immigration Canada/ Manpower and Immigration
Canada, Immigration Statistics (1965-86), Ottawa: Ministry of
Supply and Services, (Various Years).

* For details of how the figures for elite immigrants were determined, see footnote 27.

from third world countries made up close to 15% of overall Canadian immigration.³⁷² If the sample of years in Table 10 is an accurate indication of overall elite immigration, it would appear that Sanger's assumption was relatively accurate. The average percentage of global elite immigrants for the years sampled was 12.89% and although this is a world total, it is quite possible that it is a good indication of Third World patterns as well. The most significant aspect of Table 10, however, is the breakdown of Indian immigrants in the sample years. The percentage of elites among Indian immigrants has dropped from an astounding 29.7% in 1965 to 2.4% in 1986. In fact, the average percentage of elite immigrants since 1980 has been only 2.5%, well below the global totals for this same period. Therefore, although the 1965 and 1970 figures were above the global percentages and likely represented a significant drain of elites from India, the pattern in recent years suggests that there is little or no "brain drain" occurring in terms of Indian emigration to Canada.³⁷³

The make-up of Canadian immigration from India during the contemporary period has consisted mainly of spouses, children and other dependents. Thus, as the emphasis of Canadian immigration policy has shifted away from a focus on the point system of the past (which worked to the advantage of skilled immigrants) toward a stronger emphasis on "sponsored" immigrants, the brain drain problem of the past has dissipated. Canada no longer seems to be draining off the large number of skilled elites that are necessary to

³⁷² Statistics taken from Sanger, "Canada and development in the Third World".

³⁷³ Immigration information was taken from statistics compiled by Manpower and Immigration Canada. Elite occupation headings shifted in the amount of detail listed in various years consulted. 1965 and 1970 elite categories were confined to Managerial/Administrative and Professional. Immigrants classified as Clerical etc. were not included in Table 9 as elites due to the assumption that elites in these fields were listed under one of the two preceding listings. 1975-86 elite categories reported were more extensive, including: Entrepreneurs, Managerial/Administrative, Sciences/Engineering, Math, Social Sciences, Religion, Teaching, Medicine and Health, Performing Arts/Literature and Sports and Recreation. "Others" in all periods include spouses and other dependents as well as immigrants destined for the general labour force.

India's development. Given the problems that exist in other aspects of Canada's developmental relationship with India, this is a refreshing discovery.

Chapter VIII

Conclusion

India is undoubtedly a country of major global importance politically and economically. Donald C. Rowat once wrote that if "India can solve her pressing economic and social programs... she will easily rank with the United States as the most powerful democratic influence in the world. The fate of the experiment in India may well determine the fate of democracy the world over."³⁷⁴ Although this comment was made in 1950, it reflects the political importance of India in both past and present world affairs. Economically, the dualistic nature of India's society also makes it a country of global prominence. As Richard Gwyn recently noted, India's "disparities in wealth are the widest and the cruellest in the world, from the owners of \$250, 000 Mercedes-Benzes in Bombay, New Delhi and Calcutta to not merely grinding poverty but to obscene destitution of beggars deliberately deformed by their parents to improve their qualifications for their lifelong 'job'."³⁷⁵ Developmentally, the wealthy Western states have an obligation to alleviate this suffering of the poor of India. At the same time, commercially, they are naturally interested in the potential market that India provides as one of the world's major industrial powers. This political and economic importance of India globally provides the

³⁷⁴ Donald C. Rowat, "India, the making of a nation", International Journal, Spring 1950, 95.

³⁷⁵ Richard Gwyn, "A nice man in an un-nice land, Gandhi the reluctant leader", The Toronto Star, Saturday February 25, 1989, A-9.

justification for the focus in this study specifically on Canada-India relations in their entirety.

In terms of the political aspect of the bilateral relationship, several specific conclusions can be made as a result of the material presented in this study. First of all, it is clear that this relationship can be periodized in terms of positive and negative eras. Second, it is also clear that the differing stages of this bilateral interaction directly relate to the changing foreign policy objectives of both countries. In period one there was a strong level of cooperation between these two countries but there is no evidence of a "special relationship" between them at this or any other point in the bilateral relationship. As this study has made clear, the cordiality of relations between India and Canada was strongest when the foreign policy interests and objectives of both countries coincided. When these interests diverged, so, too, did India-Canada relations. Overall, it is the contention of this study that the Indo-Canadian bilateral relationship has been an example of two nation states acting pragmatically on the basis of their own self-interests. Therefore, the relationship has been a series of ad hoc responses by both India and Canada, and has not represented a planned "special relationship" at any point in its existence.

The emergence of the closer relations that have developed in the contemporary period can also be explained in terms of the shifting foci of both countries' foreign policies. Indian goals have been driven by domestic and international security concerns regarding the Sikh community and also by the hope that the imbalance of trade that exists between India and Canada can be addressed. Canada has also been driven by domestic security concerns regarding the Sikh terrorist threat and by its desire to maintain and develop its economic relationship with this country. The new closeness has also been reinforced by the beginning of an apparent super power withdrawal from the region (eg. from Afghanistan). Although the present global situation has not provided the same atmosphere that allowed Canadian and Indian internationalism to thrive as it did in the 1950's, it is still a much more conducive environment than in the recent past for strong bilateral relations. That is

especially so if the tentative signs of renewed internationalism on the part of both countries, as indicated in their cooperative roles in the Commonwealth in the 1980's, are sustained. It would appear, then, that the Indo-Canadian political relationship has the potential to continue to improve in the future.

When looking at the Indo-Canadian bilateral economic relationship, it is also clear that Canada has had an active interaction with India on this level throughout the history of relations between these two countries. Commercially, Canada has recognized the potential of the Asian and Indian markets and is actively pursuing closer business ties with this region. In terms of development, Canada has also had a traditional interest in terms of providing assistance to India. Therefore, due to Canada's emphasis on these matters, it would appear on the surface that Canada and India have shared a strong, two-way, mutually beneficial economic relationship. However, from the evidence that has been presented here, it is clear that the bilateral economic ties, when looked at in the context of each countries' global economic relations, have been only marginal.

Commercially, although Canada appears to be enjoying a positive relationship at this time due to the favorable balance of trade that it enjoys with India, there are a number of factors that appear to point to a shift occurring in these relations. India's balance of finished versus unfinished exports to Canada, the decline of Canada's trade surplus with India, and the fact that Canadian trade figures are "padded" by its contributions under the aid program all appear to point to a bilateral commercial relationship that is becoming of greater value to India than Canada. Furthermore, if the Mulroney government follows through on its calls for further trade liberalization, India may stand to derive more substantial benefits from the trade relationship in the future. Canada has thus failed to achieve its goals set out in the 1970 foreign policy review in so far as India is concerned because it is not proving to be a significant surplus market for offsetting deficits elsewhere in the world, nor a major outlet for the export of finished Canadian goods.

In terms of the development aspect of this bilateral economic relationship, it is clear that Canada's perceptions of both its size and its effectiveness have been over-estimated. When Canada's contribution to India's development is compared with the efforts of India itself, and those of other industrialized states, it is clear that Canada's overall importance to Indian development has been relatively insignificant. Further, the focus of Canadian ODA on large projects, due to such factors as Canada's continued tying of aid, means that while Canada may have helped in the development of India's industrial base, it has clearly done little to contribute to the rural poor of India who need the government's assistance the most. Thus, although India remains a leading recipient of Canadian aid, the fact that it is not going to those who need it most detracts from the human development importance of Canada's efforts. While it is true that some aid is better than no aid, Canada could contribute much more to overall Indian development if it focussed its efforts on India's poorest citizens. Why waste large percentages of total Canadian aid on financing major capital projects that tend to take years to complete and that are continual drains on yearly aid contributions when half to two-thirds of the population still lives in extreme poverty? Canada should let the larger DAC contributors get involved in these traditional projects, for barring any dramatic increase in its assistance the best way for Canada to raise the significance of its aid would be to concentrate on the rural poor.

The possibilities of this happening, however, are slim to none. Due to factors like the tied nature of Canadian aid, the pressure from Canadian business to combine CIDA and EDC funds in attractive financial packages to enable Canadian firms to compete with their European, American and Japanese counterparts for contracts for capital projects, and the ever-increasing commercial focus that Canada has placed on the region, such an outcome seems unlikely. Ultimately, therefore, Canada's aid program is likely to see a continuation of the problems that have plagued Canada's ODA since its inception.

It is clear from this discussion that Canada's economic bilateral relationship with India has been dominated by commercial rather than developmental motives. Regardless of

the repeated claims of the Canadian government that it would attempt to overcome the commercial temptations in dealing with countries like India, it is apparent that there has been little or no success in achieving this goal. What makes this even more depressing is that the commercial benefits that Canada derives from its relations with India are insignificant. While it is not surprising that Canada, much like in its political relationship with India, pragmatically pursues economic goals that it views as furthering its national self-interest, it could at least be hoped that in this process Canada would make a meaningful contribution to Indian economic development, since that would, after all, be mutually beneficial in the long term.

In sum, for the most part, Canada-India economic relations are (and have been) relatively unimportant. That being the case, either the Canadian government should alter its rhetoric to better reflect this existing state of affairs or it should take dramatic steps to address the shortcomings on every level. Hopefully, for the sake of Canadian commercial interests and Indian developmental needs, the latter approach will emerge.

Clearly, given the important political and developmental relations that Canada has had with India and the potential for the emergence of significant commercial ties, it is imperative that Canada learn as much as possible about this dynamic South Asian country. Hopefully, this research has helped to fill some of the gaps in the literature and has provided useful insights into the nature of this varied relationship. However, further work remains to be done on specific subjects in order for Canadians to develop the depth of understanding of the relationship that its diversity and complexity necessitates.

Appendix 1--Yearly Canadian Government-to-Government Aid to all Countries
(Millions of Canadian Dollars)

	50-60	60-70	70-75	75-76	76-77	77-78	78-79	79-80	80-81	81-82	82-83	83-84	84-85	85-86	86-87
Countries															
AFRICA:															
Anglophone															
Africa:															
Angola	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	.03	--	.03	.02	.10	.08	--
Botswana	--	--	35.39	1.84	1.61	2.89	2.40	3.56	2.92	3.81	3.99	5.11	6.55	4.21	10.62
Djibouti	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	.03	.03	.01	.03	--	.09	.05	--
Egypt	--	--	--	--	9.87	6.39	.31	27.78	22.11	27.32	24.40	11.26	7.16	6.43	5.42
Ethiopia	--	.10	8.65	.90	.54	.48	.82	2.09	5.19	10.66	11.37	12.26	13.83	14.22	18.48
Ghana	--	21.24	49.05	17.63	12.34	14.35	17.76	17.97	14.09	11.28	8.19	12.06	16.53	14.37	19.23
Kenya	--	8.71	18.23	6.48	9.34	9.49	6.64	12.78	17.10	46.04	41.52	19.12	29.69	22.42	24.73
Lesotho	--	--	.95	2.70	3.11	6.35	3.65	7.02	3.84	4.65	3.17	2.31	2.90	2.19	2.71
Liberia	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	.04	.02	.01	.01	.04
Malawi	--	--	10.87	14.91	3.57	18.65	15.80	15.96	6.50	11.10	9.59	8.33	3.46	2.03	6.05
Mauritius	--	--	.42	.09	.22	.15	.22	.24	.09	.25	.17	.13	.19	.38	.28
Mozambique	--	--	--	--	2.81	2.03	2.60	.06	2.63	5.59	5.62	5.65	10.14	.18	5.19
Namibia	--	--	.10	.01	.02	.02	.01	.02	.01	.02	.02	.01	.06	.05	.05
Nigeria	--	31.73	67.32	13.95	8.14	2.86	1.69	.56	.54	.25	.13	-.66	-.18	.23	-3.71
Seychelles	--	--	--	--	.04	.09	.10	.05	.04	.06	.08	.10	.15	.12	.15
Sierra Leone	--	--	.60	.06	.03	.04	.23	.37	.39	.14	.02	.04	.11	.11	.13
Somalia	--	--	.99	.39	4.06	.01	--	.02	2.87	4.82	.43	.10	.20	.06	.26
South Africa	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	.09	.15	.30	.43	.70
Sudan	--	--	--	.01	.05	.49	.82	2.40	1.67	7.35	17.67	12.91	10.68	19.0	15.08
Swaziland	--	--	1.07	.54	1.48	1.80	1.99	1.69	1.26	.95	1.23	1.64	3.08	3.05	2.06
Tanzania	--	13.49	71.38	24.38	14.75	24.99	32.98	27.64	29.20	25.66	30.46	30.05	40.75	24.29	43.98
Uganda	--	5.36	6.55	.75	.57	.56	.29	.27	.98	2.41	.44	5.62	2.49	.76	2.20
Zambia	--	--	11.13	6.59	11.85	6.93	18.06	15.98	6.85	10.93	20.39	14.43	21.99	18.02	17.87
Zimbabwe ¹	--	--	.26	--	--	.05	.04	.04	5.55	7.06	8.02	5.30	14.24	15.72	11.61
Others	--	*12.51	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
TOTAL	--	93.1	202.71	107.88	84.3	98.6	106.4	137.95	125.36	181.47	187.7	146.7	195.0	159.62	218.12

Francophone															
Africa															
Algeria	--	9.28	27.48	10.71	6.51	3.21	.80	.88	.76	1.07	4.93	24.46	5.60	5.77	-39
Benin ²	--	--	11.25	6.35	4.16	3.44	2.73	5.03	4.71	4.61	3.78	.91	1.50	.41	.20
Brk. - Faso ³	--	--	7.06	.83	1.89	1.65	3.64	18.09	9.13	10.25	9.31	5.28	8.22	14.48	13.48
Burundi	--	--	.85	.10	.09	.04	--	.03	.10	.35	.35	.36	1.02	1.15	.73
Cameroon	--	7.94	20.84	11.05	6.98	12.15	16.25	15.29	20.16	18.34	13.79	9.08	29.96	13.20	14.73
Cape Verde	--	--	--	--	--	.99	.03	.02	.04	.28	.33	.30	.39	.25	.35
Ctl. Afr. Rep.	--	--	.61	.06	.08	.12	.09	.02	.05	.15	.10	.19	.13	.15	.19
Chad	--	--	5.13	.02	1.25	3.21	.35	.20	.021	.35	.32	2.21	.13	.18	.34
Comoros	--	--	--	--	--	.05	--	.01	.03	.03	.03	.02	.08	--	.06
Congo	--	--	5.0	6.46	2.91	2.60	2.70	1.62	3.64	1.49	1.42	1.70	.95	.74	.38
Cote-d'Ivoire ⁴	--	1.77	19.29	4.83	7.04	6.60	15.13	16.99	4.62	5.27	3.43	4.32	15.23	12.96	12.41
Eqtl. Guinea	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	.03	.07	.07	.09	.05	.14
Gabon	--	--	2.06	1.21	1.08	.95	.59	.29	.26	.42	.71	1.30	.69	3.01	4.59
Gambia	--	--	.02	--	.04	3.22	.10	.03	.04	.22	.22	.24	.33	.15	.26
Guinea	--	--	.60	.07	.74	.11	.16	.05	.05	.34	.49	2.84	15.15	7.41	4.86
G.-Bissau	--	--	--	--	--	.02	.05	.03	.05	.17	.33	.35	.39	.21	.34
Libya	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Madagascar	--	--	--	--	.65	2.01	2.99	3.65	11.58	4.33	1.76	1.05	.54	.21	.35
Mali	--	--	9.88	3.95	2.87	4.65	5.08	12.79	16.91	12.11	7.93	6.10	11.58	16.4	25.03
Mauritania	--	--	5.2	.70	2.61	6.07	1.25	.72	1.75	2.24	2.38	3.63	4.39	5.04	.33
Morocco	--	5.21	23.94	3.45	3.22	5.59	4.01	2.58	4.20	7.17	4.68	2.35	8.07	1.94	2.56
Niger	--	2.72	43.49	17.38	9.69	3.71	4.07	4.08	3.78	5.26	7.75	6.73	20.92	26.37	27.69
Rwanda	--	4.3	9.64	4.07	7.35	8.54	6.56	5.84	6.25	8.06	11.44	12.28	14.45	11.81	6.52
Sao Tome & Principe	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	.05	.11	--	.04	--	--
Senegal	--	5.15	5.01	5.31	7.10	9.60	9.57	8.76	16.08	13.41	15.28	15.38	17.06	20.58	29.62
Togo	--	--	8.31	1.96	1.60	1.77	5.01	9.17	.31	-.07	.18	.25	3.09	10.54	6.33
Tunisia	--	16.07	49.79	16.42	14.44	6.92	23.21	10.87	12.20	9.22	10.69	5.77	5.74	-2.43	5.18
Zaire ⁵	--	2.5	12.49	4.28	2.71	3.87	8.73	8.18	9.70	14.49	20.62	15.07	21.80	15.49	23.78
Malagasy	--	--	2.58	.48	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Others	--	*7.9	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
TOTAL	--	N/A	299.1	104.9	--	--	--	147.72	149.07	133.3	144.83	137.6	195.82	176.09	198.99
TOTAL AFRICA	--	62.84	609.38	213.8	180.62	203.92	238.66	285.67	274.43	314.78	332.5	284.3	390.89	335.71	417.12

<u>Americas</u>															
Anguila	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Antigua	--	2.42	.40	--	--	1.01	3.63	2.06	--	1.90	4.32	--	.10	.88	.57
Argentina	--	.76	--	--	--	--	--	-.02	--	-.02	-.02	--	.69	1.15	.54
Bahamas	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	-.02	.02	.08
Barbados	--	7.26	2.14	--	--	1.49	4.62	4.61	--	2.16	2.27	--	2.01	5.12	.36
Belize ⁶	--	19.69	3.38	1.46	--	1.06	2.63	6.19	--	3.77	.58	--	1.43	3.85	7.58
Bermuda	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Bolivia	--	1.55	.21	--	--	.05	.09	1.77	--	1.01	.97	--	3.84	.85	6.11
Brazil	--	8.75	2.7	--	--	2.78	2.06	2.01	--	2.39	2.30	--	1.05	5.32	3.09
Cayman Isls.	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	.10	--	--
Chile	--	7.66	.08	--	--	--	--	-.24	--	-.25	-.30	--	-.18	-.18	-.13
Colombia	--	19.05	2.11	--	--	4.05	5.77	8.83	--	7.11	4.67	--	3.28	3.82	6.81
Costa Rica	--	.20	.14	--	--	.04	.20	.16	--	.17	.14	--	.35	3.23	4.82
Cuba	--	.91	3.68	--	--	4.26	4.52	1.06	--	--	-.02	--	-.44	-.01	--
Dominica	--	3.58	.41	--	--	.43	1.75	.34	--	1.95	.43	--	2.68	9.26	1.94
Dom. Rep.	--	3.87	1.81	--	--	1.63	.09	.03	--	.34	.71	--	3.27	.88	.14
Ecuador	--	6.3	3.35	--	--	.87	.50	.45	--	.30	.07	--	.08	-.09	-.01
El Salvador	--	5.27	2.07	--	--	.72	.32	.63	--	1.37	2.66	--	.54	.51	6.29
Grenada	--	2.09	1.18	--	--	1.82	.59	.29	--	.07	.07	--	1.58	3.51	5.69
Guatemala	--	--	.21	--	--	3.32	1.48	1.88	--	4.61	2.94	--	1.33	.86	.41
Guyana	--	13.09	14.98	2.33	--	2.21	1.80	4.83	--	5.95	4.96	--	2.72	1.54	3.44
Haiti	--	1.49	2.90	--	--	4.33	6.68	10.97	--	7.59	7.38	--	5.75	4.44	10.51
Honduras	--	3.19	1.44	--	--	.44	1.79	9.88	--	4.62	3.68	--	3.25	1.97	1.78
Jamaica	--	18.98	17.53	3.43	--	3.57	13.61	9.34	--	7.76	6.21	--	17.73	26.11	28.22
Mexico	--	1.01	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	1.25	2.44
Montserrat	--	2.59	.61	--	--	.13	.25	.32	--	.28	.33	--	.17	.14	.53
N.-Antilles	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Nicaragua	--	1.45	.13	--	--	.57	.40	--	--	.20	.20	--	4.65	6.61	3.83
Panama	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	.04	--	.15	.18	.15
Paraguay	--	.14	--	--	--	--	--	-.02	--	-.02	-.02	--	-.02	.01	.05
Peru	--	2.49	2.51	--	--	2.91	8.67	4.30	--	4.02	2.69	--	4.66	11.77	22.21
St. Kitts	--	1.74	.26	--	--	.13	.21	.18	--	1.50	1.09	--	.66	1.13	.74

St. Lucia	--	--	9.07	1.39	1.93	1.25	.39	.24	.51	.52	.59	1.41	2.20	.65	2.26
St. Vin. & Grenadines	--	--	3.07	1.26	.89	.66	.26	.12	.46	.29	.25	.25	.35	2.45	6.07
Surinam	--	--	--	--	--	--	.03	.01	--	.22	.05	--	--	--	--
Trin. & Tobago	--	17.1	4.47	1.80	.69	--	.47	-.09	.31	.32	.77	-.04	-.29	-.88	-.31
Turks & Caicos	--	--	--	--	--	.02	.03	.02	.03	.10	.10	.10	.10	.07	.10
Uruguay	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	.05	.05	.10
Venezuela	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Virgin Isls.	--	--	--	--	--	--	.01	.02	.05	.10	.10	.10	--	.01	.18
Lewd. & Wndwd	--	7.2	3.96	3.42	4.24	3.73	2.48	3.01	2.03	2.30	4.27	3.81	4.15	--	--
Other	--	*43.0	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
TOTAL	--	N/A	147.82	48.9	48.03	71.81	80.92	66.18	52.16	73.33	57.76	97.38	127.92	116.38	153.03

Asia

Afghanistan	--	--	6.01	.40	.25	2.92	4.22	6.62	1.09	.04	--	--	--	--	--
Bahrain	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Bangladesh ⁷	--	--	181.31	29.48	37.27	72.10	71.79	65.18	74.40	77.87	97.77	107.31	103.2	100.11	124.58
Bhutan	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	.05	--	.09	.10
Brunei	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Burma	2.03	12.38	9.46	.70	2.87	5.46	3.77	6.33	2.68	2.94	2.39	1.53	.74	2.24	.89
China	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	4.00	.02	.09	8.37	15.46	27.04
Hong Kong	--	--	.04	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
India	199.52	559.43	448.57	98.91	80.86	57.16	31.91	42.60	29.50	37.25	50.25	39.47	74.80	45.49	58.38
Indonesia	2.37	5.9	63.43	36.70	22.43	13.19	12.72	11.75	17.95	27.38	28.84	22.94	33.83	74.94	42.00
Iran	--	--	.02	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Iraq	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Israel	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Jordan	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	.03	.10	--	.15	.30	.25	.40
Kampuchea ⁸	398	2.21	1.06	.03	.01	-.02	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Korea	--	.024	2.67	.01	.03	-.04	-.01	-.04	-.04	-.04	-.04	-.04	-.02	-.07	-.04
North Korea	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Kuwait	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Laos	--	.61	1.07	.18	2.59	-.01	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Lebanon	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	.06	.35	.35	.35	.96	.67	.25
Macao	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

Malaysia	2.44	21.19	12.71	1.48	1.59	2.97	2.36	1.75	2.2	.58	.01	-.20	.78	1.00	1.83
Maldives	--	--	.01	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	.02	--	.02	.03
Mongolia	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Nepal	--	--	3.06	.21	.55	2.56	3.37	6.74	5.28	6.85	7.46	7.88	8.17	7.28	8.32
Oman	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Pakistan	114.8	206.44	146.3*	63.94	62.65	68.85	60.91	67.17	38.15	50.30	64.60	50.79	59.56	66.67	44.71
Philippines	--	--	.15	.07	1.29	2.84	.33	.37	.24	.40	.66	.67	.70	.51	9.71
Qatar	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Saudi Arabia	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Singapore	.144	.27	2.29	.10	.05	--	--	--	--	.02	.02	.02	.02	.02	.02
Sri Lanka ⁹	23.92	33.57	43.98	8.37	18.75	16.93	30.04	15.94	37.69	42.24	46.02	35.41	34.43	26.52	30.08
Syria	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Thailand	.132	7.6	2.71	.21	.35	.32	2.54	6.79	11.11	5.26	6.07	6.44	7.24	8.56	22.00
UAE	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
S. Vietnam	.753	12.66	10.69	2.76	--	6.07	.24	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Yemen(A.R.)	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	.01	--	.02	.23	.24	.11	.23
Yemen(D.P.R.)	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	.03	.01	--	.03	.12	--	.04
Other	*2.16	13.19	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
TOTAL	N/A	N/A	932.77	257.75	233.43	253.41	227.05	234.62	223.2	256.68	305.9	275.5	337.04	355.46	378.42

Europe

Cyprus	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Greece	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Malta	--	--	.44	--	.02	.11	.01	.40	.02	--	--	--	-.01	-.03	-.04
Portugal	--	--	--	--	--	7.5	4.27	3.00	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Turkey	--	1.79	19.39	--	--	--	--	--	18.98	11.84	.06	.03	--	-2.27	-3.09
Yugoslavia	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
TOTAL	--	N/A	19.83	--	.02	7.6	4.28	3.40	19.00	11.84	.06	.03	-.01	-2.30	-3.13

Oceania

Cook Isls.	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	.05	.05	.08	.08	.08	.11
Fiji	--	--	.09	.01	--	--	--	--	--	.10	.10	.15	.15	.25	.09
Kiribati	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	.10	.10	.15	.15	.15	.16
Nauru	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Niue	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

Appendix 2
Total Canadian Government-to-Government Aid to all
Countries
(Millions of Canadian Dollars)

Countries

ANGLOPHONE AFRICA

Angola	.26
Botswana	84.9
Djibouti	.24
Egypt	175.94
Ethiopia	99.59
Ghana	190.92
Kenya	272.29
Lesotho	41.9
Liberia	.11
Malawi	126.81
Mauritius	2.83
Mozambique	4.34
Namibia	.40
Nigeria	122.89
Seychelles	.98
Sierra Leone	2.27
Somalia	14.21
South Africa	1.67
Sudan	88.13
Swaziland	21.84
Tanzania	285.03
Uganda	29.25
Zambia	181.02
Zimbabwe	68.42
Others	12.51
TOTAL ANGLOPHONE AFRICA	2044.98

FRANCOPHONE AFRICA

Algeria	101.1
Benin	49.08
Burkina Faso	103.31
Burundi	5.17

Cameroon	209.76
Cape Verde	2.98
Central African Rep.	1.94
Chad	13.71
Comoros	.31
Congo	31.61
Cote-d'Ivoire	129.89
Eqtl. Guinea	.45
Gabon	17.16
Gambia	4.87
Guinea	32.87
Guinea-Bissau	1.94
Libya	-----
Madagascar	29.12
Mali	135.28
Mauritania	36.31
Morocco	86.29
Niger	183.64
Rwanda	117.11
Sao Tome and Principe	.20
Senegal	192.77
Togo	48.45
Tunisia	154.83
Zaire	163.71
Malagasy	3.06
Others	7.9
TOTAL FRANCOPHONE AFRICA	1687.42
TOTAL AFRICA	4144.60

AMERICAS

Anguila	1.12
Antigua	22.37
Argentina	.76
Bahamas	----
Barbados	33.27
Belize	65.89
Bermuda	----
Bolivia	32.14
Brazil	42.2
Cayman Islands	.20
Chile	6.13
Colombia	76.25

Costa Rica	29.32
Cuba	3
Dominica	33.8
Dominican Republic	15.48
Ecuador	11.49
El Salvador	27.29
Grenada	13.49
Guatemala	21.6
Guyana	64.15
Haiti	82.36
Hondouras	57.91
Jamaica	205.2
Mexico	3.7
Montserrat	5.68
Neth. Antilles	----
Nicaragua	31.79
Panama	.09
Paraguay	.12
Peru	93.74
St. Kitts	9.03
St. Lucia	22.41
St. Vincent and Grenadines	16.38
Surinam	.31
Trinidad and Tobago	24.35
Turks and Caicos	.67
Uruguay	.20
Venezuala	----
Virgin Islands	.57
Leeward and Windward Isls.	44.6
Others	43
TOTAL AMERICAS	1141.61

ASIA

Afghanistan	11.55
Bahrain	----
Bangladesh	1142.49
Bhutan	.24
Brunei	----
Burma	56.41
China	54.98
Hong Kong	.04
India	1854.2

Indonesia	432.72
Iran	.02
Iraq	----
Israel	----
Jordan	1.23
Kampuchea	3.68
Korea	2.35
North Korea	----
Kuwait	----
Laos	4.44
Lebanon	2.99
Macao	----
Malaysia	52.69
Maldives	.08
Mongalia	----
Nepal	67.73
Oman	----
Pakistan	1165.92
Phillipines	17.43
Saudi Arabia	----
Singapore	3.85
Sri Lanka	435.41
Syria	----
Thailand	87.32
United Arab Emirates	----
South Vietnam	33.19
Yemen (A.R.)	.84
Yemen (DPR)	.23
Other	15.35
TOTAL ASIA	6321.25

EUROPE

Cyprus	----
Greece	----
Malta	.92
Portugal	14.77
Turkey	45.13
Yugoslavia	----
TOTAL OCEANIA	60.62

OCEANIA

Cook Islands	.45
Fiji	.94
Kiribati	.91
Papau New Guinea	2.01
Solomon Islands	.71
Tonga	.80
Tuvalu	1.06
Vanuata	1.13
W. Samoa	.78
TOTAL OCEANIA	30.36
<u>GLOBAL TOTAL</u>	11,234.86

Bibliography

Books

- Amnesty International. Amnesty International Report 1988. London: Amnesty International Publications, 1988.
- Appadorai, A. Essays in Indian Politics and Foreign Policy. New Delhi: Vikas Publications, 1971.
- Appadori, A.; Rajan, M.S. India's Foreign Policy and Relations. New Delhi: South Asian Publishers, 1985.
- Bechhoefer, Bernard G. "Historical Evolution of International Safeguards and Nuclear Industry". in International Safeguards and Nuclear Industry. Mason Willrich (ed.) Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1973.
- Biggs, Margaret A. Canada and Third World Trade-The Challenge: Adjust or Protect? Ottawa: The North-South Institute, 1980.
- Black, Joseph E., and Thompson Kenneth W. (eds.). Foreign Policies in a World of Change. New York: Harper and Row, 1963.
- Blacker, Coit, D., and Duffy, Gloria (eds.). International Arms Control- Issues and Agreements. Stanford University Press, 1984.
- Brecher, Michael. The New States of Asia, a Political Analysis. New York: Oxford University Press, 1966.
- Brecher, Michael. India and World Politics, Krishna Menon's View of the World. London: Oxford University Press, 1968.
- Burns, E.L.M. A Struggle For Disarmament: A Seat at the Table. Toronto: Clarke Irwin and Company Limited, 1972.
- Carty, Robert and Smith, Virginia. Perpetuating Poverty- The Political Economy of Canadian Foreign Aid. Toronto: Between the Lines, 1981.
- Chopra, Surendra. U.N. Mediation in Kashmir. A Study in Power Politics. Kurukshetra (Haryana): Vishal Publications, 1971.
- Choudhry, Nanda K. "Introductory Remarks", in Canada and South Asia: Issues and Opportunities. Arthur G. Rubinoff (ed.), University of Toronto: Centre for South Asian Studies, 1988.

- Dewitt, David B. and Kirton, John J. Canada as a Principal Power- A Study in Foreign Policy and International Relations. Toronto: John Wiley and Sons, 1983.
- Dobell, Peter C. Canada's Search for New Roles. Foreign Policy in the Trudeau Era. London: Oxford University Press, 1972.
- Dobell, Peter C. Canada in World Affairs: Vol. XVII. 1971-73. Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1985.
- Eayrs, James. In Defence of Canada. Indochina: Roots of Complicity. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1983.
- Epstein, William. The Last Chance: nuclear proliferation and arms control. New York, New York Free Press, 1976.
- Finch, Ron. Exporting Danger: A History of the Canadian Nuclear Energy Export Program. Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1986.
- Fromm, Paul and Hull, James P. Down the Drain? A Critical Re-examination of Canadian Foreign Aid. Toronto: Griffin House, 1981.
- Gangal, S.C. India and the Commonwealth. New Delhi: Shiva Lal Agaraula and Company, 1970.
- Gangal, S.C. Indian Foreign Policy. New Delhi: Young Asia Publications, 1980.
- Gupta, Sisir. "Not Outside the Contest: The Soviet Indian Treaty", in Sisir Gupta, India and the International System. M.S. Rajan and Shivaji Ganguly (eds.), New Delhi: Vikas Publishing, 1981.
- Hardgrave, Robert. India Under Pressure--Prospects for Political Stability. Boulder Colorado: Westview Press Incorporated, 1984.
- Hardgrave, R.; Kochanek, S. India, Government and Politics in a Developing Nation. Toronto: Harcourt Brace Jahonovich, 1986.
- Hayes, Frank R. "Canada, the Commonwealth, and the Rhodesia Issue" in An Acceptance of Paradox/ Essays on Canadian Diplomacy in Honour of John W. Holmes. Kim Richard Nossal (ed.), Toronto: Canadian Institute for International Affairs, 1982.
- Hillmer, Norman and Stevenson, Garth. A Foremost Nation. Canadian Foreign Policy and a Changing World. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1977.
- Issacs, Harold. Scratches on Minds. Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1980.
- Johnson, B.L.C. Development in South Asia. Markham Ontario: Penguin Books, 1983.
- Kapur, Ashok. India's Nuclear Option, Atomic Diplomacy and Decision Making. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1976.
- Kapur, Ashok. "South Asia: The Diplomatic and Strategic Setting" in Canada and South Asia: Issues and Opportunities. Arthur G. Rubinoff (ed.) University of Toronto: Centre for South Asian Studies, 1988.

- Karnik, V.B. "Jawaharlal Nehru: foreign policy", in India's Defence and Foreign Policies. Shah, Amrital B.(ed.), Bombay: P.C. Manakatala and Sons Private Limited, 1966.
- Khera, S.S. India's Defence Problems. New Delhi: Orient Langmans, 1968.
- Lamb, Alastair. The Kashmir Problem- A Historical Survey. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1966.
- Lyon, Peyton V. Canada in World Affairs 1961-63. Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1968.
- Lyon, Peyton V. "Introduction" in Canada and the Third World. Peyton V. Lyon, and Tareq Y. Ismael (eds.) Toronto: The MacMillan Company of Canada, 1976.
- Lyon, Peyton V. and Ismael, Tareq Y. (eds.), Canada and the Third World. Toronto: The MacMillan Company of Canada, 1976.
- Mark, Janette. "Canada's Economic Relations with South Asia: Some Issues", in Canada and South Asia: Issues and Opportunities. Arthur G. Rubinoff (ed.), University of Toronto: Centre for South asian Studies, 1988.
- Martin, Paul. A Very Public Life: Volume 2. So Many Worlds. Toronto: Deneau Publishers, 1985.
- Morrison, Barrie. "Canada and South Asia" in Canada and the Third World. Peyton V. Lyon, and Tareq Y. Ismael (eds.) Toronto: The MacMillan Company of Canada, 1976.
- Munro, John A. and Inglis , Alex, I. (eds.). Mike: The Memoirs of the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson. Volume 2. 1948-1957. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973.
- Nehru, Jawaharlal. India's Foreign Policy: Selected Speeches . September 1946-April 1961. New Delhi: Government of India Press, 1966.
- North-South Institute. In the Canadian Interest? Third World Development in the 1980's. Ottawa: The North-South Institute, 1980.
- Nossal, Kim Richard (ed). An Acceptance of Paradox/ Essays on Canadian Diplomacy in honour of John W. Holmes. Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1982
- Nossal, Kim Richard. The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy. Scarborough Ontario: Prentice-Hall, 1985.
- Nossal, Kim Richard. "Canada's Strategic Interests in South Asia, 1947-87" in Canada and South Asia: Issues and Opportunities. Arthur G. Rubinoff (ed.), University of Toronto: Centre for South Asian Studies, 1988.
- Patil, R.L.M. India-Nuclear Weapons and International Politics. New Deihi: National Publishing, 1969.
- Pearson, Lester B. The Crisis of Development. New York: Praeger Publishers Incorporated, 1970.

- Rahman, Syed Sajjadur, and Balcome, David. Canadian Business Linkages with the Developing Countries. Vol. 1-- The Asian Experience. Ottawa: International Business Research Centre, 1987.
- Rajan, M.S. Sisir Gupta. India and the International System. New Delhi: Vikas Publishing, 1981.
- Redekop, Clarence G. "Trudeau at Singapore: The Commonwealth and Arms Sales to South Africa", in An Acceptance of Paradox/ Essays on Canadian Diplomacy in Honour of John W. Holmes. Kim Richard Nossal (ed), Toronto: Canadian Institute for International Affairs, 1982.
- Reid, Escott. "India's Development Programme", Conference on Canadian aid to Underdeveloped Countries. May 27-28, 1955. Ottawa: United Nations Association in Canada, 1955.
- Reid, Escott. Envoy to Nehru. Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1981.
- Rikhye, Indar Jit. "Peacekeeping and Peacemaking", in Peacekeeping- Appraisals and Proposals. Henry Wiseman (ed.), New York: Pergamon Press, 1983.
- Ross Douglas A. "the dynamics of Indochina Diplomacy: Pearson, Holmes, and the Struggle with the Bureaucratic Right 1955" in An Acceptance of Paradox/ Essays on Canadian Diplomacy in honour of John W. Holmes. Kim Nossal (ed), Toronto, Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1982.
- Rubinoff, Arthur G. (ed). Canada and South Asia: Issues and Opportunities. University of Toronto: Centre for South Asian Studies, 1988.
- Runinoff, Arthur G. "Diplomatic Overview" in Canada and South Asia: Issues and Opportunities. Arthur G. Rubinoff (ed.), University of Toronto: Centre for South Asian Studies, 1988.
- Rudner, Martin. "Trade cum Aid in Canada's Official Development Assistance Strategy" in 1986/ Talking Trade- Canada Among Nations. Brian W. Tomlin and Maureen Appel Molot, Toronto: James Lorimer and Company, 1987.
- Sanger, Clyde. Half a Loaf : Canada's Semi-Role Among Developing Countries. Toronto: The Ryerson Press, 1969.
- Sanger, Clyde. "Canada and Development in the Third World" in Canada and the Third World. Peyton V. Lyon and Tareq Y. Ismael (eds.), Toronto: The MacMillan Company of Canada, 1976.
- Singer, Hans W. and Ansari, Javed A. Rich and Poor Countries. London: George, Allen and Unwin, 1982.
- Singer, Milton. When a Great Tradition Modernizes. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972.
- Singh, Lalita Prassad. India's Foreign Policy : The Shastri Period. New Delhi: Uppal Publishing House, 1980.

- Sisodia, S.S. Foreign Policy of India: Indira Gandhi Era (with special reference to non-alignment). New Delhi: Inter-India Publications, 1985.
- Spicer, Kieth. A Samaritan State? External Aid in Canada's Foreign Policy. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1966.
- Stairs, Denis. The Diplomacy of Constraint: Canada, the Korean War, and the United States. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Stevenson, Garth. "Canada in the United Nations" in A Foremost Nation. Canadian Foreign Policy and a Changing World. Norman Hillmer and Garth Stevenson (eds.) Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1977.
- Stewart, Walter. Shrug: Trudeau in Power, Toronto: New Press, 1971.
- Taylor, Charles. Snow Job: Canada, the United States and Vietnam (1954 to 1973). Toronto: Anansi, 1979.
- Thomson, Dale C. Louis St. Laurent: Canadian, Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1967.
- Thomson, D.C. and Swanson, R.F. Canadian Foreign Policy: Options and Perspectives. Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Limited, 1971.
- Tremblay, Chantal. "Real and Perceived Opportunities for Economic Cooperation between Canada and South Asia," in Canada and South Asia: Issues and Opportunities. Arthur G. Rubinoff (ed.), University of Toronto: Centre for South Asian Studies, 1988.
- Tucker, Michael. Canadian Foreign Policy: Contemporary Issues and Themes. Toronto: McGraw Hill Ryerson Limited, 1980.
- Vohra, Dewan C. India's Aid Diplomacy in the Third World. New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1980.
- Willrich, Mason (ed). International Safeguards and Nuclear Industry. Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1973.
- Wonnacott, Ronald J. Canada's Trade Options. Ottawa: Economic Council of Canada, 1975.

Articles

- Abella, I.M. "Foreign policy for Canadians, the white paper in foreign policy". Queens Quarterly. Spring 1971, pp. 143-144.
- Alcock, N.Z. "Canada's nuclear program- On the threshold of success Canada has no immediate plans- India waits". Canadian Commentator 3. May 1959, pp. 8-9.
- Andersen, Walter K. "India in 1982: Domestic challenges and foreign policy successes". Asian Survey, February 1983. pp. 30-45.

- Appadori, A. "The foreign policy of India". in Foreign Policies in a World of Change, Black, Joseph E. and Thompson, Kenneth W. (eds.), New York, Harper and Row, 1963.
- Bahadur, Kalim "India and Pakistan". International Studies, July-December 1978, pp. 517.
- Bergeron, Gerard. "Foreign policy: 1950-1975 (or should that be 1945-1970?)". International Perspectives, November- December 1975. pp. 57-61.
- Bindon, G.; and Mukerji, S. "How Canada's and India's nuclear roles have been sadly misrepresented". Science Forum 10, February, 1977, pp. 3-7.
- Byers, R.B. "Defence and foreign policy in the 1970's: The demise of the Trudeau doctrine". International Journal, Spring 1978.
- Charlton, Evan. "India's earthquake; Indira Gandhi and the politics of emergency". Round Table 264, October 1977.
- Cronin, Richard P. "Prospects for nuclear proliferation in South Asia". Middle East Journal 37, Autumn 1983. pp. 594-616.
- Das, B.C. "Emergency provisions in the Indian constitution; a study in comparative analysis". Indian Journal of Political Science 38. April-June 1977, pp. 337-352.
- Dougherty, James E. "India and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty". in Studies in Indian Foreign Policy, New Delhi: Vikas Publications, 1969.
- Dutt, V.P. "The emergency in India: background and rational". Asian Survey 16. December 1976. pp. 1124-1138.
- Edwards, Michael. "Illusion and reality in India's foreign policy". International Affairs 41, January 1965.
- Fleming, Peter and Keenleyside, T.A. "The Rhetoric of Canadian Aid". International Perspectives. September/October, 1983. pp. 18-22.
- Frank, Isiah. "International Trade Policy for the Second Development Decade". International Journal, no. 1, Winter, 1969-70. pp. 94-108.
- Gangal, S.C. "The Commonwealth and Indo-Pakistani Relations". International Studies 8, July-October 1966. pp.134-139.
- Gangal, S.C. "India and the Commonwealth". International Studies 17, July-December 1978. pp. 709-717.
- Ganguly, Shivaji. "Continuity and change in India's foreign policy". India Quarterly, January-March 1978. pp. 48-58.
- Gordon, Sheldon. "What's in it for us?". International Perspectives. May/June, 1976. pp. 21-24.
- Hardgrave, Robert L. "India in 1984: confrontation , assasination and succession". Asian Survey 25 February 1985. pp. 131-145.

- Hariharan, A. "A Double Relief for India". Far Eastern Economic Review, June 24, 1974.
- Harnetty, Peter. "Canada, South Africa, and the Commonwealth 1960-61". Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies. November, 1963. pp. 160-195.
- Hoffman, S.A. "Anticipation, disaster, and victory: India 1962-71". Asian Survey 12. November 1972. pp. 976-981.
- "India and Bangladesh: Clark Visit/ International Canada, February and March 1987". International Perspectives, May/June 1987.
- "India: Terrorism Charged/ International Canada, August and September 1987". International Perspectives, November/December 1987. pp. 15-16.
- Kapur, Ashok. "Non proliferation: factors that India must weigh". Asian Review 2, April 1969.
- Kapur, Ashok. "India's nuclear presence". World Today 30, November 1974.
- Kapur, Ashok. "The Canada-India nuclear negotiations: some hypothesis and lessons". World Today, August 1978. pp. 315-320.
- Kapur, Ashok. "Nuclear proliferation in the 1980's". International Journal, Summer, 1981. pp. 535-536.
- Kapur, Ashok. "Indian foreign policy: perspectives and present predicaments". Round Table 295. July 1985. pp. 230-236.
- Kapur, Harish. "India's foreign policy under Rajiv Gandhi". The Round Table 304, October, 1987. pp. 469-480.
- Keating, Thomas F.; and Keenleyside, Terence A. "Voting patterns as a measure of foreign policy independence". International Perspectives, May-June 1980. pp. 21-26.
- Keenleyside, T.A., and Taylor, Patricia. "The Impact of Human Rights Violations on the Conduct of Canadian Bilateral Relations: A Contemporary Dilemma". Behind the Headlines, November 1984. pp. 1-5.
- Kirton, John. "Shaping the Global Order: Canada and the Francophone and Commonwealth Summits of 1987". Behind the Headlines, Canadian Institute of International Affairs, June 1987. pp. 2-9.
- Lall, Arthur. "Change and continuity in India's foreign policy". Orbis 10, Spring 1966.
- Legault, Albert. "Nuclear policy should be more open and less ambiguous". International Perspectives, January- February, 1976. pp. 8-12.
- Mohanty, Manoranjan. "India China relations". India Quarterly. January-March 1985. pp. 88-93.
- Morrison, Barrie and Page Donald. "India's option: the nuclear route to achieve goal as world power". International Perspectives. July-August 1974. pp. 23-28.

- Morrison, David R. "Canada and International Development". Journal of Canadian Studies, Vol. 14, no. 4, Winter 1979-80. pp. 137-45.
- Morrison, David. R. "The Mulroney Government and the Third World". Journal of Canadian Studies, Vol. 19, no. 4, Winter 1984-85. pp. 4-13.
- Noble, John J. "Canada's continuing search for acceptable nuclear safeguards". International Perspectives, July/August 1978. pp. 42-48.
- Nye, Joseph S. "Non-Proliferation: A long term strategy". Foreign Affairs, April 1978. pp. 602-622.
- Pant, H.G. "Indian foreign policy under Mrs. Indira Gandhi 1966-71". Political Science Review 13, January-December 1974. pp. 115-135.
- Parlour, Roger R. "Canada aids and trades with India". Foreign Trade, October 1, 1966. pp. 88-110.
- Rajan, M.S. "The Indo-Canadian Entente". International Journal 17, Autumn 1962, pp. 358-84.
- Rajan, M.S. "India and the Commonwealth". Australian Journal of Politics and History 12, August 1966.
- Rajan, M.S. "India a case of power without force". International Journal 30, Spring 1975. pp. 299-326.
- Rajan, M.S. "Non- alignment through tinted glass". Quarterly Journal of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses 13. January-March 1981.
- Rao, Rama R. "India and Pakistan". India Quarterly. January-March 1985.
- Reford, Robert W. "Problems of nuclear proliferation". Behind the Headlines, May, 1975. pp. 2-18.
- Reid, Escott. "Canada and the Struggle against World Poverty". International Journal, no. 1, Winter 1969-70. pp. 142-158.
- Reid, Escott. "A Blueprint for Assisting the Worlds Poorest People". International Perspectives, September-October, 1977. pp. 3-8.
- Reid, Escott. "Special Relationships: Canada, India and the United States". Canadian Forum 62, December-June 1982-83. pp. 18-20.
- Reuber, Grant L. "The Trade-offs among the Objectives of Canadian Foreign Aid". International Journal, no. 1, Winter, 1969-70. pp. 129-142.
- Ross, Douglas A. "Middle powers as extra-regional balancer powers: Canada, India and Indo-China 1954-1962". Pacific Affairs 55. 1982. pp. 185-209.
- Rowat, Donald C. "India: The Making of a Nation". International Journal, Spring 1950. pp. 95-108.

- Roy, Amit. "Why Mrs. Gandhi Lost- Reasons Behind the Rout of the Congress Government in India". The Round Table- The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs. April 1977. pp. 162-166.
- Saltzman, Paul. "Interview with Indira Gandhi". McCleans. October 6, 1975.
- Sharp, Mitchell. "Reflections on foreign policy during the Trudeau years". International Perspectives, November-December 1986. pp. 3-6.
- Shridath, Ramphal S. "Canada and the Commonwealth". Round Table 304. October 1987, pp. 426-33.
- Spicer, Keith. "The administration of Canadian Colombo Plan aid". International Journal. Spring 1961, pp. 169-82.
- Spicer, Keith. "Clubmanship upstaged: Canada's twenty years in the Colombo Plan". International Journal 25. Winter 1969-70, pp. 23-33.
- Sullivan, M.J.. "Indian attitudes on international atomic energy controls". Pacific Affairs 43. Fall 1970. pp. 353-361.
- Thakur, Ramesh, C. "Change and continuity in Canadian foreign policy". India Quarterly 33. October- December 1977, pp. 401-18.
- Thakur, Ramesh C. "Peacekeeping and foreign policy: Canada, India, and the International Commission in Vietnam, 1954-65.". British Journal of International Studies. July, 1980. pp. 126-147.
- Thomson, Dale C. "India and Canada a decade of co-operation 1947-57 ". International Studies 9. April 1968 (1967-68), pp. 404-30.
- Triantis, S.G. "Canada's Interest in Foreign Aid". World Politics. no. 1, October, 1971. pp. 2-8.
- Warden, Bill. "Sikhs in Canada-India Relations". International Perspectives, July/August 1987. pp. 15-18.
- Young, Roger. "Canadian Foreign Aid: Facing a Crisis of its Own?". Journal of Canadian Studies. Vol. 19, no. 4, Winter, 1984-85.

Government Documents and Reports

- Barton, W.H. "Nuclear control- or nuclear disaster". Statements and Speeches. November 4, 1975.
- Canadian International Development Agency. CIDA Annual Review 1967-68. (Ottawa: Queens Printer and Controller of Stationery), 1968.

- Canadian International Development Agency. CIDA Annual Review 1969. (Ottawa: Queens Printer and Controller of Stationery), 1969.
- Canadian International Development Agency. Canada and the Developing World, CIDA Annual Review 1970-71. (Ottawa: Information Canada), 1971.
- Canadian International Development Agency. Annual Review 1971-72. (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services), 1972.
- Canadian International Development Agency. Annual Review 1972-73. (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services), 1973.
- Canadian International Development Agency. Annual Review 1973-74. (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services), 1974.
- Canadian International Development Agency. Annual Review 1974-75. (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services), 1975.
- Canadian International Development Agency. Canada and Development Cooperation, Annual Report 1975-76. (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services), 1976.
- Canadian International Development Agency. Canada and Development Cooperation, Annual Report 1979-80. (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services), 1980.
- Canadian International Development Agency. Canadians in the Third World, CIDA's Year in Review, 1980-81. (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services), 1982.
- Canadian International Development Agency. Canadians in the Third World, CIDA's Year in Review, 1981-82. (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services), 1983.
- Canadian International Development Agency. Canadians in the Third World, CIDA's Year in Review, 1982-83. (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services), 1984.
- Canadian International Development Agency. Annual Report 1983-84. (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services), 1984.
- Canadian International Development Agency. Annual Report 1985-86. (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services), 1986.
- Canadian International Development Agency. Annual Review 1986-87. (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services), 1987.
- Canadian International Development Agency. Canadian International Development Assistance: To Benefit a Better World- Response to the Government of Canada to the Report by the Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade, September 1987. (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services), 1987.
- Clark, Joe. "Speech in the House of Commons by the Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs, on a motion by the Opposition concerning a letter sent to provincial Premiers on Sikh organizations". Statement. March 10, 1988.
- Clark, Joe. "Notes for an Address to the Fifth Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference". Statements and Speeches. October 22, 1988.

- The Department of External Affairs. "Diefenbakers comments to the House re: Sino-Indian border conflict ". External Affairs 12. December 1962, pp. 385-88.
- The Department of External Affairs. "Arms for India". External Affairs 15. June 1963, pp. 250.
- The Department of External Affairs. "The Commonwealth". Report of the Department of External Affairs. 1963 , pp. 26-31.
- The Department of External Affairs. "Nuclear Power Agreement with India". External Affairs 19. February 1967, pp. 53-54.
- The Department of External Affairs. International Development- Foreign Policy for Canadians. (Ottawa: Information Canada), 1970.
- The Department of External Affairs. Foreign Policy for Canadians. (Ottawa: Information Canada), 1970.
- The Department of External Affairs. "Asia and the Pacific". 1971 Annual Report of the Department of External Affairs. (Ottawa: Information Canada) 1971 , pp. 7-16.
- The Department of External Affairs. "Address by the Right Honourable Joe Clark Secretary of State for External Affairs, Taj Mahal Hotel, New Delhi, February 7, 1987". Statement. February, 13, 1987.
- The Department of External Affairs. "Remarks Made by the Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs, on the Occasion of a Canada Day Luncheon with Canadian and Indian Business Executives, New Delhi, February 9, 1987". Statement, February 13, 1987.
- The Department of External Affairs. "Trade in the Pacific Rim- Notes for a Speech by the Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs". Statement. April 15, 1988.
- The Department of External Affairs. "Notes for a Speech by the Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs, at a Dinner in Honour of the Visit of Mr. K. Natwar Singh, India's Minister of State for External Affairs". Statement, May 15, 1988.
- The Department of External Affairs. "Notes for a Statement by the Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs, to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Council at the Ministerial Level". Statement. May 18, 1988.
- The Department of External Affairs. "Meeting the challenge of the world Economy-- Speech by the Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs, to the Canadian Exporters Association". Statement, May 18, 1988.
- The Department of External Affairs. "Speech by the Right Honourable Joe Clark, to the Asia Pacific Foundation". Statement. October, 22, 1988.
- Department of Industry Trade and Commerce. Canadian Foreign Trade and Commercial Relations. (Ottawa: The Department of External Affairs), 1980.

- Green, Howard. "Aid to India". Statements and Speeches. January 19, 1960.
- House of Commons. Independence and Internationalism- Report of the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and of the House of Commons on Canada's International Relations- June 1986. (Ottawa: Canadian Government Publishing Centre, Supply and Services Canada), 1986.
- House of Commons. For Whose Benefit? Report of the Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade -on- Canada's Official Development Assistance Policies and Programs. May, 1987. (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada), 1987.
- House of Commons Debates. Hansard. Various Parliamentary Sessions, 1947-1988, (Ottawa: Queen's Printer).
- MacEachen, A.J. "Two urgent U.N. problems: peacekeeping and the control of nuclear proliferation". Statements and Speeches, September 25, 1974.
- MacEachen, A.J. "The Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty-- an essential shield". Statements and Speeches. May 7, 1975.
- MacEachen, A.J. "Nuclear relations with India". Statements and Speeches. May, 18, 1976.
- MacGuigan, Mark. "New Forms of Cooperation for Canada and ASEAN". Statements and Speeches, June 17, 1982,
- Sharp, Mitchell. "Relief for Pakistani refugees in India". Statements and Speeches. November 17, 1971
- St. Laurent, Louis, S. "The Commonwealth and the world today". Statements and Speeches. July 8, 1951.
- St. Laurent, Louis, S. "Address to Parliament of India". Statements and Speeches. February 23, 1954.
- St. Laurent, Louis S. "Address at the convocation of Delhi University ". Statements and Speeches. February 24, 1954.
- Trudeau, Pierre Elliot. "Canada's obligations as a nuclear power". Statements and Speeches. June 17, 1975.
- Trudeau, Pierre Elliot. "The Compelling Need for Progress in North/South Relations". Statements and Speeches, June 15, 1981.

Newspapers

- Cox, Kevin. "India denies pressure in refugee case". The Globe and Mail, May 17, 1988. A-1.
- Cruickshank, John; Sallot, Jeff and Valpy, Michael. "Mulroney calls for leaders to unite against apartheid". Globe and Mail, October 14, 1987. A-1.
- Cruickshank, John; Sallot, Jeff and Valpy, Michael. "Monitoring of Sanctions under Review- Front-line states propose agency to monitor South Africa sanctions". Globe and Mail, October 15, 1987. A-1.
- Cruickshank, John and Valpy, Michael. "Leaders urge new sanctions". Globe and Mail, October 17, 1987. A-1.
- Cruickshank, John. "P.M. ready to lead Commonwealth in Apartheid war- Progress made on danctions, P.M. says". Globe and Mail, October 19, 1987. A-1.
- "Democracy Under Pressure". Globe and Mail, June 27, 1975.
- Fraser, Graham; Malarek, Victor and Matas, Robert. "Ottawa persecuting Sikhs, critics charge". Globe and Mail, May 17, 1988. A-1.
- Gwyn, Richard. "Gandhi-Bhutto meeting heralds the 'Year of Asia'". The Toronto Star, January 29, 1989. H-1.
- Gwyn, Richard. "Indian leader is confident his nation can work with longtime foe Pakistan- Excerpts from an exclusive interview with Rajiv Gandhi". The Toronto Star, Saturday February 25, 1989. A-9.
- Gwyn, Richard. "A nice man in an un-nice land- Gandhi the reluctant leader". The Toronto Star, Saturday Februaury 25, 1989. A-9.
- Matas, Robert. "Large Contracts could hinge on Canadian ties with India". Globe and Mail, May 17, 1988.
- "Politics and the Rights of Refugees". Globe and Mail, May 18, 1988.
- Sallot, Jeff and Cruickshank, John. "Indian Prime Minister defends his army" Globe and Mail, October 13, 1987. A-1.
- Sallot, Jeff. "ANC violence understandable, Gandhi says". Globe and Mail, October 14, 1987. A-5.
- Sallot, Jeff. "Queen sad as links with Fiji cut- Last Link with Fiji Severed". Globe and Mail, October 16, 1987.
- Sallot, Jeff. "Commonwealth might take back Fiji". Globe and Mail, October 19, 1987. A-1.

Papers and Speeches

Bastedo, Thomas G. "India and Canada: some aspects of foreign policies and relations, 1947-1961". unpublished M.A. Dissertation, University of Toronto, 1969.

Cavell, Nik. "Address by Mr. Nik Cavell, Canadian Administrator for the Colombo Plan". Conference on Canadian Aid to Underdeveloped Countries- May 27-28, 1955. Ottawa: United Nations in Canada, 1955.

Kapur, Ashok. "Canadian images of Indian nuclear policy". Paper presented to the Canadian Political Science Association annual meeting. Quebec City: May 1976.

Malhotra, Inder. "Indian Non-Alignment". an Address to the Canadian Institute of International Affairs. University of Windsor. Windsor Ontario: March 14, 1989.

Marshall, George and Gamble, Howard. "Round-Table Reports- Private Investment and Trade Relationships". Conference on Canadian Aid to Underdeveloped Countries. May 27-28, 1955. Ottawa: United Nations Association in Canada, 1955.

Rau, Benegal Narsing. "Links between Canada and India". Empire Club Addresses, 1950-51, pp. 378-85.

VITA AUCTORIS

NAME: Christopher John Kukucha

EDUCATION: Primary Education received at
Lord Tweedsmuir Elementary School
New Westminster, British Columbia

Secondary Education received at
New Westminster Secondary School
New Westminster, British Columbia

Douglas College
New Westminster, British Columbia
First year university transfer credits
1983-84

University of British Columbia
Vancouver, British Columbia
Honours Bachelor of Arts Degree
Political Science
1983-87

Admitted to the Faculty of
Graduate Studies
Department of Political Science
University of Windsor, 1988
for the degree of Masters of Arts
Political Science